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Abstract
YONG KYUN KIM: The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: Domestic
Politics, Strategic Choices, and Suboptimal Outcomes.
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber.)
I explore the political dimension of developing countries’ foreign debt problems, one
of the key issues in international political economy. I address the issue by examining
three sovereign debt problems that have been salient over the past few decades. First,
I examine the political determinants of sovereign default and, using a signaling game,
show that it is most likely to actually occur when the level of default risk that a
country’s observable characteristics suggest is intermediate. It is because sovereign
default occurs when risky sovereigns successfully induce creditors to provide a loan, but
the most risky ones are among those least able to do so. Second, I explore the impacts
of political institutions on the likelihood of a sudden stop of loan rollover and show that
more transparent governments, by providing more accurate public information about
the economy, help reduce individual creditors’ uncertainty about each others’ beliefs,
thereby mitigating the likelihood of sudden stop of bond flows when good times, but
worsening it when bad. Finally, I seek to explain why some countries are more heavily
indebted than others. Democratic institutions that hold the leaders accountable may
effectively constrain them from borrowing too much at the expensive of the voters at
large, but only do so when other conditions are right. When the distribution of income
is highly skewed, however, democracy empowers the poor majority who do not share
the stake that the representative citizen has at the long-run health of the economy,
thereby exacerbating the problem of debt overaccumulation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In my dissertation, I explore the political dimension of developing countries’ foreign
debt problems, one of the key issues in international political economy. I address the
issue by examining three sovereign debt problems that have been salient over the past
few decades: sovereign default, confidence crisis, and overborrowing. From the political
economy perspective, I highlight the interplay between domestic politics and strategic
actions at the international level and, using game-theoretic models, seek to explain
why such suboptimal outcomes as defaults on debt, sudden stops of debt rollover,
and excessive debt accumulation arise. To test empirical implications of the models, I
make innovative use of various methods tools such as modeling strategic selection and
measuring unobservable latent traits like transparency.
In Chapter 2, I examine the political determinants of sovereign default. I argue that
sovereign default involves an intertemporal tradeoff between an immediate consumption
boost and a future tax increase. Since a poorer voter internalizes less of the future cost of
default, the majority’s demand for default increases as the median is poorer. Therefore,
greater income inequality implies a higher default risk. I then present a signaling game
that models the strategic selection that a sovereign must go through to get to the
default decision node. I show that sovereign default is most likely to actually occur
when the level of income inequality is intermediate. The intuition is that sovereign
default occurs when risky sovereigns successfully induce creditors to provide a loan,
but the most risky ones are among those least able to do so. Empirical analysis of the
incidence of sovereign default as well as of the frequency of no access to credit markets
provides strong support for the claim.
Chapter 3 of the dissertation, drawing upon a recent development in models of self-
fulfilling currency attacks, explores the impacts of political institutions on the likelihood
of a sudden stop of loan rollover. I show that more democratic governments are more
transparent, and the accurate public information that they provide about the economy
helps reduce individual creditors’ uncertainty about each others’ beliefs. Therefore,
unless the economy is expected to be very bad, more democratic countries are less
likely to suffer a sudden stop of bond inflows. When the expected economic situation
is dismal, however, being more transparent, democracy can have a detrimental effect,
worsening the probability of a confidence crisis. To test the model’s predictions, I
measure transparency scores from missingness in 41 economic indicators in the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators using a Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT)
model in which each indicator’s missing or non-missing status is statistically modeled
as a manifestation of the underlying, latent trait of a country, i.e., data transparency.
In the next chapter, I seek to explain why some countries are more heavily indebted
than others. Overaccumulation of debt may arise when a government does not bear
the full consequences of such reckless behavior and shifts the burdens of repayments
and adjustments onto the shoulders of the average citizen. Democratic institutions
that hold the leaders accountable may effectively constrain them from borrowing too
much at the expensive of the voters at large. When the distribution of income is highly
skewed, however, democracy empowers the poor majority who do not share the stake
that the representative citizen has at the long-run health of the economy. Then the
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impact of democracy on debt accumulation may be conditional upon the prevailing
level of income inequality. Democracy tends to be associated with a lower level of
debt only when the level of income inequality is sufficiently low whereas it tends to
exacerbate the problem of debt overaccumulation when the distribution of income is
highly skewed. I further analyze different mechanisms in which different categories of
external debt change as a response to borrower countries’ political changes. Debt stocks
owed to multilateral lenders tend to respond quickly to the debt demands by unchecked
autocrats or populist leaders. Changes in debt obligations to private lenders, however,
reflect changes in interest rates that are charged to offset the risks involved, and hence,
tend to have a long-run, equilibrium relationship with relevant political changes in
borrower countries.
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Chapter 2
Inequality and Sovereign Default
under Democracy
Typically sovereign defaults occur during times of economic trouble, often triggered
by large exogenous shocks. However, they are more than simply an economic event
since honoring debt obligations by a borrowing government is often a matter of political
will. The literature on sovereign debt suggests that defaulting governments have the
technical ability to repay debts in most cases; what they often seem to lack is the
incentive to do so (Drazen 1998).
What makes governments under economic distress more or less willing to repay
their foreign debts? In particular, do differences in the inequality of income affect the
likelihood that democratic governments decide not to honor their loan agreement with
foreign creditors? Political economists have emphasized various perils of “distributional
tug-of-war” in democracies with extreme income inequality. Inequality and the resulting
distributive politics hinder economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and
Tabellini 1994), contribute to inflationary crises (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Desai,
Olofsg˚ard and Yousef 2003), and lead to massive capital flight (Alesina and Tabellini
1990; Mahon 1996). The underlying logic of these “populist pathologies” is that higher
income inequality creates a greater political demand for redistributive policies, and
opportunistic politicians catering to the (relatively poorer) median voter opt for short-
sighted, distortionary policies. Similarly and with regard to sovereign default, Berg and
Sachs (1988, 271) find that “countries with high income inequality had a significant
greater likelihood, ceteris paribus, of having rescheduled their debts than did countries
with low income inequality.”
Besides Berg and Sachs (1988), however, the literature of sovereign default has been
silent on income inequality. There are few empirical findings that relate the inequality of
wealth and income to the propensity of sovereign default. Most works tend to focus on
a number of proximate financial covariates of default instead of delving into underlying
causes (e.g., Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001; Edwards 1984; McFadden et al. 1985).
As to the political side of the story, the literature also tends to scratch the surface. In
an attempt to account for political factors, many only include in a regression equation
“political risk” indices, such as the International Country Risk Guides (ICRG) Political
Risk Index, without asking why some countries are perceived riskier than others (e.g.,
Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris 2004; Haque, Mark and Mathieson 2000). In this article,
I revive the spirit of Berg and Sachs (1988) in the context of democracy and show in
a novel way that income inequality indeed is at the root of sovereign default under
democracy.
I do so in two steps. First, I argue that sovereign default serves as one form of
redistributive policies. Default involves an intertemporal tradeoff between an immediate
public consumption boost and a future tax increase. Since the poorer a voter is, the less
she internalizes the future efficiency cost of default, the median voter is more likely to
find such an intertemporal exchange in her favor as she is poorer relative to the average
voter. The majority’s demand for sovereign default, then, is greater as the income
distribution becomes more skewed. Hence, the risk that a democratic government
5
succumbs to the popular demand for default increases with income inequality.
Second, to derive empirical implications suitable for testing against data, I present
a simple signaling game that models the strategic interactions between creditors and
sovereigns. Default cannot be observed when it is believed to occur for sure because
any rational creditors would not provide a loan in the first place to a sovereign who
is going to default at any event. Recognizing this, I claim that there are two steps of
strategic selection that a sovereign must go through to get to the point where it actually
decides whether or not to default. First, sovereigns select themselves into “requesting
a loan” by deciding whether or not to send a costly signal. Second, on observing the
signal, creditors decide whether or not to lend the signal-sending sovereign a loan.
It turns out that, somewhat counter-intuitively, sovereign default is most likely
to actually occur when the level of income inequality is intermediate if, in fact, higher
income inequality implies a greater propensity to default. The intuition is that sovereign
default occurs when “risky” sovereigns successfully induce creditors to provide a loan,
but the most risky ones are among those least able to do so. In addition, the model
also provides a prediction that the likelihood that a sovereign is left with no credit
monotonically increases with income inequality. Statistical analyses of the incidence
of sovereign default as well as that of zero credit access in a sample of democratic
developing countries provide strong support for key empirical implications of the model.
2.1 Democracy, Inequality, and Default
Political explanations of sovereign default are closely tied to the “willingness-to-pay”
model. The model rests on two key features that distinguish sovereign debt from
ordinary one. First, debt repayment is rarely a question of the ability to pay. Borrowing
countries generally do not default during good times, but with few exceptions, they
choose not to pay even when the debt obligations are such an amount that “could
6
clearly be repaid over the long horizon were there the political will to do so” (Bulow
and Rogoff 1989, 156). Whether a borrowing government defaults or not, is at the
margin, a political decision (Drazen 2002).
Second, unlike domestic debt contracts, strict means of repayment enforcement are
typically unavailable for sovereign borrowing. To secure a debt obligation in case of
domestic borrowing, a lender often demands collateral for the loan, the right to which
is subject to seizure by the lender in the event of default. When the borrower is
the sovereign, however, collateral is largely irrelevant. Debtor assets that could be
seized by the lender are worth only a small fraction of outstanding debt (Bulow and
Rogoff 1989), and creditors cannot possibly obtain the right to assets within the debtor
country (Drazen 2002). Without a world government, sovereign debt contracts are far
from enforceable (Tomz 2007).
Why then do borrowing governments make repayments on their foreign debt at
all? To induce them to repay, lenders or any third parties must have some penalty
devices with which to raise the cost of default high enough to outweigh its benefit.1
Consider the following simplified version of the willingness-to-pay model.2 Suppose
that a sovereign seeks a loan of value L at an interest rate i and that the lenders can
impose a penalty P in the event of default. Then, when it comes due, the sovereign
must choose to repay the lenders L(1 + i) or default and suffer the penalty P . He will
honor the debt obligation if the cost of default P is greater than its benefit, the windfall
gain from its total outstanding debt L(1 + i):
L(1 + i) < P. (2.1)
1Lenders used to resort to “gunboat diplomacy” in the past centuries. They can also organize trade
sanctions on a defaulter or they can condition their future lending decision on a sovereigns track record
of repayments (see Tomz 2007).
2The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Schultz and Weingast (2003).
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In other words, the sovereign is willing to pay if the inequality above holds.
How does domestic politics under democracy shape a sovereign’s willingness to pay?
Democratic institutions might make the sovereign willing to pay by raising the value
of “political penalties” in the event of default (Schultz and Weingast 2003). Voters
may share an interest with sovereign debt-holders in various ways. They themselves
may be debt-holders; they may have a great stake in trade or financial sectors whose
interests will be harmed by the backlash of sovereign default (Alesina 1988; Alesina et
al. 1992); or they may be inclined to punish the government for reneging on interna-
tional agreements (Tomz 2005a). In short, high political costs of default for democratic
governments might effectively discourage the incumbent politicians from reneging on
their debt contracts.
The power of the public, however, can be, and is often, seen as a source of political
risks (Desai, Olofsg˚ard and Yousef 2003). Democratic competition and mass mobiliza-
tion may exacerbate untempered popular demands for distortionary public policy such
as inflationary public spending. Politicians in democracy are vulnerable to popular
pressure for current consumption, and hence, behave opportunistically by manipulat-
ing fiscal and monetary policy to appease voters (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997). In
the mean time, a government’s credibility to long-term commitments is often compro-
mised, and sub-optimal outcomes such as macroeconomic instability ensue. Moreover,
elected “populist” leaders might be induced to confiscate the assets of the unpopular
“oligarchs” or those of foreigners to maximize their chances for reelection (Clague et
al. 1996).
Given the fact that in a typical developing country, prominent lenders are foreigners
who lack political power, it cannot be taken for granted that democratic institutions
empower those who stand to benefit from committing to repaying vast outstanding
debt at all costs (Saiegh 2005). Indeed, there is no shortage of examples in history of
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sovereign default that opportunistic politicians catering to the public’s strong aversion
to staggering debt burden opted for declaring a heroic default on foreign debt (Tomz
2005a, 2007). Peru’s Alan Garcia is probably the best-known example. In his first
presidency in the mid 1980s, he declared unilaterally that he would pay no more than 10
percent of GDP. Recently, Argentina eventually defaulted on about $100 billion foreign
debt in the last week of 2001 while angry citizens took the streets shouting, “Don’t pay
the foreign debt.” A leading populist candidate in the previous presidential election held
in 1999, Eduardo Duhalde, had called for a suspension of debt payments as his campaign
platform (Tomz 2005b). More recently, Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador and well
known for his populist stance, said in 2006 at a news conference with Venezuela’s
Chavez, “If our moral duty to provide health, education and housing to our people
impedes us from paying debt, we won’t hesitate two seconds [to default].” A sovereign
default can be politically rewarding for reelection-seeking politicians, especially during
hard times.
What motivate elected politicians are reward and punishment at the polls. They
should opt to default if doing so rewards them with reelection, and they should continue
to pay in full if voters punish them for failing to do so. The majority’s preference over
sovereign default is, therefore, crucial in shaping a democratic government’s willingness
to pay. I argue that the majority’s preference over default, in turn, is largely determined
by the distribution of income.
The issue of sovereign default maps well into the rich-poor dimension because it
implies an increase in public consumption financed by a future tax increase. To see
why, note first that sovereign default involves both immediate windfall gains and con-
siderable long-run costs. Failure to pay the total outstanding debt in full would bring
the government lump-sum revenue that substitutes for the need to raise taxes or reduce
spending (Alesina et al. 1992). The mean total external debt as a percentage of GDP is
9
about 70 percent for all developing nations, and when they pay, they spend on average
about 18 percent of their total earnings from exports for debt payments.3 A default on
outstanding debt would then generate instant revenue that amounts to 18 percent of
export at a minimum.
Sovereign default, on the other hand, is costly in the medium and long term.4 In
particular, it inflicts high costs on the defaulters in the future credit markets. Defaulting
governments lose reputation, if they had any, and will have difficulty borrowing in the
future (Alesina et al. 1992; Tomz 2007). Their credit ratings will plunge in the event
of default; so will their bonds prices and the interest rates at which they can borrow
triple. As a result, they end up having to pay more for a dollar they borrow in the
future than they would have otherwise had to.
Borrowing is an intertemporal tax smoothing instrument: Spending today with
a loan and paying tomorrow (Barro 1979). Default is just another mechanism for
intertemporal tax smoothing at the payment due date: Spending now again instead
of repaying the debt and paying still later. Just like borrowing implies a future tax
to repay the debt, default implies a higher future tax to pay the borrowing costs that
are increased due to the default. Hence, voters’ preferences over default are parallel to
those over borrowing, which in turn boil down to the preferences over future tax rates.
When considering default, voters must weigh the marginal current consumption benefit
against the future deadweight loss due to higher tax rates.
As in the standard models of income taxation, it follows that the median income
3For many highly indebted countries, the total external debt easily amounts to 200 percent or even
to 300 percent of GDP. It is not uncommon that the total debt service exceeds 30 percent of export
(Data from the IMF Global Development Finance (GDF 2005)).
4It is hard to estimate the effect of default on the economy as a whole because when a government
defaults, usually situations are already in bad shape. However, a number of studies suggest that a
defaulting economy suffers overall output losses over the long run (Cohen 1992; De Paoli, Hoggarth
and Saporta 2006; Dooley 2000).
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voter is more likely to prefer default to repayment as its income is farther away from
the average income level (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Persson and Tabellini 2000). This
is because the poorer a voter is, the less she internalizes the future efficiency cost of
a higher tax to which she contributes only proportional to her income while enjoying
the same unit of public consumption today. Hence, as an increase in inequality implies
that the gap between the median and the mean income levels is wider, the public
demand for sovereign default should be greater with higher income inequality, making
its government more prone to default.
There are two other reasons why the poor are more likely to prefer default than
the rich.5 First, the poor benefit more from the increased current consumption than
the rich. The immediate benefits of default, in practice, are often realized as waived
costs of fiscal adjustment because default is considered as an option during bad times
when there is no means other than drastic fiscal retrenchment to continue to repay
the rapidly swelling outstanding debts (Tomz 2005b). By deciding not to pay in full,
the defaulting government could avoid costly austerity measures and honor its “social
contracts” by keeping up the public spending pattern. The costs of fiscal retrenchment
fall disproportionately on the poor. Drastic government budget cuts harm those who
are on public payrolls and hurt unemployed and poor citizens who rely heavily on public
transfers and services (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Nelson 1990). Empirical studies of
the effect of IMF stabilization programs have shown that they have regressive effects on
income distribution (Pastor 1987; Vreeland 2002, 2003). Hence, with such costs waived,
default benefits the poor more than the rich. Second, the poor tend to discount the
future more heavily than the rich do. The rich, by definition, are endowed with more
assets that generate future income streams such as land, financial assets, and human
5These two additional reasons relax the assumptions implicitly made above that government con-
sumption is distributed equally and tax rates are proportional to income.
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capital. Possessing these assets that promise future income streams makes the rich
value more highly the future and more susceptible to the reputational costs caused by
default. Hence, the perceived burden of future taxes is disproportionately higher on
the rich.
In short, sovereign default implies an intertemporal tradeoff: An immediate public
consumption financed by a future tax that is higher than it would have been other-
wise, the overall effects of which are distributional from the rich to the poor. Since
the majority’s demand for such an intertemporal exchange is greater as the income
distribution becomes more skewed, the risk that a democratic government succumbs to
the popular demand for default increases with the income inequality.
2.2 Modeling Strategic Selection
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the level of income equality is one
of the observable characteristics of the borrowing country from which creditors can
infer its willingness to pay. Creditors then can project the propensity to default of
a given country based on its equality-related willingness to pay as shown in Figure
2.1. As greater willingness to pay, by definition, implies a less propensity to default,
the probability of default should be monotonically decreasing with the level of income
equality.
If this is true, however, can one observe this pattern in data on sovereign default?
Consider a sovereign located in the far left of Figure 2.1. It is characterized by extreme
income inequality, hence almost certain to default ex ante : Its probability to default
is close to 1. Why would then any rational creditors lend the sovereign in the first
place? In fact, the willingness-to-pay model of sovereign default suggests that no credit
is provided more than a sovereign is believed to be willing to repay. If a sovereign
prefers not to repay (i.e., L(1 + i) > P ), it has no incentive to honor its promise to
12
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Figure 2.1: The propensity to sovereign default
repay. If it has no incentive to carry out that promise, its promise is not credible,
and no rational creditor would provide a loan in the first place. If the sovereign is
denied access to credit, then it cannot actually default because it would not have a
loan to default on. Therefore, one should not observe in sovereign default data such
a monotonic relationship between observable characteristics of willingness to pay and
the likelihood of actual default.
To predict what pattern is expected to emerge instead, I model strategic interac-
tions between a sovereign and a bank as a signaling game with two-sided incomplete
information (see Figure 2.2).6 In the model, the sovereign is always seeking a loan;
6Aggarwal (1996) develops a game-theretic model of debt negotiations to predict outcomes of debt
rescheduling with an assumption that both sides know each other’s payoffs. Tomz (2007), assuming
incomplete information, develops his reputational theory of sovereign debt to explain how the bor-
rowers’ reputations form and how reputations affect their incentives to repay. My goal is related but
simpler: to derive predictions on how observable characteristics affect lending and default decisions.
13
b
HHHHHHHHH
Sov
no signal signal (PS)
r
SQ (q,Q)
r
HHHHHHHHH
Bank
reject lend (PL)
r
RJ (q − c,R)
r
HHHHHHHHH
Sov
pay default (PD)
r
LR (p, P )
r
LD (d, D)
Figure 2.2: The sovereign default game with incomplete information
in other words, a loan is a good even though he needs to repay.7 His preference over
default depends on his type. He prefers to repay if he is willing to pay, that is, if his
payoff to repaying exceeds that to defaulting. The sovereign’s decision on whether or
not to default, however, can be made only when the bank has provided him with a
loan. The bank prefers to lend than to reject a loan request provided the loan is to be
repaid, and she least prefers to lend a loan that will not be paid back. The bank must
decide whether or not to lend upon the sovereign’s request with a signal, and she does
so by carefully investigating his willingness to pay as well as his ability to do so. If the
sovereign chooses not to request a loan, the status quo prevails.
The bank faces uncertainty regarding the sovereign’s type. She is not sure how
willing the sovereign is to pay.8 Specifically, she knows only the probability distributions
7From now on, I refer to the sovereign as “he” and the bank as “she.”
8It is true that creditors know to some extent which countries are “risky” and which ones are “safe.”
There is a great deal of information on country risk that is publicly available. Creditors also have
good reason to collect every piece of information on potential borrowers lest they incur a loss from
default. However, it is also true that there always exists some degree of uncertainty in the real world,
and this inherent uncertainty explains in part why in reality some creditors “wrongly” lent a loan to
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of the sovereign’s payoffs to paying
(
p ∼ N(pi, σ2)) and to defaulting (d ∼ N(δ, σ2)),
but not what their true values are. So the bank is, say, about 95 percent sure that the
sovereign’s true payoff to paying is in the range (pi − 2σ, pi + 2σ), but not sure exactly
where it is. She forms this prior belief, the mean values pi and δ, in particular, from
the sovereign’s observable characteristics such as income inequality. On the sovereign’s
part, he is also uncertain about the bank’s payoff to loan rejection
(
R ∼ N(ρ, σ2)).9
The uncertainty faced by the bank gives the sovereign an incentive to represent
or misrepresent his type. A sovereign of willing-to-pay type should want the bank to
know for sure that he is of good type, and hence, has the incentive to send such a signal
to the bank. A sovereign of unwilling-to-pay type, on the other hand, might want to
mimic the behavior of the good-type sovereign by sending the same signal, an attempt
to mislead the bank to believe that he is of good type as well. To the extent that any
unwilling-to-pay types send the same signal, the signal does not carry any information.
Then it is mere “cheap talk.”
For a signal to be at least partially informative, it must be costly enough to be unaf-
fordable to some bad types. There are a number of policy tools that governments have
used as costly signal: signing an agreement with the IMF (Edwards 2006), liberalizing
capital accounts (Bartolini and Drazen 1997), signing international trade agreements
or investment treaties (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006), granting the central bank
independence (Pastor and Maxfield 1999), fixing the exchange rate to an anchor cur-
rency (Bernhard and Leblang 1999; Broz 2002), adopting inflation targeting policy,
appointing a high-profile businessman to the Ministry of Finance, and the like. These
a sovereign who then defaulted. The assumption that creditors face uncertainty regarding how risky
or safe the potential borrowing countries are, is innocuous, and perhaps, more realistic.
9This assumption is realistic as well in that governments may not be sure how willing creditors are
to take risks.
15
are policy tools at a government’s disposal, and are used implicitly or explicitly to en-
hance the government’s credibility in the eyes of international creditors and investors.
What makes them a signal to the market is the “sovereignty cost” that they involve. By
entering into an explicit international agreement or abandoning its policy autonomy,
the government loses a great deal of policy-making authority that it could use to serve
its interests otherwise. The fact that it has paid such an opportunity cost signals its
commitment to behaving well in the global markets (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons
2006; Vreeland 2003).
In the model, if the sovereign sends a signal to request a loan, but fails to induce the
bank to lend him, then he is left strictly worse off since he has only incurred the cost of
the signal (c > 0). As such, the sovereign can be deterred from requesting a loan with
a costly signal if his status quo payoff exceeds the expected payoff to signaling, which
depends on the bank’s lending probability (pL), a probability that the bank will lend
him on observing that he sent a costly signal. In other words, the sovereign pays the
cost of signal if q < (1− pL)(q − c) + pLmax(p,d).
The bank, on the other hand, makes her lending decision upon the sovereign’s re-
quest by weighing her payoff to rejection against the lottery payoff from lending a poten-
tially risky sovereign, which depends on her posterior belief about the sovereign’s will-
ingness to pay, or sovereign’s default probability (pD), a probability that the sovereign
will default if a loan is provided given that he has sent a signal. That is, the bank
lends the sovereign if R < (1− pD)P + pDD. While the sovereign does not know what
R is, he nonetheless knows the probability that this inequality holds, or pL, and as
explained, conditions his choice of signaling on this probability.
Since a higher pD implies a lower pL, the sovereign’s signaling probability (pS), a
probability that the sovereign sends a signal should also decrease with pD. On the
other hand, pD , the conditional probability that he will default given that he has sent
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a signal, is proportional to the joint probability that he prefers to default (p < d) and
he prefers to pay the signaling cost
(
max(p,d) > q + c(1−pL)
pL
)
.10 Given pL, this joint
probability is higher if the difference in the mean payoffs, (pi− δ), is farther below from
zero. In words, the posterior probability that the signal-sending sovereign will default
is higher if his observables suggest a priori that he is of highly risky type. Then, a
sovereign with a higher prior probability to default will have a lower probability of the
bank’s lending, and hence, will send a signal with a lower probability in the first place.
This is the logic behind the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game.11
Formally, given her posterior belief pD , the bank lends the sovereign if
R < (1− pD)P + pDD. (2.2)
Since R is normally distributed, the probability that this inequality holds is
pL = Φ
(
pDD + (1− pD)P − ρ
)
, (2.3)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (normalizing σ equal
to 1).
Given his belief about the bank’s strategy, pL, in equilibrium, the sovereign signals
if
q < (1− pL)(q − c) + pLmax(p,d), (2.4)
or
max(p,d) > q +
c(1− pL)
pL
. (2.5)
10By definition in probability theory, the conditional probability of A given B, P (A|B), is P (A∩B)P (B) .
11The following formalization is drawn from Lewis and Schultz (2003).
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The probability that the sovereign signals is
pS = 1− Φ(q∗ − pi)Φ(q∗ − δ), (2.6)
where q∗ = q + c(1−pL)
pL
.
The conditional probability that the sovereign will default given that he has sent a
signal is
pD =
Prob[p < d ∩max(p,d) > q∗]
pS
, (2.7)
or
pD =
Prob[p < d ∩ d > q∗]
pS
. (2.8)
With these equilibrium strategies, it is now possible to calculate each of the four
outcome probabilities of the game, the status quo (SQ), signaling and rejecting (RJ),
lending and repaying (LR), and lending and defaulting (LD) as follows:
Prob(SQ) = 1− pS, (2.9)
Prob(RJ) = pS(1− pL), (2.10)
Prob(LR) = pSpL(1− pD), (2.11)
Prob(LD) = pSpLpD. (2.12)
These are the probabilities that each outcome is observed in equilibrium. One ex-
pects to observe, for instance, LD, the outcome of lending and default, with probability
pSpLpD . Note that the solution to the three equilibrium probabilities, pS, pL, and pD,
is not of closed form: One solution is a function of the others. I thus performed simula-
tions to solve this system of equations numerically. First I normalized the distributions
of the three random payoffs (p, d, and R) to the standard normal distribution. Then
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I assigned values to other fixed payoffs in such a way that is compatible with the pay-
off structure of the game. Specifically, I set P to 3 and D to -3 for the bank, and q
to
(
min(pi, δ) − 3) and c to 0.5 for the sovereign. With this particular set of payoffs,
the solution is the following: pS = 0.54, pL = 0.72, and pD = 0.30. This solution is,
in turn, translated into the four outcome probabilities as follows: Prob(SQ) = 0.46,
Prob(RJ) = 0.15, Prob(LR) = 0.27, and Prob(LD) = 0.12. Thus, with the sovereign’s
mean payoffs to repayment and to default both set to zero, the probability that his
default is actually observed is about 0.12.
As noted above, these outcome probabilities change as the sovereign’s mean payoffs
change. To see how those probabilities vary as a function of the sovereign’s willingness
to pay, I varied the mean of p from -4 to 4 while holding the others constant. The
resulting comparative statics then should provide predictions about the outcomes of
the game as a function of the mean value of willingness to pay, or the relative size of
the mean payoff to repaying given the mean payoff to defaulting.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 2.3. The top-left panel is the probability
of the status quo. It displays how the first step of strategic selection occurs. It shows
that the probability of self-screening decreases monotonically with the sovereign’s mean
willingness to pay. That is, the more willing the sovereign is expected to be, the more
likely it is to send a costly signal. Conversely, those sovereigns characterized by riskier
factors to begin with are more likely to be deterred from sending a costly signal in the
first place, hence to be left with no credit.
The top-right panel describes the probability of rejecting a loan request. This
regards the outcome of the second step of the strategic selection. It increases first
and then declines as the sovereign’s mean willingness to pay increases. It goes up first
because while the sovereign with a high risk profile is increasingly more likely to request
a loan by sending a signal, the bank tries to remain cautious in increasing her lending
19
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Figure 2.3: The four equilibrium outcome probabilities
probability. It is not until there is a greater chance that the signal sender is in fact of
good type that this probability starts to decline.
At the bottom-left the probability that a sovereign debt repayment occurs is shown.
It increases monotonically, but kicks in only after some point. No repayment is expected
to be made by a high-risk profile sovereign because he is unlikely to signal in the first
place, and even if he did, his request is likely to be rejected by the bank, and finally,
even if he successfully induced the bank to lend him, he is likely to be in fact of risky
type, hence would not repay. It increases with the mean willingness to pay because the
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sovereign is increasingly more likely to signal, more likely to get a loan, and more likely
to repay as its risk profile improves.
Finally, the bottom-right panel displays the probability that a sovereign default
occurs, the outcome of primary interest. A central feature of the pattern here is the
non-monotonic relationship between the sovereign’s mean willingness to pay and the
probability of a default outcome. A sovereign with very low mean willingness to pay
such as a democracy with extreme income inequality is very unlikely to actually default
because he is very unlikely to send a costly signal in the first place. As the mean
willingness to pay increases, he is more likely to request a loan expecting a higher
lending probability. Yet there is a higher chance that he in fact prefers to default until
the mean willingness to pay turns positive. Thus, the default probability goes up first.
However, it then declines as the sovereign is increasingly more likely to be of good type.
Note that as the mean willingness to pay approaches the center of the distribution
where the bank believes with about a 50-50 chance that the sovereign is willing to pay,
the uncertainty on the bank’s part is the greatest. Here, the probability that a default
occurs is the highest because the unwilling-to-pay type is most likely to succeed in
inducing the bank to provide a loan. This makes sense intuitively. Sovereign defaults
occur when “risky” sovereigns successfully induce creditors to provide a loan, but the
most risky ones are those who are unambiguously risky to the creditors, and hence
are among those least able to mislead the creditors. Somewhat risky sovereigns, in
contrast, are those who pose the greatest uncertainty to the creditors, and hence, are
most likely to lead the creditors to “wrongly” provide a loan.
There is a good deal of impressionistic evidence that is supportive of this claim.
Argentina is a country with relatively moderate income inequality with an average
Gini of 46.3 and one of the few countries that have enjoyed consistent access to credit
market. Yet it commits sovereign defaults more than two times as often as others
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do. Its neighboring Paraguay, on the other hand, is characterized by more extreme
inequality with an average Gini of 55.0 and has suffered the consistent lack of access
to private credit presumably due to the lack of credibility. Not surprisingly, Paraguay
has not defaulted once. Still another neighbor, Uruguay, has relatively equal income
distribution with an average Gini of 42.9, by Latin American standards, and has had
quite consistent access to private capital, and yet never defaulted at least until 2003.
A similar triplet can be found in Africa. Madagascar with moderate income inequality
with an average Gini of 50.2 has been one of the few countries in Africa that have
occasionally had access to private capital, and yet frequently defaulted about three
times more often than average countries do. The Gambia, a country with extreme
inequality with an average Gini of 71.0, has never had access to credit, and has never
defaulted. Mauritius, on the other hand, has relatively equal income distribution with
an average Gini of 39.1, and has frequently had access to credit, but has not defaulted
yet.12
In short, sovereign default is most likely to be observed when the mean willingness to
pay of a sovereign is at the intermediate level. That is, both highly unequal and highly
equal democracies are less likely to actually default than democracies with moderate
income inequality. This is the central prediction of the model, and I now turn to
statistical analysis to test this hypothesis.
2.3 Data and Analysis
I test the central prediction of the model as depicted at the bottom-right panel of
Figure 2.3 by examining the impact of income inequality on the probability of default
12The information on countries’ market access history is from Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2004).
They construct the data from Capital Data (Bondware and Loanware), which is not publicly available.
The definition of default and its source are given in the next section.
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occurrence in 53 developing democracies between 1971 and 2003.13 Data on default and
other debt indicators are all from the IMF Global Development Finance (GDF 2005).
Data on economic controls are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. I
treat a country-year as democracy if its Polity2 value in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall
and Jaggers 2004) is 7 or higher. For robustness check, however, I also employ 6 for the
cutoff point, in which case the number of countries covered increases to 62. My sample
includes all cases for which complete data were available. A full list of countries and
years is provided in Table 2.1.
2.3.1 Dependent Variable: Default
To determine when a sovereign commits a default, I employ a definition of sovereign
default commonly used by economists (see, for instance, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano
2003): Default occurs when a country fails to meet principal or interest payment on
the due date or when it restructures its external debt. This definition of sovereign
default is also largely consistent with the criteria that leading rating agencies employ
to define default. Moody’s Investors Service (1999), for instance, defines default as “(1)
any missed or delayed payment of interest and/or principal or (2) any exchange where
the debtor offers the creditor a new contract that amounts to a diminished financial
obligation or (3) where the exchange has the apparent purpose of helping the borrower
avoid default.” In short, the accumulation of debt payment arrears and a rescheduling
arrangement are the two indicators of whether a sovereign defaults or not.
More precisely, Default2025, the dependent variable, takes 1 if the increase in the
13Ideally, one could estimate the effect of income inequality on default using a two-stage selection
model, in which the access to credit is directly modeled as the selection process. This, however,
requires data on sovereign debts contract-by-contract. Without such data, no options seem feasible
other than shooting for the pattern that should emerge from the selection.
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stock of total arrears exceeds 2 percent of total debt from private creditors14 or if
the total amount of debt rescheduled exceeds 2.5 percent of total debt from private
creditors unless the stock of total arrears decreases by more than the amount of debt
rescheduled in the same year, and 0 otherwise.15 To make sure that results are not
driven by a particular choice of default thresholds, I employ two additional, more
stringent thresholds. Default4050 has thresholds of 4 percent for arrears and 5 percent
for rescheduled debt, and Default6075 has 6 percent and 7.5 percent for each. In
the sample about 19.9 percent of country-years are coded as default for Default2025.
The corresponding numbers are 16.8 percent and 13.1 percent for Default4050 and
Default6075, respectively.
2.3.2 Independent Variable: Equality
To facilitate interpretation, I use as a measure of income distribution Equality, which
is simply calculated as (100 – Gini index). It represents, according to my theory, a
sovereign’s mean willingness to pay, or one key factor from which potential creditors
infer sovereign’s willingness to pay. To fit the inverted-U shaped relationship, I include
its square term, Equality2 , the coefficient on which should be significantly smaller
than zero if the results are to be supportive of my prediction.16
The Gini index of income inequality is taken from the Standardized World Income
14I focus on default on private debt (from commercial banks and bonds) as opposed to official debt
because official creditors such as international financial institutions might not act as a pure creditor
seeking profits from lending business and might be affected by some “political” considerations (Stone
2004).
15Note that the threshold is applied to a change of arrears. As Peter (2002) suggests, this flow-based
operationalization better captures yearly variations in debt repayment behaviors. A new default occurs
whenever there is a large (2 percent or greater) increase in arrears.
16For Equality and for any other variables for which I add the square terms, to minimize multi-
collinearity resulting from adding square terms, I first mean-centered the variables before creating the
square terms. No serious multicollinearity was detected.
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Inequality Database (SWIID). The database standardizes the United Nations Univer-
sity’s World Income Inequality Database using as the standard the Luxembourg Income
Study data to maximize comparability for the largest possible sample of countries and
years (Solt, forthcoming). It provides Gini indices of both gross and net income in-
equality for 153 countries. I use gross income Gini to capture the degree of potential
demands for income redistribution in a country. The sample mean of Gini index is 54.9
while the minimum is 30.7 and the maximum is 82.6.17
2.3.3 Control Variables
In addition to income inequality, I consider three more observable country characteris-
tics that might give potential creditors a clue about the sovereign’s willingness to pay.
First, economic development (GDP per capita) may affect the sovereign’s willingness
to pay just like how income distribution affects it. As a country becomes richer, the
majority may prefer not to incur long-run costs of default than to boost immediate
consumption. Second, greater trade openness (Trade) may also make a sovereign more
willing to pay (Lane 1999; Rose and Spiegel 2004). In the event of default, creditors
might block trade-related short-term credit and even impose trade embargoes. Hence,
the more trade-dependent a country is, the higher the costs of default might be.18
17The corresponding numbers for net income Gini are 42.2 for the mean, 22.6 for the minimum, and
62.3 for the maximum. For robustness check, I used net income Gini in place of gross Gini. There was
no material changes in the results, which is not surprising given the high correlation between the two
measures. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.97. This near perfect correlation is noted by Solt
(forthcoming) as well. He notes, “In the developing world, where taxes are quite uniformly low and
effective policies to redistribute income are very rare, gross and net income inequality should be very
highly related.” The correlation between gross and net income inequality in his whole dataset is 0.967
for developing countries.
18The relationship between trade and default is subject to a debate, however. For instance, Tomz
(2007) argues that trade sanctions are not an effective punishment tool because they require all major
trade partners of a defaulting country to cooperate in forgoing profits from trade.
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Third, the level of indebtedness (Total debt), measured as the ratio of total outstand-
ing external debt to GDP, may also be an indication of how willing the sovereign is to
pay. Many heavily indebted countries borrowed foreign debts mostly by way of bilateral
or multilateral official lending and accumulated them over time. Heavy indebtedness is
indeed a sign of the lack of willingness as well as the inability to pay (Easterly 2002). I
add the square term of each of these willingness-to-pay variables to see whether there
are non- monotonic relationships. I also include a measure of political competitiveness,
Democracy, to see if there is any “democraticness” effect on default among democra-
cies. The more democratic a democracy is, the less likely it might commit a default.
It is possible that the effect of income inequality is spurious, actually capturing some
unobserved regional effects. It is important to control for the region-level heterogene-
ity since income inequality displays stark regional differences although the differences
within region are remarkable as well. Hence I include three regional dummies, one for
Eastern Europe, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and one for sub-Saharan
Africa. The percentage of default cases in a given year (% Default) is included to
capture yearly variations in the mood of global credit markets. In particular, it can
capture a change in the perceived costs of default since the penalties for default might
be more severe when there are fewer defaulters. US interest ratet−1, the US interest
rate, is added as a proxy for global liquidity at t− 1. A default is likely to be followed
by another default. As a way to model this temporal dependence, I include the lagged
dependent variable, Defaultt−1.
I include several standard liquidity indicators for controls. GDP growtht−1, GDP
growth rate at t − 1, is included to control for business cycle that might affect the
sovereigns ability to pay. Export growtht−1, export growth rate at t−1, is also included
to account for the ability to pay out of export earnings. The ratio of debt service to
exports at t−1 (Debt servicet−1) and the ratio of international reserves to imports at t−
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1 (Reservest−1) are included as indicators of potential debt servicing difficulties in the
short-run (Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001; Edwards 1984). Concessional debtt−1,
the level of concessional debt as a percentage of total external debt at t− 1, might also
affect the burden of debt repayments. In addition, Inflationt−1, the percentage change
in the consumer price index at t − 1, is included to control for the macroeconomic
conditions. Finally, period dummy variables are added to account for the long-run
fluctuations of global liquidity: 71–80 for the pre-debt crisis period, 81–89 for the post-
debt crisis period, and 90–97 for the period of the resurgence of global capital.
2.3.4 Model Specification and Results
I estimate the effect of income inequality on the incidence of sovereign default using
random-effects logistic regression. The model takes the following time-series cross-
sectional form:
logit
(
Prob(Defaultit = 1)
)
= α + βDDefaulti,t−1 + βPDemocracyit + βEEqualityit
+ βE2Equality
2
it + βWWillit + βW2Will
2
it + γXi,t−1 + δR + λP + νi, (2.13)
where Will is a vector of the variables for willingness to pay (GDP per capita, Trade,
and Total debt), X is a vector of the other controls, R and P are vectors of regional and
period dummies, respectively, and ν is a country-specific random error, for i = 1, . . . , N
countries, and t = 1, . . . , T years. The regression results are reported in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Income equality and the incidence of sovereign default
(1) (2) (3)
Default2025 Default4050 Default6075
Democracy −0.536∗∗ −0.738∗∗∗ −0.705∗∗
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3)
Default2025 Default4050 Default6075
(0.220) (0.276) (0.274)
Equality −0.036 −0.083∗ −0.089∗
(0.035) (0.047) (0.048)
Equality2 −0.005∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Total debt 0.049∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Total debt2 −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP per capita 0.141 −0.066 −0.137
(0.408) (0.493) (0.446)
GDP per capita2 −0.203 −0.380 −0.111
(0.234) (0.302) (0.273)
Trade −0.014 −0.026∗ −0.024∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Trade2 0.0004∗ 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Defaultt−1 0.774∗∗ 0.735∗ 1.044∗∗
(0.377) (0.422) (0.441)
Bank loans 0.826 0.757 0.357
(0.562) (0.662) (0.679)
% Default 8.160∗∗∗ 9.060∗∗∗ 9.095∗∗∗
(2.054) (2.437) (2.584)
GDP growtht−1 −0.061 −0.101∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(0.038) (0.046) (0.047)
US interest ratet−1 0.103 −0.003 −0.030
(0.127) (0.151) (0.159)
Export growtht−1 −2.060∗ −1.878 −2.468∗
(1.173) (1.358) (1.400)
Reservest−1 −0.004 0.062 0.099
(0.062) (0.080) (0.073)
Debt servicet−1 −2.485 −3.191 −5.908∗∗∗
(1.696) (2.080) (2.182)
Concessional debtt−1 0.012 0.013 0.002
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Inflationt−1 0.001∗ 0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Eastern Europe 3.540∗∗∗ 4.661∗∗∗ 2.905∗∗
(1.034) (1.329) (1.339)
Latin America 1.571∗∗ 1.154 0.763
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3)
Default2025 Default4050 Default6075
(0.793) (0.915) (0.803)
Sub-Sharan Africa 1.827∗ 1.660 0.797
(0.962) (1.285) (1.227)
71− 80 2.543∗ −17.649 −16.166
(1.403) (47195) (18568)
81− 89 0.626 1.558∗∗ 1.630∗∗
(0.595) (0.739) (0.782)
90− 97 0.391 0.985 0.714
(0.495) (0.632) (0.683)
Constant −2.120 −0.640 0.048
(2.254) (2.725) (2.713)
Number of observations 573 573 573
Number of countries 53 53 53
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Model 1 tests a model of Default2025, and models 2 and 3 tests models using
more stringent default thresholds. Throughout the models, the lagged default and the
percentage of default cases as well as regional dummies (Eastern Europe in particular)
are highly significant and signed as expected. The other controls also generally have
the expected signs when they carry some significance. The level of democracy turns out
to be highly significant as well, suggesting that “democraticness” matters even among
democratic regimes.19
Regarding the variables of “willingness-to-pay,” the results for equality and indebt-
edness are most consistent throughout the regressions. As expected, their square terms
19I also included additional controls. One might argue that the government’s ideology matters in
that governments of the left tend to be nationalist and populist with regard to foreign capital and,
therefore, are more likely to default on foreign debt. Thus, I added dummies for right and center
governments using a governing party’s ideology measure, taken from Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et al. 2001). Both of the coefficient were negative suggesting that governments of the center
and right are less likely to default than those of left. But they were not significant throughout the
models. I also added the log of GDP to account for the size of an economy, the terms of trade variable
to account for the size of exogenous shocks, the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, and the ratio
of interest payments to exports. The main results were not affected by these additional controls.
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are significant at the 0.05 level and negatively signed, which indicates that their ef-
fects on the probability of default are of inverted U-shape. GDP per capita also has
a negatively signed square term across models, but most of the time it falls short of
significance. Trade openness also features some significant non-monotonicity (Model
1), but shows a U-shaped relationship. The more trade dependent, the less likely a
default is to occur, but as trade openness becomes too high, the likelihood of default
starts to rise again. This rather unexpected effect of trade might have resulted from
the fact that trade openness captures the effect of “size” of an economy.20
Figure 4 depicts the predicted probability of default as a function of Equality hold-
ing all others at their means based on regression 1. As shown, the predicted pattern
from the theoretical model is nicely recovered in the empirical model. Democracies with
the intermediate level of income inequality have a substantially higher chance to default
than those with extreme inequality and those with relatively equal income distribution.
The expected probability, when Equality is around 42 (or Gini index of 58), just below
the mean, is about 0.20, or 20 percent of the time. It deceases substantially as Equality
moves in either direction. If Equality is down one standard deviation below the mean
(35 or Gini index of 65), the probability of default is predicted to decrease to 0.17,
or 17 percent of the time. With Equality down further to two standard deviations
below the mean, the probability of default goes down to 0.05, a 75.0 percent decline.
The same is true when Equality moves in the other direction. If it increases by one
standard deviation (55 or Gini index of 45), the predicted probability goes down to 0.1,
or 10 percent of the time, and with the two standard deviation increase in Equality,
the probability decreases to 0.03, or 3 percent of the time.21
20Indeed, its significance tends to go away when the logarithm of GDP is added.
21My theory only concerns default under democracy, hence, a restriction on a sample of democracies.
While my theory is agnostic of non-democratic cases, it turns out that in a sample of non-democracies,
the posited relationship between income inequality and the probability of default does not hold (not
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Figure 2.4: The predicted probability of sovereign default
To check the robustness of the results, I estimate models with a lower cutoff point
for democracy. As shown in Table 2.3, the results are consistent across models. The
coefficient of Equality2 remains correctly signed and significant at 95 percent confidence
level or higher in Models 5 and 6. It is weakly significant in Model 4. This striking
consistency lends the main empirical findings a great deal of confidence.
Table 2.3: Robustness checks with Polity ≥ 6
(4) (5) (6)
Default2025 Default4050 Default6075
Democracy −0.333∗∗ −0.293∗ −0.326∗
(0.157) (0.167) (0.170)
Equality −0.016 −0.045 −0.051
(0.031) (0.035) (0.036)
Continued on next page
shown).
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(4) (5) (6)
Default2025 Default4050 Default6075
Equality2 −0.003∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt 0.041∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Total debt2 −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP per capita −0.222 −0.621 −0.688
(0.427) (0.429) (0.426)
GDP per capita2 −0.093 0.002 0.102
(0.231) (0.236) (0.232)
Trade −0.012 −0.017 −0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Trade2 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Defaultt−1 0.660∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.332) (0.361)
Bank loans 1.932∗∗∗ 1.973∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.603) (0.632)
% Default 5.483∗∗∗ 5.345∗∗∗ 4.171∗∗
(1.709) (1.897) (1.963)
GDP growtht−1 −0.008 −0.028 −0.031
(0.033) (0.035) (0.036)
US interest ratet−1 0.044 −0.093 −0.129
(0.110) (0.122) (0.129)
Export growtht−1 −1.477 −1.250 −1.679
(1.068) (1.167) (1.211)
Reservest−1 0.046 0.095 0.111
(0.064) (0.070) (0.069)
Debt servicet−1 −2.032 −1.707 −2.692
(1.565) (1.632) (1.727)
Concessional debtt−1 0.003 −0.015 −0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Inflationt−1 0.001∗ 0.001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001)
Eastern Europe 2.780∗∗∗ 2.722∗∗∗ 1.825∗
(0.914) (0.923) (0.947)
Latin America 1.113 0.609 0.566
(0.825) (0.827) (0.815)
Sub-Sharan Africa 1.064 0.322 −0.069
(0.924) (1.026) (1.028)
Continued on next page
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(4) (5) (6)
Default2025 Default4050 Default6075
71− 80 −0.121 −20.217 −20.355
(1.362) (25196) (27497)
81− 89 0.149 0.475 0.603
(0.520) (0.568) (0.590)
90− 97 0.256 0.338 0.554
(0.405) (0.463) (0.488)
Constant −2.842 −2.314 −1.435
(1.838) (1.935) (2.007)
Number of observations 686 686 686
Number of countries 62 62 62
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
2.3.5 Inequality and Zero Access to Credit
Sovereign default occurs most likely when income inequality is at the intermediate
level. This finding is a necessary piece of evidence to support my theory, but hardly a
sufficient one. There might be other reasons why this non-monotonic relationship exists
in data. One additional testable implication of the model regards the probability that
a sovereign is denied access to credit. This outcome can be observed either because
the sovereign opts not to send a costly signal or because the bank refuses to provide a
loan. In practice, there is no way to test each outcome separately because measuring
who sent a costly signal and when is not obvious. However, it is possible to predict and
test the joint probability that a sovereign receives no credit for either reason.
Figure 2.5 depicts the probability of zero access to credit as a function of the mean
willingness to pay. This is just the sum of the two probabilities at the top panels in Fig-
ure 2.3. It shows that the probability of zero access to credit decreases monotonically
with the mean willingness to pay. In other words, the greater the inequality of income,
the more likely the sovereign has no access to credit. This explains why democracies
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Figure 2.5: Probability of zero access to credit
with extreme income inequality are less likely to actually default than those with mod-
erate income inequality. They appear more “risky,” and so they are “less often” given
access to credit, hence, less likely to commit a default.
I test this prediction on the probability of zero access to credit using data on the
average interest rates charged by private lenders in a given year taken from the IMF
GDF (2005). The level of interest rate reflects a country’s default risk: the riskier a
country, the higher it is charged for the interest payments. As noted earlier, however,
when a country seems too risky, private lenders would find no level of interest rate that
could offset the risks involved, and hence, a credit rationing would have a bite. In such
a case, high risky countries would be left with no private credit, and their interest rates
would not be observed. Then, a positive interest rate charged to a given country in a
given year indicates that it did have access to private credit for that year, and the lack
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thereof indicates otherwise, that is, it failed to have access to credit.22 The minimum
observed interest rate is 5.05, and the maximum is 17.9 while its mean is about 6.5 in
the sample. The proportion of having an observed interest rate is 84.2 percent of the
total 568 country-years in the sample. The remaining 15.8 percent (90 country-years)
is rationed out of the private credit markets.
Note that predicting yearly fluctuations of the incidence of zero credit access based
on country risk profiles is not the most appropriate way to test the hypothesis. Rather,
the primary task here is to show if the level of income inequality helps to predict
long-run frequencies of countries’ credit accessibility. To capture this average behavior
over the long run, I divide the sample period into seven five-year sub-periods and
construct the dependent variable as the proportion of years of zero credit access in
a given sub-period. It ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating no access to credit all
the time in a five-year period. To take the upper and lower censoring into account, I
run tobit regressions. For robustness check, however, I estimate two alternative model
specifications as well. First, I take the ten-year average measures over three ten-year
sub-periods and run tobit regressions. Second, I take the entire sample period and run
tobit regressions of cross-sections to see if greater income inequality is associated with
more frequent zero accesses to credit on average.
In estimating the effect of income inequality on zero credit access, I include a number
of control variables. Democracy is included to control for the level of democracy,
GDP per capita is for the level of economic development, log(GDP ) is for the size
of economy, Trade is for the effect of trade dependency, and Total debt, the level
of indebtedness, is for the effect of the amount of existing debt. To account for the
debt burden, I also include Interest service, the ratio of interest payments to exports,
22This corresponds to the first stage (selection equation) of a Heckman selection model of interest
rates, in which the probability of having observations is first estimated, and then the level of interest
rates is estimated taking into account the selection hazards.
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Short term debt, the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, and Debt service, the ratio
of total debt payments to exports. Concessional debt, the ratio of concessional debt to
total debt, is also intended to capture its substitution effect on ordinary private credit.
As a proxy for the variations of global liquidity, US interest rate, the US interest rate,
is included. In addition, I added Default history, an indicator of whether a country
defaulted in the past five years. Finally, regional dummies are included.
The results of tobit regressions are reported in Table 2.4. Equality is significant
and signed as expected across models. The results confirm the claim that the more
equal a country is, the less often it experiences zero credit access.23
Table 2.4: Income equality and zero access to credit
(7) (8) (9)
Five year Ten year All year
Zero accesst−1 0.501∗∗∗ 0.179
(0.194) (0.150)
Democracy −0.033 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.049) (0.032) (0.007)
Equality −0.016∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
GDP per capita 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.00004) (0.00003) (0.0002)
Default history 0.116 0.080 −0.172
(0.143) (0.123) (0.108)
Trade −0.003 −0.003 −0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
log(GDP) −0.219∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗
(0.063) (0.059) (0.023)
GDP growth 0.013 −0.002 0.011
(0.019) (0.024) (0.011)
Export growth 0.835 1.004 −0.870
Continued on next page
23It is worthwhile to note that both trade-dependent countries (likely small economies) and large
countries in terms of GDP (likely less trade-dependent economies) seem to enjoy more frequent accesses
to credit. This might explain the earlier observation that both countries with very high and very low
trade-dependency tend to default more often than those with intermediate trade-dependency.
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(7) (8) (9)
Five year Ten year All year
(0.631) (1.127) (0.641)
Total debt 0.002 −0.372 0.382
(0.001) (0.709) (0.612)
Interest payments 0.004 0.045 0.035∗∗
(0.024) (0.032) (0.016)
Short-term debt 0.001 −0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Debt service −0.245 −1.495 −2.226∗∗∗
(0.929) (1.365) (0.709)
Concessional debt 0.002 0.002 0.004∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
US interest rate −0.096∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.039) (0.081) (0.396)
Eastern Europe 0.079 −0.071 0.574∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.208) (0.111)
Latin America −0.315 −0.553∗∗∗ −0.121
(0.217) (0.185) (0.091)
Sub-Saharan Africa −0.002 −0.198 0.025
(0.206) (0.158) (0.092)
Constant 5.666∗∗∗ 9.179∗∗∗ 2.099
(1.762) (1.787) (1.773)
Number of observations 130 48 60
Number of countries 51 38
Note: Tobit regressions. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Substantively, its impact seems non-trivial. From the estimates of tobit regressions,
one can infer that a 10-point increase in Gini index leads to a substantial decrease in
credit access, a 8 percent reduction at least (Model 9) to a 16 percent reduction at
most (Model 7). This implies that countries with extreme income inequality (with Gini
index greater than 75) may find the opportunity to have private credit 16–32 percent
less often than countries with the mean income inequality presumably because they are
believed to be more likely to default. To the extent that they are as many times more
likely to go without a loan, they have fewer chances to default.
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2.4 Conclusion
Political economists have long argued that an increase in political participation and
electoral competition in the context of extreme income inequality complicate matters
of macroeconomic stability and imply various economic pathologies characterized by
short-sighted, distortionary policies at the expense of long-term stability. Theoretically,
sovereign default is one such pathology that is likely to result from the redistributive
politics in democracies with a skewed income distribution. Empirical studies, however,
have generally failed to demonstrate that income inequality is a key risk factor of
sovereign default under democracy. The missing key is that if the theory is true, then
one cannot observe its predicted patterns in data because creditors should also know
that higher income inequality implies a greater risk and should act accordingly.
Using a simple signaling game, I model how rational creditors and sovereigns interact
strategically and show that if the theory is true, then empirically one should observe
sovereign default most often when income inequality is not the greatest, but at the
intermediate level. My model also shows that this is because countries with higher
income inequality are more likely denied access to credit in the first place. I found
consistent and robust support for the model’s predictions. Countries with Gini index
above 65 are at least 8 percent more likely to lack access to credit and at least 17
percent less likely to commit a default than those with Gini around 55, who are, in
turn, more likely to default, while less likely to have access to credit, than those with less
inequality. In short, the empirical implications that the model generates are sufficiently
unique, and the empirical results that support the predictions are remarkably robust.
My analysis unambiguously suggests that income inequality is, in fact, a key factor in
sovereign default risk.
My analysis is not without limitation, however. Most of all, the global sovereign
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credit markets have undergone significant changes in the late 1990s. Most notably, com-
mercial banks, once the predominant private creditors, now gave way to fund managers,
institutional investors, and individual creditors who are acting more or less without ex-
plicit coordination among them. In my model, a lending decision is assumed to be
made as if it is made by one actor. This assumption is innocuous if commercial banks
are the major creditors since they often organize themselves into a syndicate. For the
new reality, this assumption may or may not be sustainable. Whether we entered a
truly new world is an empirical question that can only be answered with new data. My
findings, in this sense, need to stand the test of time.
Nevertheless, my results have a couple of implications for our understanding of
sovereign risk and global capital. First, since the 1980s, the problems of sovereign
default have persisted, and this seems not to have been resolved despite the wave of
democratization, but in part because of that. When the distribution of income is rel-
atively equal so that the decisive median voter shares a stake in the longer-run health
of the economy, democracy might help the government make credible commitments
to honoring its contracts. As the income distribution becomes more skewed, however,
democratic governments tend to be associated with more public vices than virtues.
They might even become “inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated
by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good”
as Huntington (1991, 10) might claim. This suggests the importance of active govern-
ments role in addressing gross income inequality in many developing countries for their
democracies to do more good than harm to their economies.
Second, this study demonstrates that modeling strategic interaction can be crucial
for some research questions in making correct predictions. Many outcomes of interest
in international political economy are often an outcome of joint events each of which
involves strategic interactions between actors. Sovereign lending and default analyzed
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here is only one example. There are other cases to which essentially the same model
can apply. For instance, foreign investors may decide to invest in a host country on
observing that the country has signed a bilateral investment treaty with an important
capital exporting country. Expecting this effect, a risky government might want to
pay sovereignty costs associated with signing such a treaty in the hopes that it will
bring new foreign investments that it could exploit. Anticipating this, on observing
such a treaty, foreign investors might increase investments only when the host has a
sufficiently good risk profile. Then, signing a bilateral investment treaty might not nec-
essarily increase FDI inflows to the country. Rather, it might depend on the country’s
observable characteristics from which investors infer its type. In this way, modeling
strategic interaction can help us derive rich empirical implications that are otherwise
elusive.
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Chapter 3
Democracy, Transparency, and the
Confidence Crisis in International
Credit Markets
Bond investors are like the patrons in a theater audience: Each one has
decided to see a particular play on a particular night, but none has any idea
who she will be seeing it with (Buchheit and Gulati 2002, p. 1320).
Since the 1990s, international sovereign bond markets have grown fast. In the 1970s
and 1980s, besides loans from official sources, most developing countries raised foreign
debts from commercial banks, and bonds, on average, accounted only for 5–10 percent
of external debts from private creditors. In the past decade or so, the share of bonds
in foreign debts from private creditors increased to about 30 percent, becoming the
single most important source of foreign debt. Fund managers, institutional investors,
and individual creditors have now become the major actors in global credit markets.
Bond markets differ from commercial banks’ credit markets on many counts. Among
those, perhaps the most crucial difference is the degree of the coordination problem that
the players have to deal with. Being few in number, commercial banks often organize
themselves into a syndicate (typically 10–20 banks) and act as a single player in doing
business with their client sovereign borrowers, often within well-developed institutional
arrangements such as the Bank Advisory Committee (Lipson 1985; Rieffel 2003). Bond
markets, in contrast, are populated by a number of atomistic, individual players who
make their decisions on their own without explicit coordination with each other. Thus,
when they invest in sovereign bonds that are vulnerable to a liquidity crisis, they find
themselves in a situation similar to a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).
The situation is characterized by a self-fulfilling belief. If they believe that the
country is in danger of an imminent run, it is optimal for them to run first to secure their
money. Their actions then force the country into a near default, precipitating a liquidity
crisis. If they believe otherwise, however, they prefer to roll over the debt and no crisis
ensues. In short, creditors in bond markets face formidable coordination problems,
and when they fail, they stop rolling over the loan, bringing about a confidence crisis
(Alesina, Prati and Tabellini 1990; Chamon 2007; Cole and Kehoe 1995, 1998, 2000;
Sachs 1984).
This might explain why the international financial system has been so unstable since
the mid-1990s. Many emerging market economies have fallen victim to the vagaries of
the financial markets. A common element of these episodes was a sudden stop of capital
flows, an outcome of self-fulfilling fears of a liquidity crisis by the mass of individual
investors (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi 2003).
Do democratic institutions help a country avoid such a confidence crisis arising from
a coordination failure among international creditors? A key to this question lies in
transparency. On one hand, more democratic countries are more transparent. Demo-
cratic institutions, notably, electoral accountability and checks and balances, create
incentives for politicians to provide the public with more accurate public information
about the underlying state of the economy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Persson,
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Roland and Tabellini 1997; Rosendorff and Vreeland 2006).
On the other hand, transparency, or rather, a lack thereof, has been frequently
cited as a major factor in the financial crises in the 1990s. Many studies suggest that
transparent, timely, and accurate public information about economic conditions would
help investors assess investment risks more accurately and adjust their behaviors in a
timely manner, thereby preventing speculative bubbles and mitigating crises (Furman
and Stiglitz 1998; Gelos and Wei 2002; Vishwanath and Kaufmann 2001). In the policy
circle, the G-7 countries called for enhanced transparency, and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) launched Data Standards Initiatives to improve data transparency
across emerging market economies as well as countries that seek access to international
capital markets (IMF 2005).1
There has been a theoretical development in economics regarding the role of trans-
parency in a self-fulfilling crisis. Transparency, or the accuracy of publicly provided
information about the fundamentals, affects how individual creditors infer each others’
beliefs and actions, and thus increases or decreases the likelihood of a confidence cri-
sis. In a series of papers, Morris and Shin (1998, 2002, 2004, 2006) develop models of
self-fulfilling crises and show that with incomplete information and under certain con-
ditions there exists a unique equilibrium in which the critical mass of individuals runs
on the target at a unique threshold level related to the underlying state of the economy.
Drawing on their results, Metz (2002) derives comparative statics for the probability
of a self-fulfilling crisis with regard to the precision of public information. She shows
1Some empirical studies report that the IMF’s efforts to enhance data transparency produced
beneficial effects in reducing borrowing costs (Cady and Pellechio 2006; Glennerster and Shin 2003).
In contrast, Mosley (2003a) points out that mutual fund managers were not even aware of the existence
of the IMF’s new data regime, such as the Special Data Dissemination Standard, casting serious doubt
on the effectiveness of such international standards. Some even question the unambiguous benefit of
transparency and criticize international financial institutions for pushing developing countries toward
neoliberal best practices (Best 2005). Mosley (2003a) also expresses a concern that transparency might
have deleterious consequences.
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that an increase in the precision of public information lowers the probability of a crisis
when the fundamentals are expected to be good, whereas it worsens the probability of
a self-fulfilling crisis when the expected underlying state happens to be very bad.
Applying these theories to sovereign bond markets, in this paper I seek to link,
through the channel of transparency, the level of democracy and the likelihood of a
sudden stop of loan disbursements from bond markets and test the following hypothesis
using data on bonds flows. A higher level of democracy implies greater accuracy of the
public information that the government provides about the state of the economy, and
thus, it reduces the probability of a sudden stop of loan disbursements from bond
markets when its economy is expected to be in good shape. When the economy is
expected to be in a severe downturn, however, the greater transparency that more
democratic institutions provide worsens the risk of a sudden stop of bond flows.
The intuition is the following. The public information that the government releases
to the public at large serves as prior information to the individual creditors. They
use the public information to update their own information about the economy. If
the political system is not transparent, that is, the public information is known to be
very imprecise, the creditors tend to ignore it, and hence, it does not help reduce the
uncertainty that the creditors have over each others’ beliefs. If, in contrast, the public
information is known to be very precise, it serves as a more informative prior for the
creditors. As they take more seriously the information commonly given to them, the
uncertainty regarding each others’ beliefs can be reduced. As such, when the economy
is expected to do fairly well, the availability of more precise public information, by
reducing the uncertainty about each others’ beliefs, tends to confirm the creditors’ ex-
pectations. Hence it helps them better coordinate their actions on the good equilibrium
in which few run on the country and no crisis ensues. By the same token, however, if
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the expected state of the economy is too poor, the greater precision of public informa-
tion again serves to confirm their initial expectations, leading them to overreact to the
bad signal, thereby worsening the odds for a sudden stop of loan from bond markets.
Democracy, after all, is a transparent system. When creditors deal with a more
democratic system, they face less strategic uncertainty. They can be relatively sure
that what they see, either good or bad, is also what others see. As everybody is
more or less on the same page, investors do not easily lose their confidence unless they
see very bad things about the country. When the situation seems too bad, however,
transparency can be dysfunctional. A more democratic regime is more transparent
about the bad things as well, assuring investors that many others see the same and will
behave the same way, thereby prompting them to flee the country. Empirical analysis of
the incidence of a sudden stop of loan disbursements from bond markets using a sample
of developing countries from 1975 to 2003 provides strong support for the hypothesis.
This paper’s contribution is three-fold. First, the model that I use was developed by
Morris and Shin over the past ten years to model a self-fulfilling currency crisis. Their
model, however, turned out to be quite general and have the potential to be widely
applied. In this paper, I apply their model to sovereign bond markets in which a self-
fulfilling confidence crisis is deemed potentially prevalent. Second, transparency is a
governmental trait, that is, a government’s ability and willingness to provide accurate
and reliable public information. This is inherently political and is greatly affected and
shaped by political processes and political institutions. Unlike economists’ work, in
this paper I try to relate democracy to transparency and to stops of bond flows, both
theoretically and empirically. Third, the works by Morris and Shin, Metz, and other
economists dealing with models of self-fulfilling crisis have been purely theoretical. They
set up models and derive comparative statics but do not work on empirical models and
test theories against real-life data. I test an implication of their theory (applied in a
46
different context) against real data on sovereign bonds. Furthermore, I try to test it in a
more direct way by measuring data transparency from the patterns of data availability
in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
3.1 Democracy and Transparency
Democracy implies transparency. Normatively, transparency is a necessary condition
for democratic governments to be accountable and responsive to their citizens. With-
out transparency, key democratic mechanisms to enforce government accountability,
i.e., competitive elections and checks and balances, would not properly function. If
voters are not informed of what the true state is and what outcomes the government
produces given the state, voters cannot hold politicians accountable for their actions
at the polls and cannot exploit a conflict of interest between government bodies. Non-
democratic regimes can be as transparent as democratic ones; however, no transparency,
no democracy in the normative sense.
Democracy promotes transparency in the positive sense as well. Institutions of
electoral accountability induce politicians to reveal information about public matters.
First, elections pit competing political parties against one another, providing the op-
position with the incentive to elicit and release the information that the government
would be reluctant to release otherwise.
Second, information about public affairs is a publicly provided good that benefits the
voters at large. The voters as the principal are better off with more information given
about their agency, the government, since a lesser degree of informational asymmetry
between the politicians and the voters leaves less room for rents. As the politicians are
less able to extract such informational rents, the voters as a whole are left better off
(Persson and Tabellini 2000). Like any provision of public goods that benefits voters
across the board, as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue, democratic leaders (or
47
leaders of large coalition systems) have stronger incentives to provide public information
that would benefit a large section of citizens than autocrats do.
Third, it is in the incumbent’s interest to provide voters with public information
about the state of the economy with as much accuracy as possible (Rosendorff and
Vreeland 2006). Voters tend to engage in economic voting; that is, they punish or re-
ward incumbents retrospectively for their records of economic performance.2 However,
economic outcomes depend not only on government policy but also on random shocks
that are out of government control. More information about the state of the economy
helps voters distinguish bad outcomes due to bad policy from those due simply to bad
luck. To the extent that the country is vulnerable to external shocks and to the extent
that better informed voters can correctly attribute bad outcomes to bad luck, incum-
bent politicians are better able to survive at the polls if they provide more accurate
information about the state of the economy. In other words, the voters’ ability and
willingness to punish or reward the incumbents for their economic performance induce
politicians to better inform voters of the state of the economy, because that would
minimize the risk of being punished unfairly for the bad luck that they just happen to
have.
Finally, institutions of checks and balances facilitate transparency as well. They
are designed to enforce horizontal accountability, making separate government bodies
with different powers check each other in an open manner. On the one hand, this
involves intragovernmental exchanges of information through, for example, hearings
before Congress. This process, in turn, transmits information to the public. On the
other hand, as Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) show, the conflict of interest
2There is a vast literature on this issue. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) provide a good review
and summarize decades of findings by saying “Among the issues on the typical voter’s agenda, none is
more consistently present, nor generally has a stronger impact, than the economy.” Others are more
cautionary and emphasize that there are variations in individual and institutional constraints that
allow or impede economic voting (For instance, see Anderson 2007).
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between the bodies enables the voters to extract information about the true state from
the body that serves to check the executive.
While there is no reliable measure for transparency, there have been a few empirical
studies to test the democracy-transparency hypothesis. For example, Rosendorff and
Vreeland (2006) find that democracies are more likely to provide data on inflation and
unemployment than their autocratic counterparts, and Allum and Agc¸a (2001) show
that, using the index of political rights from the Freedom House, a higher level of
democracy is associated with a more frequent and timely provision of economic and
financial data.3
In short, democratic institutions beget a transparent government. The more demo-
cratic, the more transparent we expect a government to be. In particular, more demo-
cratic governments provide more accurate information about the underlying state of
the economy than less democratic ones. That is, what they say about the economy is
more informative to the public.
3.2 Transparency and Confidence Crisis
In this section I apply Morris and Shin (1998, 2004)’s models of self-fulfilling crisis
to the problem of confidence crisis in sovereign bond markets and derive a hypothesis
regarding the effect of transparency on the probability of a confidence crisis drawing
on Metz (2002)’s results of comparative statics.
Suppose that a group of creditors are investing in a country through sovereign bond
markets.4 Each creditor lends the debtor country an amount L at interest rate i and
receives L(1 + i) at maturity if the country remains solvent and liquid. In the event
3In the empirical analysis section below, I test this hypothesis using a measure of data transparency.
My results also confirm the democracy-transparency thesis.
4The following formalization is drawn largely from Morris and Shin (2004) and Metz (2002).
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of default, the creditors lose their money and get nothing. Before the end of the term,
however, the creditors can choose to foreclose on the loan and secure their money L or
to roll over the loan until maturity.
The country’s ability to pay depends in part on the underlying state θ. If the
fundamentals are sufficiently good (θ > 1), the country is strongly solvent so that it
can always repay the debt even if all the creditors reclaim their money. If θ is sufficiently
low (θ ≤ 0), the country is fundamentally insolvent so that it is not able to pay at any
rate. If the underlying state is in between (0 < θ ≤ 1), the country is solvent but may
become illiquid depending on how many of its creditors choose to claim their money
back. More precisely, denoting with l the proportion of creditors who refuse to roll over
the loan, the country remains liquid if θ ≥ l, and it becomes illiquid if θ < l. That
is, for a θ that is neither very high nor very low, the country’s ability to pay depends
crucially on the size of the mass that runs on the country relative to the underlying
state.
Thus, in this intermediate interval (0 < θ ≤ 1), the creditors face a coordination
problem analogous to the bank run problem (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). If creditors
believe that the country is in danger of an imminent run, it is optimal for them to run
and secure their money (L > 0). Their actions then precipitate the liquidity crisis (bad
equilibrium), thereby having their initial beliefs fulfilled. If they believe that there will
be no run, they prefer to roll over the debt rather than foreclose
(
L(1+ i) > L
)
, leading
to the good equilibrium in which everyone gets her highest payoff. Again their beliefs
have been self-fulfilled. Figure 3.1 shows the payoff to rolling over given l as a function
of θ with L(1 + i) normalized to 1 and 0 < L < 1.
With an assumption of complete information, this coordination problem is charac-
terized by the existence of multiple equilibria (Obstfeld 1996). For 0 < θ ≤ 1, either
outcome, good or bad, is equally feasible, and the theory tells nothing about what
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Figure 3.1: Payoff to rolling over
drives a shift from one to the other and when it will occur if it should. A change in
mood or a random event that lies outside the model should be invoked to explain the
onset of a confidence crisis.
However, the game may have a unique equilibrium if the complete information
assumption is relaxed. Morris and Shin (1998), using a theory of global games developed
by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), show that if each agent is informed of θ, not
perfectly but with little noise, , then there is a unique equilibrium; that is, there exists
a unique threshold level (0 < θ∗ < 1) such that just enough creditors choose to roll
over when the state is slightly beyond θ∗ and just enough choose not to roll over when
the state is slightly below θ∗.
To illustrate this assumption, suppose agent i receives her noisy signal about the
state, xi = θ + i, with i ∼ N
(
0, 1
β
)
, β > 0 (see Figure 3.2).
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On observing xi, i cannot be sure of what value agent j observes, but must infer
it from what she herself observes. Since she is about 95 percent sure that the true
θ is within the confidence interval
(
xi − 2√β , xi + 2√β
)
, and since she knows that j is
also informed of θ with noise j, she can infer the probability distribution of xj (the
flatter distributions in Figure 3.2 indicated by the dashed curves). From this, she can
calculate the proportion of creditors who observe xj below some value, say θ¯, as the
area under the probability density function for θ < θ¯. If she observes very high xi, she
can be sure that only a small fraction of other creditors observe xj below θ¯ (the top
panel in Figure 3.2). In this case her expected payoff for rolling over is likely higher
than that for not rolling over since l is low while θ is likely high, and since when θ > l,
the country remains liquid. Hence she optimally chooses to roll over. Similarly, if she
observes very low xi, she can be sure that all but a small fraction observe xj below θ¯
(the bottom panel in Figure 3.2). In this case, her expected payoff to rolling over is
likely lower than that to not rolling over because θ is likely low while l is high. Hence
she chooses not to roll over.
Then it follows that there must be a unique xi that leads to the expected payoffs
to rolling over and to not rolling over that are equal (the middle panel in Figure 3.2).
Denoting this marginal creditor’s signal by x∗i , every creditor observing lower than x
∗
i
will not roll over, whereas every creditor receiving greater than x∗i will roll over. And
the corresponding “switching” level of the state, θ∗, is the equilibrium state below which
more than the critical mass of investors rush to withdraw their loans.
In short, noisy private information smoothes out the discontinuous payoffs and
induces a probabilistic payoff structure to the game. An incremental change in signal is
associated with an incremental increase or decrease in the payoffs to the actions, which
ensures the existence of the marginal signal that makes the agent indifferent between
rolling over and withdrawing (Heinemann and Illing 2002).
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While adding noisy private information makes the information structure of the
model more realistic, assuming the total absence of common knowledge about θ might
be as unrealistic as assuming complete information. In Morris and Shin (2002, 2004,
2006), they develop a series of models that feature noisy public information in addition
to noisy private information and show that under certain conditions there still exists a
unique equilibrium. This makes it possible to analyze comparative statics with regard
to the precision of public information and thus to derive predictions about the likelihood
of a confidence crisis with differing degrees of transparency.
Specifically, the government releases public information on the state of the funda-
mentals. It can only provide a certain degree of accuracy, not perfection. That is, the
public information the government provides is y = θ + ν, with ν ∼ N (0, 1
α
)
, α > 0.
Here parameter α is the precision of the public information, and hence, is meant to cap-
ture the degree of transparency. This same information is equally given to all agents,
and every agent knows that everyone else knows it, and so on to infinity. That is, the
public information is common knowledge to all agents.
Each creditor also independently observes the state as before. Each observes her
own xi = θ + i, with i ∼ N
(
0, 1
β
)
, β > 0. Parameter β represents the precision of
this private information. While the distribution of  is common knowledge, a particular
realization of the noisy signal, xi, is private in the sense that it is known only to i.
Now the game has a unique equilibrium provided that private information is precise
enough relative to public information.5 To put this into perspective, this condition holds
if creditors each individually acquire more precise information about the economy than
the government provides to the public at large. In the context of financial markets, this
makes sense since individual actors in the markets are, most of the time, professional
5More precisely, the sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium is satisfied if β > α
2
2pi . For more
details, see Morris and Shin (2004) and Metz (2002).
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traders who have resources and expertise in analyzing risks involved in investments in
foreign countries. Individually they should be better informed of the country they are
investing in than the public at large, who are informed by public information.
Suppose the government provides y, and creditor i receives xi. Her expected value
of θ given y and xi, or her posterior belief about θ, is given by
E(θ|y, xi) = αy + βxi
α + β
, (3.1)
with variance
Var(θ|y, xi) = 1
α + β
. (3.2)
That is, each creditor, given public information y, updates her belief about θ using
her own signal xi. Then the posterior distribution of θ that the creditor with signal xi
should form has the mean that is the weighted average of y and xi, with each weight
given by the relative precision of each piece of information ( α
α+β
and β
α+β
). Hence, an
increase in α, on the one hand, pulls the center of the posterior distribution closer to
y. On the other hand, the variance is reduced to the extent that more information is
added. Thus, an increase in α leads to a narrower posterior distribution.
Suppose that the creditors roll over the loan whenever their updated beliefs about
θ exceed threshold level θ∗. Then, given y, there is a unique value of the private signal
x that leads to θ∗ by equation (3.1). Denoting it by x∗, and rearranging the terms in
(3.1), x∗ is given by
x∗(θ∗, y) =
α + β
β
θ∗ − α
β
y. (3.3)
x∗ is the private signal received by the marginal creditor who is indifferent between
rolling over and withdrawing. A creditor is indifferent if the expected payoff for rolling
55
over equals the payoff for foreclosing, that is, if
L = 0 · Prob(confidence crisis) + 1 · (1− Prob(confidence crisis)). (3.4)
Since a confidence crisis occurs whenever θ < θ∗, and since the conditional density of
θ is given by equations (3.1) and (3.2), its probability equals the area under the density
function for θ < θ∗. Normalizing the density to the standard normal distribution, the
probability of a confidence crisis is given by
Prob(confidence crisis) = Φ
(√
α + β
(
θ∗ − α
α + β
y − β
α + β
x
))
, (3.5)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal density.
By substituting (3.5) into (3.4), the condition for indifference is given by
L = 1− Φ
(√
α + β
(
θ∗ − α
α + β
y − β
α + β
x
))
. (3.6)
On the other hand, the country becomes illiquid whenever θ < l, and l is given
by the proportion of creditors who receive a private signal below the critical signal x∗.
Hence l = Prob (x ≤ x∗|θ). Normalizing the density to the standard normal density, l
is given by
l = Φ
(√
β (x∗ − θ)). (3.7)
Therefore, the second marginal condition is
θ = Φ
(√
β (x∗ − θ)). (3.8)
From equations (3.6) and (3.8), now the solution pair (θ∗, x∗) can be obtained.
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Solving for θ∗, we have
θ∗ = Φ
(
α√
β
(
θ∗ − y +
√
α + β
α
Φ−1(L)
))
. (3.9)
This θ∗ and the corresponding x∗ constitute a switching point equilibrium. Those
creditors who receive a private signal lower than x∗ choose not to roll over the loan,
thereby triggering a confidence crisis at any θ lower than θ∗. Since a higher threshold
implies a higher probability of a confidence crisis, predictions of the probability of a
crisis with differing parameter values can be derived.
Of particular interest here is the effect of a change in the precision of public infor-
mation (α) on the probability of a confidence crisis. The analysis of comparative statics
on θ∗ with regard to α shows that an increase in transparency reduces the probability of
a confidence crisis when the fundamentals are expected to be good whereas it increases
the probability of crisis when the expected fundamentals are bad.
Proposition (Metz 2002): An increase in the precision of public information
α reduces the probability of a confidence crisis if y is greater than a certain
value yα such that, for all y > yα, θ
∗ < y − 1
2
√
α+β
Φ−1 (L). However, if
y < yα such that, for all y < yα, θ
∗ > y − 1
2
√
α+β
Φ−1 (L), an increase in α
increases the probability of a crisis.
Proof:
∂θ∗
∂α
=
1√
β
φ(·)
(
θ∗ + α
∂θ∗
∂α
− y + 1
2
√
α + β
Φ−1(L)
)
, (3.10)
or
∂θ∗
∂α
=
φ(·)
(
θ∗ − y + 1
2
√
α + β
Φ−1(L)
)
√
β − αφ(·) . (3.11)
The partial derivative, ∂θ
∗
∂α
, is positive if θ∗ > y − 1
2
√
α+β
Φ−1(L), and is
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negative if θ∗ < y − 1
2
√
α+β
Φ−1(L). Denote the switching point function,
y− 1
2
√
α+β
Φ−1(L), by f(y). f(y) is increasing in y. On the other hand, since
the partial derivative of θ∗ with regard to y is negative
(
∂θ∗
∂y
< 0
)
, θ∗(y) is
decreasing in y. Then there must be a value of y, denoted by yα, such that
θ∗(yα) = f(yα). Therefore, it follows that if y > yα, then θ∗(yα) < f(yα),
hence
(
∂θ∗
∂α
< 0
)
, implying that an increase in α reduces the probability of
a crisis. If y < yα, then θ
∗(yα) > f(yα), hence
(
∂θ∗
∂α
> 0
)
, implying that an
increase in α raises the probability of a crisis (see Figure 3.3).
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
y
f(y
)
yα
f(y)θ*(y)
∂θ*
∂α
> 0
∂θ*
∂α
< 0
Figure 3.3: Switching point in y
The intuition is as follows. When the precision of public information is very poor,
the creditors tend to ignore it and behave as if there were no public information (see
58
θP
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 θ 1
0
5
10
low α
Prob(xj < θ) = 0.4
θ
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 θ 1
0
5
10
high α
Prob(xj < θ) = 0.2
θ
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 θ 1
0
5
10
low α
Prob(xj < θ) = 0.7
θ
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
de
ns
ity
0 θ 1
0
5
10
high α
Prob(xj < θ) = 0.85
Figure 3.4: The effect of α on the inference of others’ beliefs
Figure 3.4). That is, public information is treated as a rather non-informative prior.
Thus their updated beliefs about θ do not greatly differ from those based solely on their
private signals. In the top left panel in Figure 3.4, given a relatively non-informative
public signal (the solid flatter curve), the creditor i’s posterior distribution (the dashed
curve) almost overlaps with her expectation about θ that is formed by her private signal
(the solid curve). From there, she infers what others observe (the dotted flatter curve)
and how many of them believe the true θ is below a certain benchmark level (the shaded
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area) just as before.
In contrast, if public information is known to be very precise, the creditors take
that information more seriously into their calculations by granting it a higher weight.
Thus, in the top right panel, the posterior distribution is drawn closer to where public
information suggests the true θ is located. From there they infer the distribution of
other creditors’ posterior beliefs (the flatter dotted curve), which is narrower compared
to that in the left panel. As a result, the expected proportion of creditors who believe
the true θ is below a certain benchmark level is smaller (the shaded area). In other
words, the more informative prior shrinks the distribution of their posterior beliefs,
which in turn makes the area of a tail smaller. Therefore, a signal should be lower
in order to make the marginal creditor indifferent, hence a lower x∗. In short, more
precise public information serves to confirm the creditors’ beliefs about θ and helps
reduce the uncertainty regarding each others’ posterior beliefs, thereby facilitating their
coordination.
By the same token, however, when the creditors receive a very low public signal, its
greater precision confirms their expectations and helps them coordinate on the other
side, triggering a crisis at a higher threshold level. Comparing the bottom left and
right panels in Figure 3.4, one can see that even if public information suggests a better
economic situation than what agent i privately observes, thus pulling her posterior
belief to the right, an increase in precision raises the proportion of those who believe
that the situation is worse than a certain critical level by reducing the uncertainty (or
shrinking the posterior distribution). In other words, precise public information about
a very bad situation prompts the agents to take action in anticipation of an imminent
crisis.
For a numerical illustration of how the probability of a crisis changes with differing
α, I performed simulations. I set the payoff to not rolling over (L) to 0.5 and set the
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value of β such that the uniqueness condition is satisfied. I then varied α from 1 to 10
to get changes in the location of θ∗ in the unit interval, which represents the probability
of a crisis. I did this for two scenarios. Under the good scenario, public information
(y) and the private signal (x) are drawn uniformly from the high interval [1, 2]. Under
the bad scenario, y and x are drawn from the uniform distribution of [−1, 0].
Figure 3.5 displays the simulation results of changes in the probability of a confi-
dence crisis as a function of α, or the precision of public information. Consistent with
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Figure 3.5: The effect of α on the probability of a confidence crisis
the analytical results in the proposition, an increase in α raises or lowers the probability
of a crisis depending on whether the expectations about the fundamentals are high or
low. When public information tends to suggest a very bad economy (−1 < θ < 0), an
increase in α increases the probability of a crisis (the left panel in Figure 3.5). When
the available information points in the other direction (1 < θ < 2), the improved ac-
curacy of public information helps to reduce the probability of a confidence crisis (the
right panel).
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3.3 Data and Analysis
I test the central prediction of the model as depicted in Figure 3.5 by first examining
the impact of democracy on the probability of a sudden stop of loan disbursements
from sovereign bond markets using a sample of 40 developing countries between 1975
and 2003. Later I provide a more direct test using the measure of data transparency
that I estimate from the data missing patterns in the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) using a Bayesian Item-Response Theory model. Data on loan
disbursements and other debt indicators are all from the IMF Global Development Fi-
nance (GDF 2005). Data on economic controls are from WDI. Since I examine the
transition probability to a state of zero loan disbursements from a state of nonzero dis-
bursements, I only consider cases where nonzero loans were disbursed in the previous
year. Otherwise my sample includes all cases for which complete data were available.
A full list of countries and years is provided in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Stop of Loan
A variable PPG bonds (DIS, US$) from GDF 2005 measures the amount of loans from
bond markets that were actually disbursed to a given country during a given year. This
raw measure is highly skewed since only about 60 countries have ever received nonzero
loans from bond markets. Most of the time the variable takes zero, indicating that
not a single dollar was disbursed. When countries receive loans, however, they usually
receive a substantial amount. The minimum of nonzero disbursements is 0.1 million
dollars, while the mean and the median are 1.01 billion dollars and 300 million dollars,
respectively. A binary variable Zero loan then takes one if PPG bonds (DIS, US$)
is zero and takes zero otherwise. Thus Zero loan is an indicator of whether or not, for
a given country-year, a loan disbursement was made. Finally, the dependent variable
Stop of loan at year t is constructed to measure a transition from nonzero to zero
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disbursements. Precisely,
Stop of loant =

1 if Zero loant = 1 given that Zero loant−1 = 0,
0 if Zero loant = 0 given that Zero loant−1 = 0.
(3.12)
In other words, Stop of loan is an indicator of whether loan disbursements from bond
markets came to a halt at a given year or continued. Thus it captures the incidence of
a sudden stop of rolling over in sovereign bond markets.6
Constructed this way, the dependent variable, Stop of loan, is analogous to the
concept of “sudden stop” in the economics literature. Sudden stops are an episode
in which a country experiences a large contraction in capital flows given that it was
receiving large positive net flows until that moment (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia 2004;
Frankel and Cavallo 2004). While sudden stops concern any kinds of capital flows that
register in a country’s capital account, Stop of loan is meant to capture an episode of
a sudden stop of a particular class of capital flows, or government bonds.7
In using data on bond flows to measure stops of loan, I rely on standard neoclas-
sical economic theory which states that capital-scarce countries should be borrowing
large amounts to finance domestic investment (e.g., Lucas 1990), hence a stop of loan
resulting from a stop of loan supply, rather than from a stop of loan demand. In fact,
the dataset (IMF GDF) only includes capital-scarce, net-borrowing countries. It does
6The amounts of bond flows at year t given bonds that flowed in at year t−1 are essentially binary.
The bottom half of the observations are all zeros and the minimum (which also happens to be the
median) non-zero amount is about 18 million dollars. So zeros clearly indicate a stop of flows and
non-zeros a continuation of flows.
7More recently, Edwards (2007) propose a broader concept, “capital flow contractions,” defined as
an episode in which a country experiences a large decline in capital net flows no matter whether it had
positive or negative net flows at previous year. Since an incidence of capital flow contraction may still
occur even when a country was experiencing periods of capital net outflows, capital flow contraction
is a superset of sudden stop, and the former includes episodes of “capital flight” while the latter does
not. And for this reason, his broader concept is not appropriate for this paper since a stop of loan
presupposes a flow of loan last year.
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not include, for instance, the countries that are classified as creditors by the World
Bank and a list of countries that Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2004) suggest excluding
on the grounds that those countries do not need foreign borrowing either because they
are rich enough or because they are completely isolated: Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).
I acknowledge that this is not a completely satisfactory solution. To mitigate this
problem, I include in the regression lagged Bond Disbursements, the amount of bond
flows in the previous year. This would capture year-to-year fluctuations in bond flows.
A stop of bond flows at t might simply be preceded by large bond inflows at t − 1
either because this might reduce the need to borrow in the following year or because of
moving-average-like fluctuations of capital availability for a given bond-issuing country.
Still, it might be the case that bond flows stop because governments do not need
to issue bonds, not necessarily because investors stop providing loans. This might
be particularly so if the government has an alternative and more attractive source
of funding such as concessional loans from bilateral and multilateral lenders. In the
empirical models, I include the ratio of concessional debt to total debt to capture this.
I also try to control for a government’s fiscal position (Cash Surplus/Deficit to GDP
from WDI) as well as a country’s current account surplus.8
In a total of 402 country-years, 104 (25.9 percent) cases experienced a sudden stop
of bond flows. By construction, however, this sample of 402 cases may include ones that
received bond flows at t−1 but not at t−2 or even before that. To check that regression
results are not driven by those occasional bond issuers, I construct four more restrictive
8Neither of them, however, is statistically significant across different models and has no noticeable
impact on the main findings. Besides, including the former, whose data availability is highly limited,
reduces the sample size considerably to about a fourth of the sample used. Hence, I report the results
without these additional controls.
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versions of the dependent variable. Stop of loan 2 takes 1 if a country-year received
no bond flows given that the country received bond flows for the past two consecutive
years and takes 0 otherwise. Similarly, Stop of loan 3 is constructed conditional on
non-zero loan disbursements during the past three consecutive years, and Stop of loan 4
conditional on the past four consecutive years. With occasional bond issuers excluded,
the sample size is reduced to 260 for Stop of loan 2. It goes down further to 192 for
Stop of loan 3, and to 144 for Stop of loan 4. The proportions of the cases of loan
stop are 19.6 percent, 16.7 percent, and 18.8 percent, respectively.
The distribution of Stop of loan over time is presented in Figure 3.6. There are
two peaks in the number of the incidences of bond stop during the 1975-2003 period.
Not surprisingly, the first peak was the time of a global debt crisis in the early 1980s,
and the second was the late 1990s when many emerging economies were hit by a global
financial meltdown.
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Figure 3.6: The distribution of the number of bond stop episodes
66
3.3.2 Independent Variables: Democracy and GDP growth
For a measure of democracy, I use the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall and Jaggers 2004). It is a 21-point composite index of political systems’
competitiveness. Since more democratic institutions imply greater transparency, the
democracy variable serves as a proxy for transparency or the precision of public infor-
mation on the underlying state of the economy.9
The model predicts that the effect of democracy depends on the expected state of
the economy. I use the GDP growth rate at year t − 1 for a proxy measure of where
everybody stands in terms of the expectation of the economy at t on the grounds that,
by first-order autocorrelation, the economic growth of this year can be best predicted
by the economic growth of last year without knowing any other factors. In other
words, since a bad (good) economy is most likely to be followed by another bad (good)
economy, it is reasonable to assume that having had a bad (good) economy last year,
the agents expect another bad (good) economy this year without considering other
complications.10 Then I create the interaction term Democracy×GDP growtht−1. The
coefficient on this interaction term should be less than zero in order to be supportive
of the hypothesis.
3.3.3 Control Variables
I consider several factors that might be related to the incidence of a loan stop. I include
log(GDP ), the logarithm of GDP, to account for the size of the economy. A smaller
economy might be more vulnerable to a confidence crisis than a larger one for many
9For this reason, continuous measures of democracy such as Polity2 are preferred to dichotomous
ones such as the PACL measure constructed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (Przeworski
et al. 2000).
10The correlation coefficient between GDP growth rates at t and t− 1 is 0.41 in the sample.
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reasons. Perhaps it is dependent on external resources to a greater degree. Perhaps
it is disadvantaged over a larger one in the geopolitical sense so that it is less likely
to be bailed out when in danger of imminent crisis. I also consider the ideology of
the government. The fact that a left government is able to issue bonds implies that
it gained investors’ confidence enough to offset its ideological disadvantage. Further,
investors are relieved by the fact that any changes in the government should be toward
the right. Therefore, the leftist governments in the markets face less nervous investors
and thus are less prone to a confidence crisis. I include Left, an indicator of governing
party’s leftist ideology, taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.
2001).11
I also include a few debt indicators. Total debt, the total external debt scaled by
GDP, is a measure of the level of indebtedness. Heavy indebtedness is a sign of the lack
of ability and willingness to pay. More heavily indebted countries, therefore, might fall
victim to a confidence crisis more easily than countries with less debt. Short term debt,
the short-term debt to total debt ratio, is also added to account for the effect of the
debt structure. When countries rely more heavily on short-term debts, they are more
vulnerable to a liquidity crisis since short-term debts are, by definition, subject to
a more frequent interim review of debt contracts. Concessional debt is the ratio of
concessional debt to total debt. Countries that are granted more concessional debts
are thought to be less creditworthy, and hence, creditors’ confidence about them might
be more fragile. Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, those countries that receive larger
loans at concessional terms may not need to seek loans from bond markets.
11I also included GDP per capita to control for the wealth of the economy in the expectation that
a richer economy might better weather a confidence crisis than a poorer economy since it is likely to
have more resources available to meet creditors’ claims. However, its estimated coefficient was far from
significant across models and its sign was positive, rather than negative, for the most of the models.
Further, whether it is included or excluded, the other variables’ estimated slopes did not change to
any noticeable degree. Here I present the results of those models without it.
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A country’s ability to pay hinges greatly on its balance of payment position. Reserves,
the amount of international reserves, is a direct measure of the balance of payment and
is indicative of the amount of liquidity the country retains. To account for fluctuations
of global liquidity as well as their contagion within regions, I include the percentage
of zero bond flows in a region (% Zero bond in region). Finally, to capture long-run
period effects, I include three period dummies, one for the 1970s (75 − 80), one for
the 80s (81 − 89), and one for the 90s (90 − 98). The most recent five-year period
(1999–2003) is left out as the reference category.
3.3.4 Model Specification and Results
I estimate the effect of democracy on the incidence of a loan disbursement stop using
fixed-effects logistic regression. The model takes the following time-series cross-sectional
form:
logit
(
Prob(Stop of loanit = 1)
)
= βDDemocracyit + βGGDP growthi,t−1
+ βDGDemocracyit ×GDP growthi,t−1 + γXit + λP, (3.13)
where X is a vector of the controls, and P is a vector of period dummies, for i = 1, . . . , N
countries, and t = 1, . . . , T years. The regression results are reported in the left column
in Table 3.2.
Overall the model predicts the outcome very well. Most variables are signed as
expected, and many of them are statistically significant. The size
(
log(GDP )
)
turns
out to matter significantly. Larger economies tend to fare better than smaller ones.
With a larger economy, a country faces a smaller risk of investors’ confidence crisis. Its
effect seems highly significant both in the statistical and substantive sense. The debt
indicators are all significant. Heavy debtors, debtors with short-term contracts, and
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Table 3.2: Democracy, expected GDP growth, and a loan stop
(1) (2)
Bonds Banks
Democracy −0.074 −0.012
(0.051) (0.037)
Democracy×GDP growtht−1 −0.013∗∗ 0.002
(0.006) (0.003)
Bond disbursementst−1 0.350∗∗∗ −3.440∗∗
(0.124) (1.420)
% Zero bond in region 14.004∗∗∗ 6.730∗∗∗
(2.153) (1.151)
GDP growtht−1 0.067 −0.021
(0.053) (0.020)
Left −0.859 −0.034
(0.585) (0.387)
log(GDP) −2.588∗∗∗ −0.268
(0.596) (0.186)
Total debt 0.109∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.026) (0.003)
Short-term debt 0.129∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.026) (0.016)
Concessional debt 0.098∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.038) (0.013)
Reserves −0.942∗ 1.160
(0.533) (1.360)
75–80 −5.835∗∗∗ −0.694
(1.229) (0.629)
81–89 −3.632∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.914) (0.457)
90–98 −2.166∗∗∗ −0.052
(0.586) (0.313)
Log likelihood −97.67 −235.56
Number of observations 402 932
Number of countries 40 71
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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debtors relying on concessional treatment are all signs of inherent fragility and thus are
easily exposed to a confidence crisis.12 The three period dummies are also significant.
The most recent period is more volatile than any previous period. It also turns out
that the more recent the period, the more nervous the bond markets tend to be, as
the decreasing magnitudes of the coefficients suggest. So it confirms what we know:
the international financial system has become increasingly unstable. Left, however,
falls short of the conventional significance level, although its sign is consistent with the
expectation.13
Turning to the variables of interest, more democratic countries are less likely to
experience a confidence crisis under the average economic situation (3.8 percent GDP
growth rate in the previous year). As the theory suggests, the effect of democracy
increases with economic conditions. When the economy yielded a higher-than-average
growth rate last year, more democratic countries face an even lower risk of crisis this
year than less democratic ones that are equally on a roll. However, when things were
very bad last year, more democratic countries tend to fall victim more easily to the
volatility of the bond markets than less democratic ones that are equally in trouble.
Does the democracy score really capture the effect of transparency on crisis prob-
ability? While a definite answer cannot be made unless transparency can be directly
measured, one indirect test is to compare it with what happens in the commercial bank
credit markets. If higher democracy provides more transparency and greater trans-
parency leads to a higher or lower chance of a loan stop from bond markets because it
12I checked whether the data suffer multicollinearity among these debt indicators, but there was no
such sign in the calculated variance inflation factor.
13As shown below, in a later analysis with a measure of data transparency, Left turns out to be
significant suggesting that leftist governments in the markets do fare better than governments of center
or right. They seem to have established a good reputation among creditors and, by doing so, they
preemptively defused a self-fulfilling crisis in bond markets, more successfully than governments of
another stripe.
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affects how individual investors deal with the coordination problem, and if the credit
markets of commercial banks differ from bond markets in that banks do not face such a
coordination problem in the first place, then we do not expect to see the same pattern
in the data of loan disbursements from commercial banks. At least this test could
falsify the theory: if the same relationship holds in bank markets as well, then it would
not be via the coordination issue that democracy affects the probability of crises.
The test, however, fails to falsify the theory. As seen in the right column in Table
3.2, the same model is fitted using bank disbursement data in place of the bond data.
Now the dependent variable is the indicator of whether loans from banks continued to
come in or came to a halt. The overall model fit is quite similar to the previous bond
data model. However, the effect of the Democracy variable carries no significance at
all in this case, suggesting that a higher democracy score and improved transparency
do not affect the likelihood of a bank’s loan disbursement stop.
Finally, for robustness checks, I fit the same model for bond markets using the
more restrictive measures of the dependent variable (Stop of loan 2 − 5). Table 3.3
reports the results. Across the different measures, the interaction term is consistently
significant and signed correctly. This assures that the main results are not driven by
any particular class of countries. Whether occasional bond issuers are included or only
more consistent issuers are included, the results consistently support the hypothesis.14
3.3.5 Measuring Data Transparency
Transparency is a latent trait of a government that is not directly observable, which
forces many researchers interested in the effects of transparency to settle for using
14For further robustness checks, I exclude those cases with trivial amounts of bond flows at t − 1
(less than 0.1 million dollars, less than 0.5 million dollars, and less than 1 million dollars) as well as
those with huge amounts (more than 10 billion dollars, more than 5 billion dollars, and more than 1
billion dollars). Excluding those extreme cases does not affect the results.
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Table 3.3: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Two years Three years Four years
Democracy −0.132∗ −0.167∗ −0.570∗∗
(0.080) (0.102) (0.227)
Democracy×GDP growtht−1 −0.020∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.022)
Bond disbursementst−1 0.409∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗ 0.434∗∗
(0.147) (0.170) (0.216)
% Zero bond in region 13.398∗∗∗ 13.392∗∗∗ 20.353∗∗∗
(3.039) (3.580) (6.581)
GDP growtht−1 0.043 0.023 0.004
(0.062) (0.075) (0.116)
Left −0.460 −1.312 −0.615
(0.991) (1.483) (3.674)
log(GDP) −2.494∗∗∗ −1.681 2.388
(0.922) (1.102) (2.490)
Total debt 0.092∗∗∗ 0.081∗ −0.059
(0.040) (0.044) (0.087)
Short-term debt 0.143∗∗∗ 0.071 0.013
(0.041) (0.056) (0.064)
Concessional debt 0.130∗ 0.109 0.115
(0.078) (0.109) (0.151)
Reserves −0.547 −0.576 −3.630
(0.681) (0.682) (2.710)
75–80 −5.660∗∗∗ −3.521∗ −5.771∗
(1.784) (1.978) (3.466)
81–89 −2.641∗∗ −1.659 −3.369
(1.271) (1.321) (2.935)
90–98 −1.906∗∗ −1.354 −3.223
(0.808) (1.002) (2.378)
Log likelihood −54.36 −37.35 −18.44
Number of observations 260 192 144
Number of countries 29 21 19
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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democracy scores as its proxy. Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006), however, present an
insightful suggestion that data (un)availability in the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) are a good indicator of governments’ data transparency. As they
note, the dataset that consists of the time series 1960–2007 and has a total of 854
indicators (as of 2008) has numerous missing points across countries and time periods.
The pattern of data missingness, however, seems rather systematic. Even with a casual
look, one can easily notice that some countries have more missing points than others
across a wide range of indicators, that over time fewer and fewer indicators remain
missing across countries, and that some indicators tend to be missing more so than
other indicators across country-years. This naturally begs the question of why certain
indicators are missing for certain country-years and not for others.
There are two sources of missingness according to Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006):
first, a failure of reporting by a government; and second, a deletion by the World Bank
of the data that are reported but seem questionable. As for the former, the government
was either unable or unwilling to provide the data. This reflects data transparency in
a strict sense: a government’s ability and willingness to provide the public information
on the state of the economy. The latter seems more complicated since it involves the
international organization’s judgments on whether or not the reported data are reliable.
However, if we accept that the World Bank’s judgments are objective and technically
well grounded, the missingness by deletion also represents data transparency, albeit in a
less strict sense: a government’s ability and willingness to provide reliable information.15
15Figuring out exactly why certain indicators are missing for certain country-years is a daunting
task given the size of the dataset and technical details in compiling all the data in a way that ensures
consistency and comparability across countries and years. Its annual publication version (for instance,
The World Development Indicators 2008) provides technical information on statistical methods and
concepts used, and other background information, but no specific reasons why a particular indicator is
missing for a particular case. It does note, however, “Many factors affect data availability: . . . statistical
systems in many developing economies are still weak; statistical methods, coverage, practices, and
definitions differ widely . . . . Data coverage may not be complete because of special circumstances
affecting the collection and reporting of data, such as problems stemming from conflicts. (p. xx)” It
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There are two possible scenarios in which a government reports questionable data.
First, it does not have the capacity to collect, manage, and report data on certain
indicators in ways that ensure the data quality that is required by international or-
ganizations, but it reports the data anyway. In this case, the government lacks data
transparency to the extent that the information it provides is not accurate or reliable.
Second, a government might intentionally report false data for some strategic reasons.
Whatever the motivations, the very fact that the government tried to misrepresent the
true state of the economy indicates that it lacks data transparency in the sense that it is
unwilling to present the data as they are. After all, data manipulation is the last thing
that a transparent government is expected to do.16 In sum, in what follows, I assume
that data (un)availability of each indicator in WDI is a manifestation of a government’s
underlying trait, i.e., its ability and willingness to provide reliable information on the
state of the economy.
To clarify the concept of (data) transparency further, in the theory section it is
conceptualized as the accuracy of the public information that the government provides
about the state of the economy, captured by the precision parameter α (or the inverse
of the variance of the public information). So transparency in this paper is defined,
perhaps somewhat narrowly, and hence, better called data transparency, as the accuracy
of the public information. A government’s capacity and willingness to provide reliable
information on the state of the economy is a necessary and sufficient condition for
transparency. The accuracy of the public information implies that the government
must be able and willing to provide reliable information. On the other hand, the fact
also says, “When available data are deemed to be too weak to provide reliable measures of levels and
trends or do not adequately adhere to international standards, the data are not shown. (p. xx)”
16Why and under what conditions governments try to misinform outside observers is an important
and interesting question in itself, which is beyond the scope of this paper. I leave this issue for future
research.
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that the government is able and willing to provide such information implies that the
public information it provides must be accurate.
In reality, however, there is no “the” public information. What the government
provides is a host of pieces of information regarding the state of the economy such as
inflation rates, unemployment rates, real exchange rates, the amount of international
reserves, the amount of external debt that comes due, and the like. Those numerous
pieces of information, taken together, inform economic agents of the state of the econ-
omy, hence constituting what one might conceptualize as the public information on the
economy.
Now suppose that there are k (k > 0) pieces of information that constitutes the
public information and that each piece is a binary response of a government’s ability
and willingness to provide information, that is, it is available only when the government
is able and willing to provide it in a reliable way. If government A is able and willing to
provide all those k pieces of information that are reliable, the public information is said
to be accurate, and hence, the government is transparent. If government B is so unable
or unwilling to provide information that none of those is provided in a reliable manner
or altogether, the public information is considered inaccurate, and the government
is characterized as non-transparent. Between these two extremes, there are varying
degrees to which governments are able and willing to provide reliable information, and
thus, varying degrees to which they are viewed as transparent.
Seen in this light, the pattern of data missingness in WDI becomes useful data for
measuring governments transparency.17 Specifically, it allows one to measure trans-
parency scores using an Item-Response Theory (IRT) model. IRT was developed in the
field of education to measure the latent ability of students who take an exam consisting
of a number of questions (items). Students’ answers (responses) to the questions are
17This insight is based on Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006), although I further pursue it in this paper.
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coded one if they got it right or zero if wrong. Then whether they answered each item
correctly or not is statistically modeled as a manifestation of their latent ability (α).
Importantly, the model explicitly takes into account the degree to which items vary
in terms of their difficulty or easiness (δ) and in terms of their discriminatory power
(γ) given the difficulty. As such, IRT is considered a state-of-the-art method to re-
cover students’ underlying abilities through their manifested responses to a number of
heterogeneous items.18
The analogy seems quite straightforward. Governments (country-years) take an
exam that consists of a number of economic indictors (items). If they report the
data for an item (and the data are accepted as reliable), they got it right and their
responses are coded one (the data are available in WDI), and if they fail to do so,
they got it wrong and the responses are coded zero (the data are missing in WDI).
Some indicators are inherently easier to report than others, and some indicators are
better able to discriminate governments’ underlying data transparency than are other
indicators.
Using an IRT model, I measure latent data transparency for all country-years in-
cluded in WDI. Instead of using all 854 indicators in WDI, I select 41 indicators to run
the model. I employ five governing rules for the selection process. First, I make the list
as comprehensive as possible. Rather than making arbitrary choices, I include every
indicator as long as it meets other criteria.
Second, I make sure that the indicators are relevant information to the state of the
economy. So I include those indicators classified as Economy and as Finance in the
WDI manual and leave out such indicators as population statistics. This leaves me with
18In recent years, IRT models began to be widely used in political science. Mostly they are applied
to estimate ideal points of legislatures (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004), of Supreme Court judges
(Martin and Quinn 2002), and of states in the United Nations. (Voeten 2004). Other applications
include an analysis of government responses to crises (Rosas 2006) and measuring democracy (Treier
and Jackman 2008).
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302 economic and financial indicators which include the balance of payments data, the
data on exchange rates and prices, financial statistics, the data on government finance
(GFS), and national account data.
Third, indicators should be independent of each other and not be redundant.19
Redundancy of indicators is prevalent in WDI. Many indicators carry the same infor-
mation but only differ in scales. For instance, government expenses enter the WDI
entry as several indicators scaled by different denominators: as percentage of GDP, as
percentage of revenue, and as current local currency unit (LCU), and the like. If a
government reports on one of these, it reports on the others as well, and by the same
token, if a government fails to report on any of those, it misses the others too. To
ensure non-redundancy among indicators, I calculate pair-wise correlations of all pairs
of indicators, and if two or more indicators have perfect correlation in any year, that
is, if they are all missing for the exact same set of countries and are reported for the
other exact same set of countries, then I delete those perfectly correlated indicators
save one. Those selected are the ones that come first in an alphabetical order in indica-
tors’ names.20 Perfect correlation, however, turns out to be too low a bar to select out
redundant indicators. Among the remaining 88 indicators, some of them are clearly
the same indicators with different scales. I further delete those and am left with 69
indicators.
Fourth, I do a reality check. The pattern of data availability of one particular group
of indicators, called GFS data, clearly goes against common sense. GFS data deal with
the fiscal accounts of the central government: the balance of incomes and expenditures
19This criterion is important since it is related to one of the key assumptions of IRT models, or local
independence, which means that the fact that one is able to answer one item correctly must not imply
that the person can get another item right. That is, items should be independent of each other given
the latent ability (Johnson and Albert 1999).
20For this reason, some of the indicators in the final list are “nominal” in the sense that they
happened to be the first in an alphabetical order among their perfectly correlated families.
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and how they are financed. However, for some governments, particularly those with
federal systems, the bookkeeping practice is very complicated since it involves complex
intragovernmental transfers between the federal and local governments. As such, in
some cases, there is no such book that can be considered the fiscal accounts of the
central government. For instance, the United States does not have any reported data
on all indicators in this category. Nor do such large countries as Argentina and Brazil
have data on GFS indicators. Deleting GFS data leaves me with 51 indicators.
Fifth and finally, to ensure the full comparability across years, I leave out those
indicators that began to be measured some points after 1970. WDI includes many
indicators that the World Bank and IMF did not collect and report from the beginning,
but only began to do so later. For instance, real effective exchange rate index was added
to the dataset in 1975, so this indicator is missing for all countries before that. An
indicator named “financing via international capital markets” began to be reported
only in 2004, and hence, any time before that, it is entirely missing for every country.
Of the 51 indicators, 10 are those that are missing for all countries for any year before
they began to be reported. Deleting those indicators leaves me with a final set of 41
indicators that I then use to measure data transparency by way of an IRT model. The
full list of 41 indicators’ series names is provided in Table 3.4.21
21One might argue that the list contains too many indicators and some of them do not seem to
be what investors would necessarily be interested in looking at. Actors in financial markets such as
investors and credit rating agencies are eager to know about countries’ key macroeconomic indicators
such as inflation rates, exchange rates, the level of international reserves that have significant implica-
tions for the countries’ risks (Mosley 2003b; Sinclair 2005). Restricting the list to those key indicators,
however, is not desirable for the purpose of measuring transparency for those countries that have
issued bonds. Since they were able to issue bonds in international markets, most, if not all, have made
those key indicators available precisely because they are indicators of such significance, and hence,
there is little variation in the data availability. For instance, data on inflation rates (consumer price
index) are available for more than 98.4 percent of the sample country-years, and data on international
reserves (total reserves) are available for all the country-years in the sample. What really matters
to investors is the substantive information that those indicators convey about the economy, but not
merely whether they are available or not.
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I set up a Bayesian IRT model of data transparency as follows:
Prob(yi,j = 1|αi) = F
(
γj (αi − δj)
)
, (3.14)
where yi,j represents missing (0) or nonmissing (1) status of a country-year i = 1, . . . , n
on an indictor j = 1, . . . , k, F (·) is the logistic CDF F (z) = 1/(1 + exp(−z)), and
αi is the i-th country-year’s latent data transparency score, which is of our primary
interest. γj and δj represent the j-th item’s discrimination and difficulty parameters,
respectively.
The Bernoulli probability of response yi,j may be written as:
Prob(yi,j|αi, γj, δj) = F
(
γj (αi − δj)
)yi,j(1− F(γj (αi − δj)))1−yi,j . (3.15)
With the assumption of local independence, the property that the responses of a
country-year yi,j are conditionally independent given the latent transparency value αi,
we can define the likelihood function as:
L(α,γ, δ) =
n∏
i=1
k∏
j=1
F
(
γj (αi − δj)
)yi,j(1− F(γj (αi − δj)))1−yi,j . (3.16)
The total number of parameters to estimate is n+ 2k. To estimate them, I proceed
with a Bayesian method. There are at least two major merits of the Bayesian approach
over classical estimation such as the joint maximum likelihood estimation. First, by
Bayesian inference, one is able to acquire posterior samples of the parameters of interest,
not just their point estimates. This is important since here the ultimate goal is to use
the resulting measure of latent traits as an independent variable in the regression of
stop of loan. If we use its point estimates and ignore uncertainty in the measurement,
then it amounts to ignoring measurement errors in an independent variable, which
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causes bias in all the regression coefficients. Generating the entire posterior density,
Bayesian methods allow one to take measurement errors into account in inferring the
latent variable’s effect on the outcome. I will return to this issue later.
The other advantage of Bayesian methods has to do with the identification problem
of an IRT model. The model has two indeterminacies. First, a constant can be added
to all the α’s and all the δ’s without changing the model’s predictions. Second, if each
α is multiplied by a constant, and α and δ are both divided by the same constant,
the predicted success probability again remains unchanged. Thus, it is not possible
to obtain unique estimates for both the latent variable and item parameters (Johnson
and Albert 1999; Gelman and Hill 2006). To resolve the issue of identification, one
must impose certain constraints on those parameters. The Bayesian framework, in
which the prior distribution of all unknown parameters needs to be specified, provides
flexibility in setting constraints on parameters. This makes it possible to ensure that
the constraints imposed are theoretically guided and realistic rather than arbitrary.
I specify the standard normal prior on the distribution of the difficulty parameter
δ. This provides a useful scale with which the values of estimated items’ difficulty can
be interpreted, and against which country-years’ transparency scores can be identified.
Thus, an average item’s difficulty score equals 0, and almost all items’ difficulty scores
are assumed to fall in the interval (−3, 3). Against this scale, transparency scores can
be uniquely placed. So, for example, if a government reports on even the most difficult
indicator as well as on the others, its transparency score is likely to fall above the range,
and if a government fails to report on even the easiest indicator, its transparency score
is likely to fall below it. I also constrain the discrimination parameter γ to have a
positive sign. This is theoretically valid because an item with negative γ would mean
that the more transparent, the less likely it is that the government reports the data on
that item. Finally, I leave the latent trait parameter α unconstrained by specifying a
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non-informative prior on its distribution.
I estimate the Bayesian IRT model for each year from 1970 to 2003.22 For an
illustrative purpose, I present the estimated transparency scores of developing countries
for 2000 in Figure 3.7. The dots represent the posterior means of data transparency,
and the horizontal lines surrounding them represent 95 percent credible intervals. A
few remarks on the results are in order.
First, although one might raise issues with regard to individual cases, overall, the
measured transparency scores from WDI seem consistent with common sense. Rela-
tively more open regimes tend to have higher scores than more closed ones, and rela-
tively more developed countries tend to have higher scores than poorer ones. I will test
more formally whether these relationships hold in the following section.
Second, uncertainty about the measure is nontrivial as represented by the widths
of the horizontal lines. Thus, from Figure 7, for instance, one cannot say with any
certainty that Hungary in 2000 was more transparent than Argentina in 2000. In fact,
one cannot be 95 percent certain that Hungary was more transparent than any countries
listed above Albania, whose upper bound is lower than Hungary’s lower bound. Albania
and all those below it, however, can be said, with certainty, to be less transparent than
Hungary.
3.3.6 Democracy and Data Transparency
Are more democratic governments more transparent? In this section, using the measure
of data transparency as the dependent variable, I test the democracy-transparency
hypothesis. As shown below, democracy turns out to be a very strong predictor of data
transparency.
22I ran the model using MCMCPack in R for 50,000 iterations with 50,000 burn-in and 10 thinning
interval. I ran three chains to check convergence of parameter estimations, and all the parameters
achieved convergence.
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Figure 3.7: Data transparency, 2000
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I fit time-series cross-section models on the data transparency measure with democ-
racy scores and GDP per capita as well as some other control variables. Note that,
data transparency series are nearly integrated. The correlation between transparency
scores at t and t − 1 is about 0.97. The proper dependent variable in this situation is
the first-differenced transparency scores.
I estimate two sets of models of changes in data transparency: one with levels of
independent variables (simple models) and the other with both levels and changes of
independent variables (error correction models). The latter models might be preferable
since they enable one to estimate separately an independent variable’s short-term and
long-term effects on the dependent variable (De Boef and Keele 2008). For both sets of
models, I first proceed only with democracy scores and GDP per capita as independent
variables. I go on adding two other control variables. They include IMF, an indicator
of whether a country-year draws on IMF credits, and Crisis, an indicator of whether
a country-year is under a civil-war crisis. As suggested by Rosendorff and Vreeland
(2006), the former is expected to have a positive impact on data transparency, as when
a country is under an IMF program, it is under pressure to follow international rules and
standards that include the practice of data dissemination. A civil war might negatively
affect a government’s capacity, if not willingness, to provide reliable data on the state
of the economy.
Table 3.5 summarizes the results. As shown by the coefficients on lagged democ-
racy, the long-run effect of democracy is positive and highly significant throughout the
models. With GDP per capita controlled for, which itself turns out to be strongly
related to transparency, its effect remains essentially the same. Adding Crisis and IMF
does not make any noticeable changes.
There are two issues worth noting regarding this section’s analysis. First, the dataset
has some missing points due largely to the GDP per capita variable which is unavailable
85
T
a
b
le
3
.5
:
D
em
o
cr
ac
y
an
d
ch
an
ge
s
in
d
at
a
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
S
M
1
E
C
M
1
S
M
2
E
C
M
2
S
M
3
E
C
M
3
T
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
t−
1
−0
.0
80
3∗
∗∗
−0
.0
80
6∗
∗∗
−0
.1
59
2∗
∗∗
−0
.1
64
3∗
∗∗
−0
.1
59
0∗
∗∗
−0
.1
64
5∗
∗∗
(0
.0
06
8)
(0
.0
06
8)
(0
.0
09
3)
(0
.0
09
4)
(0
.0
09
5)
(0
.0
09
6)
D
e
m
o
cr
a
cy
t−
1
0.
00
18
∗∗
0.
00
21
∗∗
∗
0.
00
20
∗∗
∗
0.
00
25
∗∗
∗
0.
00
19
∗∗
0.
00
25
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
8)
∆
D
e
m
o
cr
a
cy
0.
00
23
0.
00
22
0.
00
25
∗
(0
.0
01
6)
(0
.0
01
5)
(0
.0
01
5)
lo
g(
G
D
P
p
c)
t−
1
0.
02
03
0.
02
95
∗∗
0.
02
13
0.
03
14
∗∗
(0
.0
13
1)
(0
.0
13
4)
(0
.0
13
4)
(0
.0
13
8)
∆
lo
g(
G
D
P
p
c)
0.
16
01
∗∗
∗
0.
15
57
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
49
7)
(0
.0
50
5)
C
ri
si
s t
−1
0.
00
15
−0
.0
01
4
(0
.0
09
7)
(0
.0
10
9)
∆
C
ri
si
s
−0
.0
16
4
(0
.0
12
2)
IM
F
t−
1
0.
00
01
0.
00
10
(0
.0
09
1)
(0
.0
09
8)
∆
IM
F
0.
00
72
(0
.0
13
8)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
03
69
∗
0.
04
40
∗∗
−0
.0
08
7
−0
.0
63
3
−0
.0
15
4
−0
.0
73
8
(0
.0
19
4)
(0
.0
19
5)
(0
.0
86
6)
(0
.0
88
3)
(0
.0
89
5)
(0
.0
94
4)
N
u
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
34
51
34
46
31
14
31
09
31
02
30
97
N
u
m
b
er
of
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
11
1
11
1
10
9
10
8
10
9
10
8
N
ot
e
:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
*
p
<
0.
1;
**
p
<
0.
05
;
**
*
p
<
0.
01
.
86
for some country-years. Not surprisingly, those country-years whose GDP per capita
is missing tend to be the usual suspects, ones that are relatively non-democratic, poor,
and opaque countries. The average transparency mean scores for those country-years is
about -1, and their average democracy score is as low as about -6. With these country-
years truncated due to missing GDP per capita, the estimated results above might
be potentially biased. There are two possibilities under which bias occurs. Among
country-years with low levels of democracy, only those with large negative errors (i.e.,
those with unusually low transparency given their democracy and GDP per capita
levels) happen to have data on GDP per capita. In this unlikely scenario, the estimated
coefficient on democracy is inflated, exaggerating democracy’s effect. A more plausible
scenario, however, points in the other direction. That is, among those with low levels
of democracy, only those with unusually high transparency might be included in the
dataset, in which case the democracy’s estimated effect would be dampened. In sum,
given the truncated dataset, bias might exist, but if bias does exist, the likely direction
of the bias makes it harder, not easier, to establish the positive relationship between
democracy and data transparency. Given that the actual estimated coefficients, which
might have been dampened, are strongly positive, it is fair to conclude that democracy
has a positive effect on data transparency.
Second, as mentioned above, transparency scores are measured with random errors.
Random measurement errors in the dependent variable pose no threat to valid infer-
ence because the dependent variable is itself a random variable subject to numerous
unmeasured factors, all of which are collapsed into the error term in the regression
equation. Measurement errors in the dependent variable become subsumed in the error
term, without violating the basic assumptions in regression analysis (Kmenta 1997).
This is not the case, however, if one of the independent variables is measured with
errors. This is the case in the next section’s analysis.
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3.3.7 Data Transparency and Confidence Crisis
Democracy implies data transparency. Does a higher data transparency score reduce
the chance of a sudden stop of bond flows when the expected economy is good and
increase its chance when the economic situation is expected to be bad? In this sec-
tion, I replicate the main regression analysis of loan sudden stop, substituting data
transparency scores for democracy scores. This constitutes a more direct test of the
hypothesis, and if the hypothesis cannot be rejected, it would lend additional confidence
to the inferential validity of the main results.
Data transparency is measured with errors; thus, using it as an independent variable
would lead to what is known as the errors-in-variables problem. Estimated coefficients
would be biased and inconsistent. While the estimated coefficient on the imperfectly
measured variable (in this case, data transparency) would be biased toward zero, all
other coefficients in the regression are also estimated with bias, the direction and mag-
nitude of which are unknown, rendering the consequences potentially serious (Greene
2003).
To take measurement errors in data transparency into account, I use a Monte Carlo
procedure to let uncertainty in transparency scores propagate into inferences for the
coefficients in the main regression. The procedure involves 1,000 iterations of the main
regression. In each iteration, each country-year’s transparency score is randomly drawn
from its posterior sample which was acquired by the Bayesian IRT analysis. Second,
with these random samples of transparency scores as an independent variable, the main
regression is fitted, and the coefficients as well as their variance-covariance matrix
are estimated. Third, from the multivariate normal distribution with the estimated
coefficients as the means and their estimated variance-covariance matrix as the variances
and covariances, coefficients are randomly drawn. Thus, one iteration generates a
sampling of the coefficients of the variables in the regression, which is itself based on
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a sampling of transparency scores. After 1,000 iterations, a sample with size 1,000 is
collected for the coefficient on each variable, which then can be used make inferences.23
I report the results in Table 3.6. The first column is a replication of the main results
reported in Table 3.2. The second column consists of the results of the regression with
the means of transparency scores ignoring the errors-in-variables problem (Mean). The
results from the Monte Carlo procedure are reported in the third column (MC). As
shown, the three sets of results provide equally strong support for the hypothesis. One
can conclude that democracy affects the likelihood of a sudden stop of bond flows
through the channel of transparency.24
Figure 3.8 depicts the relationship between transparency and the probability of
a loan stop conditional on the previous year’s GDP growth rate. With the average
economic performance (3.8 percent) in the previous year, a higher transparency score is
associated with a lower probability of a crisis. As the transparency score moves from 0.3
(one standard deviation below the mean in the sample) to 1.3 (one standard deviation
above the mean), the probability of a loan stop decreases by 0.1 points (from 0.43 to
0.33). As the previous GDP growth rate increases, the effect of transparency becomes
stronger. Having had an unusually booming year (8.2 percent growth), a country faces
a significantly lower probability of a loan stop by about 0.23 points (0.11 compared to
0.34) with the same scale of transparency change. However, when the economy was in
severe trouble last year with GDP growth of -5 percent or worse, higher transparency
leads to an increased risk of crisis this year.25
23This method is used in Treier and Jackman (2008).
24Since the causal path is such that data transparency is an intermediate variable between democracy
and the outcome variable, running the model with both democracy and data transparency should lead
to a reduction of the magnitude and significance of the preceding variable (democracy). This was
exactly the case. The coefficient on the interaction term between democracy and GDP growth was
reduced to -0.0078 and lost its significance while transparency remained intact.
25There are some missing observations in this analysis due to the inclusion of Left, which is taken
from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Its coverage for party ideology is quite
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Figure 3.8: Predicted probability of stop of bond disbursements
3.4 Conclusion
Autocrats like to live under a veil. What is happening in an autocratic regime is not
publicly known until a long time later. Outside observers often have to guess what is
going on beyond the iron curtain. Facing an opaque regime, they are unsure whether
broad, but it does not cover all country-years included in the GDF dataset. Including Left in the
regression leads to a deletion of 36 observations. Running the models without Left, and hence, without
a loss of those observations, yields virtually the same results. Another potential problem concerns the
fact that the GDF dataset itself might not cover all of those country-years that have issued bonds. As
noted earlier, it does leave out a class of countries, or net creditor countries, so advanced industrialized
countries are not covered in the GDF dataset. There might be more omissions in the dataset, but it
is the most comprehensive source for developing country debt data.
91
others think the same way about what is going to happen. They are uncertain of each
others’ beliefs. In this situation, they can lose their confidence so easily that, at even
a hint of crisis, they might run. When things are already very bad, however, being
opaque and making investors uncertain might be advantageous. If investors suspect
that they are the only ones seeing things so negatively, they would rather stay the
course.
Once the curtain is lifted, investors can be sure that they are more or less on the
same page. In a democratic regime, what they see is probably what others see. Unless
they receive a very bad signal, they do not easily lose their confidence, since it is quite
certain that others do not see things very badly either. They see no reason to rush.
Sometimes, however, being transparent is a disadvantage. When the situation is very
bad, a transparent regime again poses little ambiguity about the situation. Investors,
sure of many others seeing the same thing and behaving the same way, are prompted
to flee the country. They might have had a moment of hesitation had they been in
doubt.
How bad is bad enough for transparency to be detrimental? This is an empirical
question, and the empirical results of sovereign bond markets suggest that in order
for a democracy as a transparent regime to work against the economy, the expected
economic situation needs to be dismally bad. Unless the economy is expected to be in
a severe downturn, democracy helps; most of the time, it helps a lot.
This paper’s findings raise interesting questions that are worth further investigation.
The possibility that a release of true values on sensitive economic and financial data
risks panicking market participants might explain why some governments are reluctant
to provide accurate data in a timely manner, especially when the economy seems to
suffer a major setback. It is quite plausible that strategic misinformation or strategic
delay in releasing data is at play in regards to such sensitive, high-frequency information
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as the data on the international reserves the Central Bank is holding today, the weekly
movements of exchange rates, and the total amounts of outstanding debt that come due
at the end of this quarter. Market participants then should anticipate this and respond
accordingly by pulling out of the country if they notice any intentional delay in data
disclosure or when they disregard as fake the information that is provided by those
governments that lack credibility to begin with. This two-way strategic interaction
between governments and the market is an interesting issue for future research.
Related to this issue is another interesting question of when and under what con-
ditions governments subscribe to the IMF’s data transparency standards regimes such
as the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). The IMF’s initiative to prolif-
erate data dissemination standards is precisely aimed at preventing governments from
misrepresenting and delaying the release of data. However, since the subscription is
on a voluntary basis, interesting strategic considerations might play out. First, as the
IMF claims, the very act of subscribing to the regimes can serve as a strong signal of
government commitment to data transparency. Second, given the competing nature
of interdependence among capital-seeking developing countries, who has and has not
subscribed might also affect a government’s strategic choice regarding if and when it
subscribes. Who subscribes first to the IMF data standard regimes is a question that
merits further research.
Finally, this paper has shown that one can measure theoretically important but
directly unobservable concepts such as data transparency. Since many researchers of
comparative and international political economy have long been interested in predicting
when governments are more transparent and in estimating the effects of transparency
on economic policy and performance, this paper can serve as a good start for moving
forward in measuring transparency and testing empirical implications involving it in a
more direct way.
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Chapter 4
Democracy, Inequality, and
External Debt
Do democracies borrow less than non-democracies? One of the long-standing de-
bates in comparative political economy concerns the effect of regime type on economic
performance. The risks associated with high external debt, on the other hand, have
long been a concern for many developing countries, and reckless build-up of foreign debt
has often had immediate consequences for economic performance. Rapid foreign debt
accumulation with increasing debt-service burdens has often led to debt crises and
the resulting painful periods of economic adjustments. Are democracies less heavily
indebted than autocracies, and under what conditions?
Since the mid-1980s, the average level of external public indebtedness for developing
countries has hovered around 100 percent of GDP. This is not only very high compared
to that of the G-7 countries, which has been about 30 percent of GDP (IMF 2003). It
is also very risky and intolerably high in the sense that about half of the developing
countries’ debt crises occurred with external debt standing at less than 60 percent of
GDP (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003).1 As of 2003, the average developing
country government holds outstanding debt equivalent to 80 percent of GDP, and this
high external debt has been a key source of recent defaults and debt restructurings
in Argentina, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uruguay in the late 1990s and
early 2000s.
There have been huge variations in the level of indebtedness among developing
countries, however. In a recent ten-year period (1994-2003), while the median foreign
debt level ranges from 53 to 67 percent of GDP, the bottom ten percentile stands at a
moderate level between 16 and 25 percent of GDP whereas the top ninety percentile
level reaches as high as 184 percent of GDP. Botswana is one of few countries that have
managed foreign debt consistently well over decades. Its foreign debt has been kept low
at about 20 percent of GDP and never exceeded 50 percent of GDP. In recent years,
the Botswana government owed international lenders less than 10 percent of its GDP.
This is in a stark contrast to countries like Liberia. In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
Liberia built up massive foreign debt, and its debt level stood around astounding 600
percent of its GDP.
Why are some governments indebted more heavily than others? Excessive debt ac-
cumulation can arise when those who decide to borrow do not bear the full consequences
of reckless borrowing (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006). In particular, a predatory
autocrat who does not fully internalize the welfare of the public at large may well end
up with more debt than the average citizen would have wanted to borrow. Dictators
want to borrow as much as they can because they need to buy off a small number of
insiders whose support is key to their political survival (Oatley 2007). Absent effective
1“Safe” external debt-to-GDP thresholds for developing countries are sometimes as low as 15 per-
cent (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003).
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democratic and civic controls on government finances, autocrats are also able to chan-
nel foreign lending to specific groups and into their own pockets (Anderson 1988; Jain
1993). Excessive borrowing, then, results from the lack of democratic control on the
government’s fiscal behavior, suggesting that increases in electoral competition, pop-
ular participation, and checks and balances deter the elected leaders from borrowing
too much at the expense of the average citizen. The higher the level of democracy,
the lower the level of external indebtedness (Anderson 1988; Oatley 2007; Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith 2009).
While this simple democratic-constraints hypothesis is theoretically appealing and
seems consistent with a number of notorious cases of autocratic debt build-ups, it has
a few limitations. First, it is assumed that democratic institutions empower those
who fully internalize the costs of overborrowing, that is, the representative agent of
the economy. Political economists, however, have emphasized various perils of distri-
butional tug-of-war in democracies with extreme income inequality. Inequality and
the resulting distributive politics hinder economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994;
Persson and Tabellini 1994), contribute to inflationary crises (Haggard and Kaufman
1995; Desai, Olofsg˚ard and Yousef 2003), and lead to massive capital flight (Alesina
and Tabellini 1990; Dornbusch and Edwards 1990). The underlying logic of these pop-
ulist pathologies is that higher income inequality creates a greater political demand for
redistributive policies, and opportunistic politicians catering to the (relatively poorer)
median voter opt for short-sighted, distortionary policies. With regard to external
debt, “the political pressures for excessive foreign borrowing tend to be more acute in
economies with extreme inequalities of income,” Berg and Sachs (1988) argue, because
in such economies, “the pressures for redistributive policies tend to be greatest.” Simi-
larly, Perotti (1996) shows that in an economy with high inequality, the country ends up
running a budget deficit and borrowing from abroad to meet the poor’s redistributive
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demands while the rich try to escape taxation with capital flight. In short, at high lev-
els of inequality, increased democratic competition and participation, by empowering
the poor who do not internalize the full costs of excessive borrowing, simply exacerbate
demands for foreign borrowing.
The impact of democracy on external indebtedness, therefore, might not be un-
equivocal as the simple democratic-constraints view suggests. Rather, it might be
conditioned by the prevailing level of income inequality. Democracy is likely to be as-
sociated with lower foreign debt only when the level of income inequality is sufficiently
low so that the decisive median voter shares a stake in the longer-run health of the
economy whereas an increase in democracy might lead to a higher level of external
debt in countries with extreme income inequality.
The second limitation of the existing studies is that they fail to consider different
implications of different sources of international lending. A country’s total outstanding
external debt consists of loans extended by private lenders (mostly commercial banks
and bond investors) and loans provided by official sources. The latter, official lending,
can be further broken into bilateral lending by foreign governments and government
agencies and multilateral lending by international institutions such as the IMF, the
World Bank, and other regional development banks. While one may be most interested
in explaining why some countries are more indebted than others no matter what the
sources of the debt, looking only at the aggregate numbers might well lead to an
incomplete, if not misleading, analysis of the causes of debt-buildup.
The main reason for the need to unpack the aggregate into its components is that
lending purposes are not the same across different types of lenders, and hence, pri-
vate lenders seeking profits from sovereign lending might respond quite differently to a
borrowing country’s political change and the resulting change in its demand for debt
than do official lenders whose lending purposes are more “political” than profit-seeking.
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Specifically, official lending, which is often meant to “fill the gap” between a country’s
need for capital and its ability to tap private sources, is where changes in debt demand
are more closely met by the supply of credit. Hence, higher demands by unchecked
autocrats or populist leaders are likely to lead to an immediate increase in debt stock
owed to official lenders. For private lending, however, changes in debt demand should
not be closely reflected in changes in debt stock. Private lenders adjust interest rates
that can offset the risks involved in sovereign lending, and those changes in interest
rates are reflected over the long run in increases or decreases in borrowing countries’
outstanding debt obligations. In short, the way in which the effect of regime type
registers on debt cannot be uniform across different lending types.
In this paper, I revisit the democratic-contraints argument and put it to an em-
pirical test along with the alternative, inequality-mediated hypothesis. In a sense, the
former, simple regime-type hypothesis is a nested model, or a special case of the latter
since the simple, democracy-constraining effect prevails when there exists no inequality-
moderating effect. I do this by examining not only the aggregate, total outstanding
external debt, but also its multilateral, bilateral, and private lending components.
As shown below, the results are mixed; but overall, the impact of democracy on
external debt seems to vary considerably depending on the level of income inequality
in a way that is consistent with the alternative hypothesis. It turns out that democ-
racy tends to be associated over the long run with less of total external debt only
when income inequality is low. The results of the disaggregate-level analysis are more
supportive of the alternative hypothesis. On the debt owed to multilateral lenders,
democracy has diverging short-run effects; it reduces the debt level with low inequality,
but increases it with high inequality. The results of private lending seem most robust
and strongest among all, however. Democracy tends to lead, over the long run, to
lower debt obligations to private lenders when it has low income inequality, but it has
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a long-run swelling effect on debt owed to private lenders when income inequality is
high. In addition, I show that private lenders respond to heightened sovereign risks
by withholding debt provisions and by adjusting interest rates, which then, leads to
changes in long-run obligations to private lenders.
One key limitation of this paper should be noted at the outset, however. The
political theory of debt accumulation is an explanation of why some governments have
larger “public debt” than others, not necessarily limited to public “external” debt.
Ideally, empirical tests should be conducted on the total public debt which includes the
government debt issued domestically and held by its residents as well as the sovereign
debt held by nonresidents (foreign banks and bond investors, foreign governments, and
international institutions).
Only looking at external debt, the analysis may well underestimate political ef-
fects on debt accumulation for some countries that have been able to issue substantial
amounts of domestic debt.2 I seek to mitigate this problem in three ways. First, in
the analysis of aggregate external debt, I control for the level of development (per
capita GDP) with an assumption that in a more developed country, the government is
able to issue more debt domestically. Private savings should be a better proxy for a
government’s ability to issue domestic debt, but the data on private savings are also
plagued by many missing observations. Second, for the analysis of total aggregate
debt, I supplement the analysis using data on total public debt which is the sum of
2The primary scope of this paper has to be confined to external debt due to the limited data
availability on domestically issued public debt. Datasets such as the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) and World Development Indicators (WDI) provide data on public debt, but the coverage is
highly limited. Even combined together, they even lack data, for instance, for Argentina, Brazil, and
Colombia, three of the largest economies in Latin America, not to mention other smaller economies.
The situation is not better for East Asia and tends to be worse for Sub-Sahran Africa and Middle
East. IMF (2003) compiled a dataset on public debt, but it covers only 34 developing countries and is
not publicly available. Jaimovich and Panizza (2006) assemble a larger dataset, but its time coverage
does not begin until 1991. Moreover, its debt data refer only to “central” government debt rather
than “general” government debt, so the debt data are not comparable across countries with different
levels of fiscal centralization.
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external and domestic debt, compiled by Jaimovich and Panizza (2006). Finally, al-
though the analysis begins with the aggregate debt data, its focus progresses toward
the disaggregate-level analysis, looking into more specific mechanisms of debt accumu-
lation extended by bilateral, multilateral, and private lenders, respectively. Then, the
main subject of analysis is not total public debt, but the specific categories of public
debt disaggregated by the identities of debt holders. Seen this way, the analysis in
the disaggregate stage omits one of the components of total public debt, that is, the
debt held by residents. This omission is lamentable, but inevitable due to the lack of
comprehensive data for the moment.3
4.1 Democracy and Debt Accumulation
The causes of debt accumulation generally fall into two categories: external and do-
mestic factors. Dornbusch and Fischer (1985), for instance, stress both aspects in
explaining the causes of rapid foreign debt buildup that led eventually to the 1982 debt
crisis by saying “imprudent borrowing policies in the debtor countries and imprudent
lending by commercial banks had a chance encounter with extraordinarily unfavor-
able world macroeconomic conditions.” Those unfavorable world conditions typically
include oil and other world price shocks, rising interest rates, and declining terms of
trade, and the bad luck story goes like this: While commodity price booms resulted
in an expansionary policy with heavy foreign borrowing, an abrupt turnabout to an
anti-inflationary policy in industrial countries with higher interest rates not only made
3The World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF 2005) dataset used in this paper defines
external public debt as debt that “is owed to nonresidents . . . and is an external obligation of a public
sector.” (World Bank 2008) This residence basis definition is one that is officially adopted by the main
compilers of data on public debt such as the BIS, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, Paris Club, UNCTAD, and
the World Bank. According to this definition, a debt obligation is external debt as long as its ultimate
holder is nonresidents no matter where the debt is issued (the place of issuance) and no matter what
currency it is issued in (the currency of issuance).
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the existing debt sharply increase but also necessitated further borrowing to cope with
the declining terms of trade in a period of world recession (Ajayi 2000; Iyoha 2000).
One cannot overemphasize the importance of the global shocks in developing countries’
debt problems. Nonetheless, those external factors alone cannot account for the huge
variation that exists across countries at a given point in time.4
Why do some governments accumulate more debt than others? Political expla-
nations of imprudent borrowing behaviors of some governments revolve around moral
hazard problems. Debt accumulation can be excessive when the government does not
bear the full costs of reckless borrowing. That burden is shared with someone else:
When repayment time comes, the average citizen pays the entire bill, which implies a
future higher taxation. In the event of debt crisis, the average citizen again bears the
burden of the painful adjustments. Thus, moral hazard prevails at the expense of the
average citizen who cannot fully observe or control the actions of the government that
contract debt and decide how it is used (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006).5
Autocrats are more likely to engage in imprudent borrowing than leaders in democ-
racy. First, autocratic leaders have an incentive to borrow as much as they can. Auto-
cratic leaders, who generally depend on a small winning coalition, use external funds to
distribute as private benefits to their backers to ensure their hold on office. Producing
public goods in the form of a moderate level of taxation, macroeconomic stability, and
a sound debt management is not the best way to maximize their political survival given
the small size of the insiders. Transferring private benefits to cronies, the military, and
other ruling elites even at the expense of the population at large would reward the
4The standard deviation of external indebtedness at any year is often as high as 80 percent of GDP
and reaches even 150 percent of GDP.
5Similarly, commenting on the origins of debt crisis, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003, p. 7)
say, “governments have often been too short-sighted (or too corrupt) to internalize the significant risks
that overborrowing produces over the longer term.”
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autocratic leaders. In short, their political incentives are such that they do not fully
internalize the costs of excessive borrowing and shift the burden of repayment on the
average citizen’s shoulder (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Oatley 2007; Olson 1993;
2000).6
Second, the principal, or the average citizen, cannot fully observe or control the
actions of its agent, the government, on matters of the national treasury among other
things, which opens the door for the government’s imprudent borrowing. An absence of
effective democratic institutions means that information asymmetry is greater, and the
agent is more likely to act inappropriately from the principal’s viewpoint. Autocratic
leaders are freer to seek foreign debt that finances government spending, and are better
able to pocket large sums from the treasury (Anderson 1988; Jain 1993).
Unchecked dictators’ inclination to accumulate high foreign debt at the expense of
the public has revived the notion of odious debt. Debt is odious when “it was incurred
without the consent of the people and was not for their benefit” (Jayachandran and
Kremer 2006). Much developing-country debt that was lent to autocratic regimes is
considered odious as it was incurred not for the needs or in the interests of the state, but
to strengthen the regimes, to repress the population that fights against them (Adams
1991; Hanlon 2006). For instance, in the 1980s, Zaire was billions of dollars in debt, yet
Mobutu’s personal wealth was estimated to be in the billions. When Saddam Hussein
was toppled, Iraq owed about $120 billion to the rest of the world. Ferdinand Marcos,
the ex-president of the Philippines, took billions of dollars of embezzled public funds
out of his country during his 21 years in power. When he went exile, the Philippines’
6Democratic leaders would have wanted even larger debt if they had depended on distributing
private benefits to the winning coalitions. According to the selectorate theory, however, the leaders
of large winning coalition should find it optimal to provide public goods and not to transfer private
benefits because of the size of the coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). It then follows that
democratic leaders should care more about maintaining the macroeconomic health that will benefit a
large section of the electorate by refraining from borrowing too much.
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external debt was about 100 percent of its GDP.
According to this “odious debt” view, excessive borrowing results from the lack of
democratic controls on the government’s fiscal behavior, suggesting that increases in
electoral competition, popular participation, and checks and balances deter the elected
leaders from borrowing too much at the expense of the average citizen. The higher the
level of democracy, the lower the level of external indebtedness (Anderson 1988; Oatley
2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).7
4.2 Income Inequality and the Impact of Democ-
racy on External Debt
One of the key premises of this simple democratic-constraints hypothesis is that demo-
cratic institutions empower those who fully internalize the costs of overborrowing, that
is, the representative agent of the economy. The power of the public, however, can be,
and is often, seen as a source of imprudent economic policy. Democratic competition
and mass mobilization may exacerbate untempered popular demands for distortionary
public policy such as expansionary public spending that needs to be financed through
debt. This “populist” debt build-up is particularly prevalent in democracies with ex-
treme income inequality. This is because higher income inequality creates a greater
political demand for redistributive policies, and opportunistic politicians catering to
the relatively poorer median voter opt for short-sighted, distortionary policies. In
short, when the level of income inequality is very high, democratic institutions, rather
7It has been argued that there is a democratic advantage in creditworthiness because the institutions
of electoral accountability and checks and balances effectively constrain leaders from reneging on the
debt obligations (Schultz and Weingast 2003). Others do not agree with this view especially when it
comes to foreign debt (Saiegh 2005; Tomz 2005), and there are many instances of democratic, or more
aptly, populist sovereign defaults on foreign debt over the past three decades. Regarding whether
democracy merits greater creditworthiness or not, the jury seems still out.
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than empowering the average citizen who shares a stake in the longer-run health of the
economy, grant a greater political weight to the poor who do not fully internalize the
costs of heavy borrowing.
Borrowing is an intertemporal tax smoothing instrument: Spending today with a
loan and paying tomorrow (Barro 1979). As borrowing implies a future tax to repay
the debt, voters’ preferences over borrowing are parallel to those over future tax rates
(Oatley 2007). When considering issuing debt, voters must weigh the marginal current
consumption benefit against the future deadweight loss due to higher tax rates. As in
the standard models of income taxation, it follows that the median income voter is more
likely to want larger debt as its income is farther away from the average income level
(Meltzer and Richard 1981; Persson and Tabellini 2000). This is because the poorer a
voter is, the less she internalizes the future cost of a higher tax to which she contributes
only proportional to her income while enjoying the same unit of public consumption
today. Hence, as an increase in inequality implies that the gap between the median
and the mean income levels is wider, the public demand for debt-financed government
spending should be greater with higher income inequality.
The public’s increased distributional demand can be met in a number of ways.
First, the government can raise its revenues. For many developing countries, however,
government’s revenue position is generally very low. On average, the revenue-to-GDP
ratio is about 27 percent, compared with 44 percent of GDP in industrial countries (IMF
2003). Even worse, much of it tends to come from non-tax sources such as profits from
state-owned enterprises and royalties from mineral extraction, which are volatile and
largely out of control (Gavin and Perotti 1997). Moreover, tax capacity has historically
been very limited, and most developing countries lack efficient tax systems, and as a
result, effective tax rates, especially, direct tax rates tend to be very low, much lower
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than in industrial countries. With the limited ability to raise revenues, developing-
country governments have often resorted to running budget deficits and issuing debt to
finance those gaps in the budget (IMF 2003). Still, another prominent way of financing
spending beyond its means is simply to print money. Indeed, incurring high debt
and run-away inflation, often accompanied by massive capital flight, have been key
macroeconomic pathologies of a developing country when its politics is under popular
pressure for redistribution (Dornbusch and Edwards 1990).
The impact of democracy on external indebtedness, therefore, is likely to be con-
ditioned by the prevailing level of income inequality. Democracy, instead of having an
unequivocal constraining effect on debt, might be associated with lower foreign debt
only when the level of income inequality is sufficiently low so that the decisive median
voter shares a stake in the longer-run health of the economy. By contrast, when the
level of income inequality is very high such that a majority of voters are very poor,
increased democracy, by enhancing the influence that the poor majority can have on
any given policy, might lead to higher external debt.
Guyana’s external debt stood at stunning 825 percent of GDP in 1991, a year before
the country’s democratic transition. Over the next decade, while working to improve
the Guyana democracy and to implement free-market reforms, the ruling People’s Pro-
gressive Party (PPP) managed to reduce its foreign debt to about 200 percent of GDP.
Despite its long-lasting ethnic conflict between the Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese,
income inequality in Guyana has not been one of the worst cases. Guyana’s Gini in-
dex in the 1990s, in fact, was about 45, a low-to-moderate level by Latin American
standards. Mozambique, a relatively equal country in Africa whose Gini index was less
than 40 in the 1990s, is another success story. Since Joaquim Chissano was elected
president in 1994, its democracy continued to improve. The government’s tight control
of spending and the money supply, combined with financial sector reform, successfully
105
reduced inflation from 70 percent in 1994 to less than 5 percent in 1999. Its external
debt also decreased from 366 percent of GDP in 1994 to 120 percent in 2003.
The Central African Republic, a country of extreme income inequality with its Gini
index about 65, presents a very different story. After populist Ange-Fe´lix Patasse´ was
elected president in the 1993 election which was regarded as fairly democratic, the next
decade saw increasing conflict between Patasse´’s “northerners” who constitute a ma-
jority of the population and “southerners” who had enjoyed the privileges of accessing
lucrative jobs in the public and parastatal sectors of the economy while Patasse´ tried
to redistribute the country’s wealth from the latter to the former. In the mean time,
external debt nearly doubled in a matter of a few years as the country drew new loans
from multilateral and bilateral sources. Similarly, Peru’s 1980s began with the return
of democracy, the first five-years of the presidency of Fernando Belau´nde, and the next
five-years of Alan Garc´ıa, a famous populist. The decade was also characterized by all
sorts of macroeconomic mismanagement from run-away inflation, to burgeoning foreign
debt, and to outright sovereign default. Peru’s external debt went up from 36 percent
of GDP in 1981 to 166 percent by the end of the decade.
4.3 Official versus Private Lending
Developing countries draw on different sources of foreign debt to meet their demands
for debt financing. Since the early 1970s, many developing countries have borrowed a
great deal from private lenders, notably from commercial banks, particularly when the
global liquidity was high and cheaper loans were available. Nonetheless, on average,
the amount of loans owed to private lenders has never been greater than a quarter
of the total outstanding external debt. As shown in Figure 4.1, the share of private
loans (dashed curve) lent to the developing world has remained quite stable around 20
percent throughout the past three decades. It began to lose its relative significance a
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little bit since the late 1980s, and has since stabilized around 15 percent.
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Figure 4.1: The composition of developing-country external debt by lending sources
The bulk of foreign debt has come from official sources, that is, from governments
or government agencies such as official export credit agencies and from international
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the regional development banks.
Accounting for about 25 to 45 percent of the total debt, bilateral lending (solid curve),
in particular, used to be the single biggest component of developing country debt. Its
relative weight, however, has been declining throughout the period and giving its way
to multilateral debt (dotted curve). The latter has been increasing its share constantly
and has become the largest component since 1997.
The effects of regime type on debt accumulation cannot be uniform across different
categories of foreign debt. First, the extent to which governments’ demands for foreign
debt are met by the supply of credit varies across types of lenders. Private lenders
such as commercial banks are willing to provide a loan to risky borrowers as long
as the latter assume the risks involved. Typically, borrowing governments issue debt
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on a short-term, in a hard currency, and at a risk-free interest rate. This way, the
governments assume much of the risks and are able to meet their demands for foreign
debt. Nevertheless, there is a limit on the amount of loans that are available to a
sovereign borrower, and not all the debt demands can be met by private lending even
at risk-free market interest rates.
Official lending, in contrast, is not subject to credit rationing as the primary purpose
of such lending is not profit-seeking, but matching the needs of developing countries’
debt financing, often complementing private lending. Official loans tend to behave
counter-cyclically and play an important stabilizing role during times of credit rationing
(Ratha 2001). So official lending is not driven by a profit concern; on the contrary, it has
been argued that official lending has a greater potential to be under political influence
than does private lending.
In particular, regarding multilateral lending, scholars in the public choice tradition
emphasize “bureaucratic politics” as a key political factor in lending decisions by inter-
national financial institutions. Bureaucrats in those institutions try to maximize their
autonomy and budget, and hence, have incentives to provide as large loans as possible
whenever member countries are in need of external financing (Dreher and Vaubel 2004;
Vaubel 1991). Consistent with this view, Faini and Grilli (2004) find that the World
Bank and IMF lending tends to be quick to respond to the borrowing needs of the
member countries. High demands for foreign debt by unchecked autocrats or by pop-
ulist leaders then can be tightly met by multilateral lenders, more so than by private
ones.
However, many find evidence for “high politics” in multilateral lending, particularly
in IMF lending, which is said to be affected by major shareholder countries’ (such as
the United States) political and financial stakes in a given borrower country (Barro and
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Lee 2005; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Stone 2002; 2004; Thacker 1999). Turkey and Pak-
istan, for instance, have often been treated favorably by the IMF due to their strategic
importance to the United States. Then, although multilateral lending is generally quick
to meet the borrowing demands of a member country, the amount of those loans might
reflect political interests that the major financial powers have in the country.
On the other hand, developing countries may or may not prefer multilateral lending
to private lending. Private loans should be more attractive when a borrowing coun-
try has a good standing in creditworthiness since then the interest costs are not too
high while those loans do not come with “strings attached” unlike much of multilateral
lending. Borrowing countries, however, find multilateral lending more attractive some-
times or the only option available when they lack access to private credit markets. The
interest costs of private loans are sometimes too high compared to official loans during
periods of global illiquidty and when the country’s sovereign risks are perceived high.
According to a recent report by Martin, Harford, and Klein (2005), many developing
countries have increasingly sought multilateral loans even when they have access to
private credit. A key advantage of the former over the latter is in its long maturity.
The average maturity of official loans is more than 20 years whereas that of private
lending is only about 10 years. All in all, ceteris paribus, controlling for geopolitics,
global liquidity, a country’s creditworthiness, multilateral lending should closely reflect
changes in debt demands by borrower countries.
The political nature of lending seems even more prominent in bilateral lending. As
Rieffel (2003) notes, loans from bilateral agencies such as export credit agencies have
a significant political dimension. Other bilateral lending programs are even more po-
litical, such as programs to finance military equipment sales.8 Similarly, much of the
8These agencies provide loans even to countries where political risks are substantial as they can
bear those risks thanks to the political leverage that they have. “When a problem arises, ambassadors
representing their countries can make high-level demarches, and other forms of diplomatic pressure
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literature on bilateral foreign aid, which includes loans with concessional terms, has
pointed out that political and strategic considerations such as colonial past and politi-
cal alliances are major determinants of bilateral aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000). On the
other hand, perhaps, the very political nature of bilateral lending may make it less likely
to respond to the needs of borrowing countries than does multilateral lending. It has
been criticized that bilateral lending has been “carried out on an ad hoc, country-by-
country basis, . . . , with outcomes dominated by [donor countries’] political or domestic
concerns” (United Nations 2005). When donors’ interests dominate the needs of re-
cipients, the pattern of bilateral lending might be more “ad hoc” than systematically
related with the borrowing needs of the clienteles. Then a hypothesis on bilateral lend-
ing cannot be drawn unambiguously; democracy in a borrower country may either have
an immediate influence on bilateral lending just as it does on multilateral one or may
not show a clear pattern since it is driven by donors’ interests.
Second, the ways in which the outstanding debt stock changes in response to a
political change also differ across different lending types. While official lending is more
responsive to short-term changes in government demand for loan, a change in the
level of debt owed to private lenders should more closely reflect changes in interest
costs over time. Interest component has a bigger impact on changes in the total debt
stock owed to private lenders than to official lenders for two reasons. First, private
lenders charge higher interest rates than official lenders who often provide loans on
a concessional term. The average interest rate for private lending is about 8 percent
whereas that for official lending is about 4.7 percent. Second, much of private lending is
short-term contracts with variable interest rates, hence the interest component changes
substantially in response to any external or domestic changes, which contributes to an
upward or downward movement in the total debt stock over time beyond changes in
can be exerted” (Rieffel 2003, p. 35).
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the principal component.
As stated above, on the demand side, a higher level of democracy with extremely
high income inequality implies greater demand for debt. On the supply side, this
increased demand is most likely to be met by official lending, multilateral or bilateral.
This, however, implies a higher default risk, and hence, private lenders adjust the
interest rates to the heightened risk over time, thereby increasing the level of private
loan obligations in the long run. In contrast, an increase in democratic controls on
government in an economy with low inequality leads to less demand for external debt,
which is likely to be followed by less debt from official lenders. This implies a lower
default risk, and hence, should lower the interest rates charged by private lenders, and
the level of indebtedness to private lenders should decrease accordingly.9
4.4 Data and Analysis
I test the above-stated hypotheses regarding the impact of democracy to see whether
democracy has any significant effect on the level of external debt, and if so, whether
its impact varies by the level of income inequality. I do so by, first, examining the
impact of democracy on aggregate external indebtedness, and then, further examining
its impact on disaggregate debts, on multilateral, bilateral and private lending, in 60
developing countries between 1981 and 2002. Data on external debt stock and other
debt indicators are all from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF 2005).
I also analyze total aggregate debt, external and domestic, using the dataset compiled
by Jaimovich and Panizza (2006). In addition, I conduct an analysis of interest rates
9While the political logic of debt accumulation discussed in the previous section tells the demand
side of the story, the account of the differing responses from different lenders attempts to fill the
missing link from changes in demand for debt to changes in debt stocks. Nonetheless, it is crucial
to control for supply-side variables in empirical analysis. As discussed below, I do so by including
Institutional Investor ’s country credit ratings as a measure of creditors’ willingness to supply a loan
to a given country as well as the US interest rate to capture changes in global liquidity.
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charged by private lenders as an attempt to link between political changes in borrower
countries and changes in debt obligations to private lenders. Data on economic controls
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. My sample includes all cases
for which complete data were available. A full list of countries and years is provided in
Table 4.1.10
Table 4.1: List of country-years in sample
Country Year Country Year
Algeria 1989-91 Malawi 1982-2002
Argentina 1981-2002 Malaysia 1981-2002
Bangladesh 1983-2002 Mali 1994-2001
Bolivia 1997-2002 Mauritius 1982-2001
Botswana 1993-1994 Mexico 1981-2002
Brazil 1981-2002 Morocco 1981-99
Burkina Faso 2002 Mozambique 1997-2002
Central African Republic 1991-94 Nepal 2001-03
Chile 1981-2002 Nicaragua 1994-2002
China 1984-2002 Nigeria 1981-99
Colombia 1981-2002 Pakistan 1981-2002
Costa Rica 1981-2002 Panama 1982-2002
Cote d’Ivoire 1981-2002 Paraguay 1996-2001
Dominican Republic 1981-2002 Peru 1982-2002
Ecuador 1989-2002 Philippines 1981-2002
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1981-2002 Poland 1992-2002
El Salvador 1982-2002 Senegal 1992-2001
Ethiopia 1996-2000 South Africa 1995-2000
Ghana 1993-99 Sri Lanka 1983-2002
Guatemala 1982-2002 Swaziland 1995-2001
Guinea 1994-2002 Tanzania 1992-2001
Haiti 1988-2001 Thailand 1981-2002
Honduras 1990-2002 Tunisia 1981-2000
Hungary 1984-2002 Turkey 1981-2002
India 1981-2002 Uganda 1990-2002
Continued on next page
10The sample contains countries with a very short time span such as Burkina Faso (2002), Iran
(2001-02), Jamaica (2001-02), Nepal (2001-03), and Vietnam (2001-02). With and without those
cases, the results below remain largely unchanged.
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Country Year Country Year
Indonesia 1983-2002 Uruguay 1982-2002
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2001-02 Venezuela, RB 1981-2002
Jamaica 2001-02 Vietnam 2001-02
Jordan 1982-2002 Zambia 1981-2000
Kenya 1981-99 Zimbabwe 1991-94
4.4.1 Dependent Variable: Debt as a Percentage of GDP
As a measure of how much a government is indebted to international lenders, I use the
total outstanding (public and publicly guaranteed) external debt stock as a percentage
of GDP, which is the most widely used indicator of indebtedness (e.g., Reinhart, Rogoff,
and Savatano 2003). Similarly, for the analysis of total debt, I use the total public debt
stock, which is the sum of the external and domestic public debt, and is also scaled
by GDP. To look into heterogeneous patterns across different lending categories, I take
advantage of the feature of GDF (2005) dataset in which disaggregate-level data on debt
stocks are available. I use the outstanding debt stocks owed to multilateral, bilateral,
and private lenders, each as a percentage of GDP.
The debt stock, which is the accumulated debt level, however, is nearly integrated.
The series is highly trending; that is, its mean rises steadily over time, and the present
value is strongly dependent on the prior value. The average level of debt stock is less
than 10 percent of GDP in the early 1970s. It then goes up to about 50 percent in
the mid-1980s and to about 90 percent in the late 1990s. The variation of this year’s
debt level can be explained for more than 90 percent by that of last year alone. The
correlation coefficient for the two successive years’ debt levels are about 0.96 on average
across countries.11 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests were performed country
11Although the year-to-year variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio is small, it does vary substantially
over time as well as cross countries. While its average between-country standard deviation is 52.3, its
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by country, and the results of the formal tests indeed indicate that the vast majority
of the debt stock series are integrated. In this case, the first-differenced dependent
variable should be used to detect the effects of changes in independent variables on the
dependent variable. This allows one to estimate the effect of a predictor that varies a
lot from this year to next such as the level of democracy on a variable that is highly
trending such as the accumulated debt stock (Oatley 2007).
4.4.2 Independent Variables: Democracy and Inequality
For a measure of democracy, I use the Polity2 variable in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall
and Jaggers 2004). It is a 21-scale (from -10 to 10) composite measure of the level
of democracy for a country-year. It combines measures that record key qualities of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition.
The Gini index of income inequality is taken from the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID). The database standardizes the United Nations Univer-
sity’s World Income Inequality Database using as the standard the Luxembourg Income
Study data to maximize comparability for the largest possible sample of countries and
years (Solt, forthcoming). It provides Gini indices of both gross and net income in-
equality for 153 countries. I use gross income Gini to capture the degree of potential
demands for income redistribution in a country. The sample mean of Gini index is 56.2
while the minimum is 28.7 and the maximum is 85.4.12
within-country standard deviation is 66.3 on average.
12The histogram of the in-sample gross income Gini index is provided in Figure 4.5 below. The
corresponding numbers for net income Gini are 43.0 for the mean, 21.4 for the minimum, and 65.3
for the maximum. For robustness check, I used net income Gini in place of gross Gini. There was
no material changes in the results, which is not surprising given the high correlation between the two
measures. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.95. This near perfect correlation is noted by Solt
(forthcoming) as well. He notes, “In the developing world, where taxes are quite uniformly low and
effective policies to redistribute income are very rare, gross and net income inequality should be very
highly related.” The correlation between gross and net income inequality in his whole dataset is 0.967
for developing countries.
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4.4.3 Control Variables
First and foremost, I control for creditors’ willingness to supply a loan to a given
country. For this, I include Institutional Investor ’s country credit ratings. The higher
the credit rating, it is more likely that the country is able to issue debt. This should
be particularly evident in private loans. I also include the US interest rate to capture
the global liquidity in a given year. A higher US interest rate, a sign of a lack of
global liquidity, is expected to have a long-run depressing effect on private lending
to developing countries, but a positive impact on official lending, which often serves
as a lender of last resort at times of global financial crisis. In addition, I include a
measure of a country’s foreign policy affinity in the UN General Assembly voting to the
G–5 nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan)
to capture the nature of political lending by multilateral and bilateral lenders. Thus,
S–score G5 is included, which is the mean of S–scores to each of those 5 countries,
following Copelovitch (forthcoming).13
I consider a couple of macroeconomic factors that might explain the variation in
external indebtedness. Terms of trade are also included to control for an external
shock to the economy. Improved terms of trade may enhance the country’s ability to
borrow, thereby allowing it to borrow more. However, it might reduce the need to
borrow abroad, hence decreasing the level of debt stock over the long run. Similarly, a
strong export growth should mitigate the financing gap that the country needs to fill
with foreign borrowing, reducing the debt level over time. Last but not least, current
account balance is likely to be a close mirror image of the government’s external debt
account where the government is the major, if not the only, issuer of foreign debt.
13Thacker (1999) and Stone (2002; 2004) also take a similar approach to capture the political
dimension of the IMF lending. The S–scores are taken from Gartzke (2006)’s dataset “The Affinity of
Nations Index, 1946–2002.”
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While a deficit on the current account might well mean an increase in debt financing
for government spending, a current account surplus is likely to be associated with a
lower foreign debt.
I also consider a host of debt-related factors. First, I include the average interest
rate at which the country’s debts were contracted. A higher interest rate is associated
with a higher debt obligation with others being equal. An increase in the interest rate
is also likely to put upward pressure on the outstanding debt over the future periods.
Second, indicators of debt crisis are included as well. Default is an indicator of a failure
of debt repayment, a narrow definition of default, and Rescheduling is an indicator
of whether a country-year struck a rescheduling agreement with lenders. Both events
of debt distress are likely to be associated with higher debt as the government often
receives an emergency loan during the crisis and new loan commitments after concluding
a debt workout with creditors (Rieffel 2003). Third, as a matter of accounting, I include
the ratio of the amount of debt service to outstanding debt, the ratio of the amount of
arrears to outstanding debt, the ratio of the amount of rescheduled debt to outstanding
debt, the ratio of the amount of debt forgiven to outstanding debt, and the ratio of the
amount of concessional debt to outstanding debt.
In addition, I control for some other characteristics of an economy that might have
to do with foreign debt accumulation. I include the log of per capita GDP to control
for the wealth of the economy. Greater wealth might help the country earn good
creditworthiness, enabling it to borrow more. It might lessen the need for foreign
borrowing in the long run, however. A richer country tends to have a larger stock of
private savings, and hence, might be able to issue greater domestic debt, which can
serve to complement external debt.14 I also include the log of GDP to account for
14I experimented both per capital GDP and its log transformation. With the latter, the models
have a better fit. Otherwise, there was no noticeable changes in the results.
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the size of the economy. A bigger economy might be better able to issue debt abroad
or might need less of foreign resources than a smaller economy. The ratio of trade to
GDP is also included to control for trade dependency, which might also imply greater
dependency on foreign debt. GDP growth rate is included to control for the extent to
which the dependent variable (debt scaled by GDP) changes as the economy grows or
sets back.
It is possible that the effect of income inequality is spurious, actually capturing some
unobserved regional effects. It is important to control for the region-level heterogene-
ity since income inequality displays stark regional differences although the differences
within region are remarkable as well. Hence I include four regional dummies, one for
Eastern Europe, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, one for Middle East, and
one for sub-Saharan Africa. Period dummy variables are also added to account for the
long-run fluctuations of global liquidity: 1972–81 for the pre-debt crisis period, 1982–89
for the post-debt crisis period, and 1990–1997 for the period of the resurgence of global
capital.
4.4.4 Model Specification and Aggregate Results
As a preliminary inspection, I first present a simple bivariate plot between the level
of democracy and the level of debt stock in Figure 4.2. Each circle, white or black,
represents each observation, which is a three-year average. Due to high auto-correlation
within the same countries, only three observations for each country are plotted (1974-
76, 1986-88, and 1998-2000).
At first look, there seems no apparent relationship between democracy and debt.
If anything, the debt level tends to be lowest at the intermediate level of democracy,
with both high democracies and high autocracies being heavily indebted. However,
once the observations are split into two groups, one with below-the-mean inequality
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Figure 4.2: Democracy, inequality, and external indebtedness
(black circles) and the other with above-the-mean inequality (white circles), clearer
patterns emerge. For the relatively equal group, the debt level tends to be lower as its
democracy score is higher. For the unequal group, the opposite seems true although the
pattern is less evident than is that of the former. The overall U-shaped relationship,
now, can be seen as an artifact; it is a mere overlap of the two distinct relationships.
High autocracies tend to be more heavily indebted among relatively equal economies;
high democracies tend to have higher debt among countries with high inequality. So
the simple bivariate relationships are quite suggestive.
Now I turn to multiple regression analysis. As discussed earlier, the debt stock vari-
able displays a strong trend over time, violating the stationarity condition, and hence,
potentially causing spurious correlations. The proper form of the dependent variable is
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its first-difference. I estimate the effect of democracy (conditioned by income inequal-
ity) on external indebtedness using random-effects error correction models (ECMs).
Error correction model is the standard choice for integrated series. It is also preferable
in that it allows analysts to separately estimate an independent variable’s immediate
effect and long-run, equilibrium effect on the dependent variable (Keele 2004). The
models take the following time-series cross-sectional form:
∆Di,t = α0 − α1(Di,t−1 − β1Xi,t−1) + β0∆Xi,t + νi + i,t, (4.1)
where Di,t is the debt stock as a percentage of GDP, Xi,t is a vector of predictors
including democracy, inequality, and their interaction term as well as other controls,
νi is a country-specific random error, i,t is the standard error term, for i = 1, . . . , N
countries, and t = 1, . . . , T years.
β0 measure the short run, immediate effects of changes in Xi,t on Di,t and β1
measure the long run effects.15 The latter are also referred to as the equilibrium effects
of Xi,t on Di,t as they are the causal effects that persist across future time periods and
decay at some rates (Keele 2004). If the coefficients on democracy are negative, and
15It is important to note that β0 in ECMs have exactly the same interpretative meaning as β in
any regular regressions, that is, representing the effect of a unit increase in Xt on yt (in this case,
Dt), even though they are the coefficients on changes in Xt and the dependent variable is in the form
of first-difference. This is because the relationship between Xt and Dt is equivalent to that between
∆Xt and ∆Dt. To see this, consider the following distributed lag model:
Dt = α∗0 + α
∗
1Dt−1 + β
∗
0Xt + β
∗
1Xt−1 + t, (4.2)
where β∗0 , as in any regressions, measure the immediate effect on Dt of a unit change in Xt. To
transform this into the ECM form, first, subtract Dt−1 from both sides of equation (4.2) to have:
∆Dt = α∗0 + (α
∗
1 − 1)Dt−1 + β∗0Xt + β∗1Xt−1 + t. (4.3)
Next, add and subtract β∗0Xt−1 from the right-hand side to get:
∆Dt = α∗0 + (α
∗
1 − 1)Dt−1 + β∗0∆Xt + (β∗0 + β∗1)Xt−1 + t. (4.4)
The coefficients on ∆Xt, that is, β∗0 , are the same as those on Xt in equation (4.2), which measure
the effect of Xt on Dt (De Boef and Keele 2008).
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the coefficient on the democracy-Gini interaction terms are not significant, then the
simple democracy-restraints hypothesis prevails. However, if the latter are significantly
positive, then it suggests that the impact of democracy is increasing with the level of
income inequality, hence evidence for the alternative hypothesis. The regression results
for the aggregate external debt as well as the total public debt are reported in Table
4.2.16
Table 4.2: Democracy, inequality, and total debt
(1) (2)
External debt Total debt
Debt to GDPt−1 −0.079∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.024)
∆Democracy −0.094 0.471
(0.126) (0.383)
Democracyt−1 −0.111∗∗ −0.037
(0.052) (0.141)
∆Gini 0.011 0.118
(0.183) (0.556)
Ginit−1 0.018 −0.118
(0.040) (0.102)
∆Democracy×Gini 0.009 0.063∗∗
(0.011) (0.032)
Democracy×Ginit−1 0.006 0.001
(0.004) (0.012)
∆Creditworthiness 0.144 −0.433∗
(0.104) (0.263)
Creditworthinesst−1 0.059∗ −0.083
(0.034) (0.087)
Continued on next page
16The full models, as they stand, suffer a high degree of multicollinearity due in large part to many
GDP-related variables. I checked VIF (variance inflation factor) scores and dropped those variables
that were highly correlated with others in the models until the mean VIF went down under 5. Those
excluded are the lagged per capita GDP, lagged and first-differenced GDP, lagged GDP growth, and
lagged US interest rate. In the model of total debt, the lagged terms of trade is also dropped in
addition to those 5 variables. They themselves are not significant in the full models, and while
excluding those variables makes some variables (for instance, the first-differenced per capita GDP)
significant, essentially the same results in regard to the variables of main interest are obtained with
and without those variables.
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(1) (2)
External debt Total debt
∆S-score G5 2.718 −30.865∗∗∗
(3.605) (9.554)
S-score G5t−1 5.720∗∗ −0.194
(2.748) (9.046)
∆US interest rate 0.578 −0.279
(0.407) (1.185)
∆Terms of trade 0.038∗∗ −0.038
(0.019) (0.059)
Terms of tradet−1 0.025∗∗∗
(0.009)
∆Export growth 2.129 −0.037
(1.875) (0.079)
Export growtht−1 −0.139 −0.057
(2.516) (0.105)
∆Current account −28.520∗∗∗ −0.795∗∗∗
(8.133) (0.211)
Current accountt−1 −25.817∗∗∗ −0.845∗∗∗
(7.269) (0.173)
∆Interest rate 0.414∗∗ 0.681
(0.198) (0.498)
Interest ratet−1 0.495∗∗ 0.051
(0.200) (0.535)
∆Default 0.476 1.616
(1.086) (3.212)
Defaultt−1 1.617 4.539
(1.283) (4.090)
∆Rescheduling 3.557∗∗∗ 1.320
(1.091) (2.763)
Reschedulingt−1 4.191∗∗∗ 0.314
(1.347) (3.163)
∆Debt service −22.925∗∗∗ 8.161
(8.744) (21.349)
Debt servicet−1 −15.831∗∗ −10.085
(7.475) (18.412)
∆Debt in arrears 18.560∗ 22.253
(9.880) (27.253)
Debt in arrearst−1 −7.997∗∗ −8.527
(3.997) (10.719)
∆Debt rescheduled −9.319 8.619
(7.082) (21.024)
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
External debt Total debt
Debt rescheduledt−1 −10.501 15.159
(9.098) (23.851)
∆Debt forgiven −74.123∗∗∗ 8.573
(7.808) (19.321)
Debt forgivent−1 −76.442∗∗∗ 17.273
(10.690) (26.636)
∆Concessional debt −0.279∗∗∗ 0.226
(0.101) (0.253)
Concessional debtt−1 0.014 −0.018
(0.020) (0.051)
∆ln(Per capita GDP) −82.903∗∗∗ −132.295∗∗∗
(9.383) (28.284)
∆Trade openness −0.061 0.218∗
(0.040) (0.120)
Trade opennesst−1 0.017 −0.015
(0.011) (0.026)
∆GDP growth 0.067 0.110
(0.069) (0.204)
Eastern Europe −1.277 −4.336
(1.991) (5.281)
Latin America −3.012∗∗∗ −5.960∗∗
(1.093) (2.794)
Middle East −1.710∗ 1.783
(1.026) (2.707)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.904 −0.250
(1.033) (2.598)
Constant −2.658 18.899∗∗
(3.104) (8.505)
Mean VIF 4.50 4.59
Number of observations 888 603
Number of countries 60 48
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
To start with factors that affect creditors’ supply of loans, as expected, a country’s
creditworthiness, measured by Institutional Investor ’s credit ratings, has a long-run
positive, though not highly significant, effect on external debt level (Model 1). The
122
higher its credit rating, the more debt the country seems able to borrow over the long
run. Interestingly, it also has a short-run negative impact on the total public debt
(Model 2). It appears that as a country loses creditworthiness in international credit
markets, it borrows less from external lenders, but more in total. This suggests that
domestic debt serves as a complement to external debt when a government is less able
to raise loans abroad. Still, another possibility is that the causality runs in the opposite
direction. That is, as a country’s total public debt stock grows, its creditworthiness
tends to be down-graded right away.
A measure of foreign policy affinity to G–5 countries shows a similar pattern. A
greater foreign policy alignment with G–5 countries is associated with a higher level
of external debt in the long run (Model 1), but leads to a lower level of total debt
in the short run (Model 2). Again, as a country loses financial commitments from
G–5 countries due to foreign policy disagreements, it tends to borrow less from foreign
lenders, but more in total.
Turning to macroeconomic factors, an improvement in terms of trade has both
short-term and long-term effects on external debt. A better terms of trade appears to
make a country more able and willing to borrow from abroad. Hence, external debt
buildup turns out to arise from good luck, rather than bad. As expected, a surplus in
the current account tends to be associated with less debt, foreign and total, both in
the short and long term. A deficit in the current account must be offset by a surplus
in the capital account, which might involve capital flows to private sectors as well as
external loans to the public sector. This latter component registers as the short-term
effect on the government debt of the current account.
A higher interest rate at which the country’s external debt was contracted is sig-
nificantly associated with a higher level of external debt both in the short and long
term. Interest rate is likely to be endogenous, however. As much as it increases the
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debt stock, a higher debt stock might also lead to a higher interest rate due to the
heightened risk. Its estimated coefficients then might have been overestimated, so one
should interpret its effects with caution. On the other hand, it is quite evident that the
two variables are highly closely correlated, and, as discussed below, that holds only for
private lending, but not for multilateral and bilateral lending, so the results of aggregate
debt with regard to interest rate are primarily driven by the private component.17
Among the two indicators of distressed debt, a narrowly-defined default on the
existing debt has no significant impact on debt by and large whereas an instance of
debt rescheduling has both the short- and long-run swelling effects. There are two
reasons for these positive effects. First, a government under debt crisis often receives a
large package of emergency assistance. Second, in the event of default the government
enters a debt workout with the Paris or London Clubs, which typically involves new loan
commitments from official sources in return for the government’s promise to undertake
adjustment efforts. Other external debt-accounting variables reveal various degrees of
significance here and there, but as a whole, it is no surprise that they explain a great
deal of the variations in external debt levels. In particular, the ratio of the amount of
debt forgiven to the outstanding external debt shows the most obvious and significant
effects among all.
An increase in wealth measured as the log of per capita GDP turns out to have a
negative short-run impact on debt, both external and total, confirming the well-known
fact that heavily indebted countries tend to be poor ones. Higher per capita GDP tends
to mitigate the need for public debt because richer country governments are likely to
have stronger capacity to generate revneues. Furthermore, richer developing countries
can issue larger amount of debt domestically, which should reduce the need to raise
17Running the models without the interest rate variables did not make any substantial changes to
the main points of the paper.
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debt abroad.18 Trade dependency generally has no significant effect on debt except
that it seems to lead to larger total debt in the short run.
Turning to the effects of the variables of main interest, Figure 4.3 summarizes the
short-run (top-left panel) and long-run (top-right panel) effects of democracy on the
external debt as well as its short-run (bottom-left panel) and long-run (bottom-right
panel) on the total debt as a function of the Gini index. The Y-axes represent the size
and sign of the effect of democracy (β). So the solid lines keep track of changes in β
as the Gini index varies from the minimum (28) to the maximum (85), and the dotted
curves show the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Regarding the effect of democracy on the external debt (top panels), the pattern of
how changes in democracy are associated with changes in the aggregate external debt
level confirms what was found in the bivariate analysis depicted in Figure 4.2 above.
While there is no evident immediate effect of democracy, in the long run, democracy
seems to have a considerable restraining effect on external debt, evidence consistent
with the simple regime-type hypothesis. And the interaction terms are not significant
although they are signed as expected by the alternative hypothesis (Model 1 in Table
4.2). However, the effect of democracy is significant only for those economies with
less-than-average income inequality (top-right panel). Democracy tends to have an
opposite, positive effect, though not significant, on aggregate debt when the Gini index
becomes very high. So one can make an inference about the impact of democracy on
external debt that is parallel to one made from the bivariate plot. The constraining
18The equally significant, and even larger in magnitude, effect of per capita GDP in total debt seems
to suggest that poorer countries have higher domestic as well as external debt. This is not the case,
however. The correlation between external debt and total debt is generally higher for lower income
groups and lower for higher income groups. That is, for lower income groups, the data on external debt
capture most of the debt they owe in total while for rich income groups, they leave out a substantial
portion that is raised domestically. The effect of per capita GDP on total debt should be interpreted
as its strong effect on external debt, strong enough to offset its opposing effect on domestic debt. The
difference in its magnitude may well result from the difference in the data coverage of the two datasets.
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Figure 4.3: The effect of democracy on aggregate debt as a function of Gini index
impact of democracy on external debt is statistically significant on average, but once
the Gini index is explicitly taken into account, its effect becomes more pronounced.
Democracy tends to be associated, in the long run, with the significantly lower level of
debt only when the prevailing income inequality is lower than the average Gini.19
The results for the total debt differ from those for the external debt in that the effect
of democracy is more pronounced in the short-term than in the long-terms (bottom
panels). In the long run, its effect, either simple or interactive, is virtually non-existent.
19To minimize multicollinearity resulting from adding the interactive term, I first mean-centered
the variables before creating the interactive term. No serious multicollinearity was detected for the
variables of main interest.
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In the short-run, however, its interaction term is significant at the 0.05 level (Model 2
in Table 4.2), and as the graph shows (bottom-left panel), the impact of democracy is
significantly positive when the Gini index is 62 or higher whereas, for the lower Gini,
democracy has no significant effect. Democracy tends to increase, rather than, decrease
total public debt, but this tendency exists only when the income distribution is highly
skewed.
4.4.5 Disaggregate Analysis
The results of the external debt disaggregated by lending types, multilateral, bilateral,
and private lending, are reported in Table 4.3.20
Table 4.3: Debt owed to multilateral, bilateral, and private lenders
(3) (4) (5)
Multilateral Bilateral Private
Debt to GDPt−1 0.029∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
∆Democracy 0.029 −0.043 −0.006
(0.033) (0.068) (0.045)
Democracyt−1 −0.062∗∗ 0.014
(0.028) (0.019)
∆Gini 0.090∗ −0.071 0.152∗∗
(0.048) (0.099) (0.067)
Ginit−1 −0.011 −0.021
(0.022) (0.014)
∆Democracy×Gini 0.009∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Democracy×Ginit−1 −0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Continued on next page
20Note that the lagged dependent variable for the model of multilateral lending is signed positive,
which suggests that a dynamic model setup (i.e., the inclusion of lagged independent variables) is not
suitable. Hence, I estimate and present a non-dynamic model for multilateral lending in which only
first-differenced variables are included. Whether or not the lagged variables are included, however,
does not affect the results regarding the immediate effects of independent variables.
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(3) (4) (5)
Multilateral Bilateral Private
∆Creditworthiness 0.071∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.002
(0.026) (0.054) (0.036)
Creditworthinesst−1 −0.015 0.036∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011)
∆S-score G5 −0.248 −0.290 −0.616
(0.900) (1.937) (1.296)
S-score G5t−1 −0.621 0.114
(1.503) (0.979)
∆US interest rate 0.370∗∗∗ 0.330 0.028
(0.109) (0.213) (0.143)
∆Terms of trade −0.002 0.030∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007)
Terms of tradet−1 0.009∗∗ −0.001
(0.005) (0.003)
∆Export growth 0.030 −1.178 0.380
(0.357) (0.994) (0.793)
Export growtht−1 −1.937 −2.782∗∗∗
(1.334) (1.056)
∆Current account −2.478 −5.188 −3.363
(1.929) (4.287) (2.828)
Current accountt−1 −3.117 1.362
(3.717) (2.263)
∆Interest rate 0.035 0.060 0.096∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.097) (0.037)
Interest ratet−1 0.173 0.143∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.043)
∆Default −0.055 −0.185 0.105
(0.204) (0.519) (0.329)
Defaultt−1 0.903 −0.413
(0.616) (0.390)
∆Rescheduling 0.803∗∗∗ 2.790∗∗∗ −0.578
(0.231) (0.615) (0.362)
Reschedulingt−1 3.425∗∗∗ −0.706
(0.799) (0.435)
∆Debt service −2.489∗∗∗ −1.014 −3.836∗∗∗
(0.948) (1.227) (0.818)
Debt servicet−1 −0.946 −3.436∗∗∗
(1.405) (0.797)
∆Debt in arrears 0.456 16.666∗∗∗ −1.040∗
(1.803) (4.431) (0.576)
Continued on next page
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(3) (4) (5)
Multilateral Bilateral Private
Debt in arrearst−1 1.193 0.717∗
(1.882) (0.372)
∆Debt rescheduled −7.163∗∗ 4.201 0.531
(3.444) (10.755) (1.662)
Debt rescheduledt−1 7.455 0.353
(12.887) (1.710)
∆Debt forgiven −0.608 −53.386∗∗∗ −5.496∗∗
(1.399) (4.303) (2.545)
Debt forgivent−1 −57.771∗∗∗ −5.564
(5.786) (3.589)
∆Concessional debt 0.003 0.156∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.053) (0.040)
Concessional debtt−1 0.012 −0.003
(0.010) (0.007)
∆ln(Per capita GDP) −18.360∗∗∗ −18.639∗∗∗ −27.529∗∗∗
(2.274) (4.963) (3.445)
∆Trade openness 0.017 −0.024 −0.005
(0.011) (0.022) (0.014)
Trade opennesst−1 0.011∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.005) (0.004)
∆GDP growth 0.005 −0.004 0.061∗∗
(0.018) (0.037) (0.025)
Eastern Europe −0.149 −0.951 0.541
(0.402) (1.078) (0.700)
Latin America −0.445∗∗ −1.256∗∗ −0.063
(0.192) (0.588) (0.371)
Middle East −0.344 0.594 0.358
(0.245) (0.559) (0.356)
Sub-Saharan Africa −0.368 0.166 0.623∗
(0.240) (0.551) (0.373)
Constant 0.695∗∗∗ −0.489 −0.558
(0.240) (1.541) (1.040)
Mean VIF 1.50 4.11 4.28
Number of observations 883 882 873
Number of countries 60 59 60
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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First, creditworthiness appears to have an immediate positive impact on multilateral
loans (Model 3), but it might well be picking up the reverse case. That is, as a country
draws on multilateral loans which often come with reformist policy packages, it gains a
positive rating from private creditors. In terms of its long-run effect, its weak positive
effect on aggregate external debt that is previously discussed (Model 1) seems to reflect
its strong impact on private lending (Model 5). For the official lending components,
the bilateral one in particular, its effect is largely negative, though not significant,
suggesting that more loans tend to be extended by bilateral lenders to countries with
less creditworthiness (Model 4).
This long-run equilibrium relationship between creditworthiness and private debt
is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Starting from a previous point (A), an increase in the
country’s credit rating at t (point B) would mean that the current level of debt is too
low (off the equilibrium) given its increased creditworthiness, and to get back onto the
equilibrium track, the debt level will increase over the several future periods, at t+ 1,
t+ 2, t+ 3, and so on, until it has increase to the equilibrium level (point F).
The US interest rate turns out to have a significant positive short-run impact on
developing countries’ external debt from multilateral lenders. This can be interpreted
that during periods of the lack of global liquidity, captured by high US interest rates,
international institutions tend to step in and extend loans to those countries that lack
or lose, if they already had, access to other sources of credit. Even those countries that
can draw on private sources, it would be too expensive to issue loans in private credit
markets during periods of high interest rates, and they might restructure their debt,
increasing the share of multilateral debt, which is usually cheaper in interest costs and
longer in maturities (Martin, Harford, and Klein 2005).
The debt-swelling effect of a positive external shock (terms of trade) on the aggregate
external debt (Model 1) now can be seen driven largely by the bilateral component. An
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Figure 4.4: The creditworthiness’ long-run effect on debt owed to private lenders
improvement in terms of trade has both short-term and long-term effects on bilateral
debt (Model 4). Windfall gains from export appear to make a country more able
and willing to borrow from foreign governments, probably from those who they trade
with. On the other hand, a strong growth in export seems to mitigate the need of
international borrowing in the long run, particularly from private lenders (Model 5).
So those economies with growing export sectors are significantly less indebted to private
lenders.
As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the interest rate and the external
debt is most evident in private lending. As a country has to pay a higher interest rate,
its debt stock owed to private lenders tends to swell immediately as well as over time.
Or equally plausibly, as a country owes much to private lenders, they have pay a high
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risk premium. Whichever the case is, since countries are charged for a higher interest
rate when their risks are higher, their debt obligations to private lenders tend to be
higher as they appear riskier to private lenders.
Before turning to the variables of main interest, it is worth mentioning the impact
of foreign policy affinity to major financial powers in the world, captured here by S–
score G5. First, unlike in the models of the aggregate debt, here, it appears to have
no significant impact on any of lending types. It is particularly surprising that foreign
policy affinity scores cannot account for changes in debt owed to bilateral lenders.21
Interestingly, adding the affinity scores in regard to Russia and China yields a weakly
positive long-run result for Russia, suggesting that a close relationship with Russia
leads to a greater bilateral debt over the long run. One reason for this result might
be that the source of a country’s bilateral debt is heterogeneous and its source is well
beyond those major financial powers except for those country that draw heavily from
Russia. To pursue further along this line, bilateral lending needs to be disaggregated
into the creditor countries level, and the proper unit of analysis should be a dyad, i.e.,
a pair of creditor and borrower.
Second, as noted above, here, the lagged S–score G5 is dropped in the model of
multilateral lending due to the ill-behaved lagged dependent variable. However, in
various model specifications that include the level of S–score G5, it comes out highly
significant, suggesting that its long-run effect on the aggregate external debt in Model
1 reflects indeed its effect on multilateral debt. Then one can say that a greater affinity
to G–5 nations is associated with a larger loans from multilateral lender in the long
run, evidence that is largely consistent with others’ findings about the IMF lending.
21When each affinity score is all included instead of the mean score for G–5 countries, higher affinity
to the United States leads to a lower bilateral debt, but this result is not robust and appears to suffer
a high degree of multicollinearity due to high correlation among G–5 countries. With only the US
affinity score included, it is not significant.
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Finally, as to the impact of democracy, it appears that the aggregate results dis-
cussed in the previous section are largely driven by multilateral lending for the short-run
effect and by private lending for the long-run effect. In the short run, the impact of
democracy on the total public debt varies significantly from negative (insignificant)
to positive as the Gini index increases (bottom-left panel in Figure 4.3). A stronger
version of this finding is replicated in multilateral lending as shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: The effect of democracy on debt owed to multilateral lenders
For the multilateral component, democracy turns out to have an immediate effect,
which varies significantly with the size of the Gini index. When income inequality
is very low, lower than 43, an increase in democracy immediately reduces debt owed
to multilateral lenders. When the income distribution is highly skewed with the Gini
index of 59 or higher, however, an increase in democracy tends to raise the level of
multilateral debt obligations in the short term. The significant results of democracy’s
short-run effect on multilateral debt are then consistent with the finding that loans
from the World Bank and IMF tend to respond quickly to the borrowing needs of the
member countries (Faini and Grilli 2004).
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Unlike multilateral lending, bilateral lending shows little systematic pattern with
regard to the impact of democracy. As shown in Figure 4.6, for the short-run effect,
democracy has no significant effect on bilateral debt regardless of the level of income
inequality. This suggests that bilateral loans are extended in response to recipient
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Figure 4.6: The effect of democracy on debt owed to bilateral lenders
governments’ demands in a less, not more, systematic way than are multilateral loans
(left panel). This confirms the view that bilateral loans are, perhaps, so political and
dominated by donors’ strategic considerations that they are extended in a rather ad-hoc
way. In the long run, democracy turns out to have a constraining effect on bilateral
loans, evidence that is consistent with the simple democracy-constraining hypothesis
(Model 4 in Table 4.3). However, its long-run effect is significant only for the average
economy in terms of income inequality. Democracy’s long-run constraining effect is no
longer significant for any countries with the above- and blow-average Gini index (right
panel).
The results for the private lending are a stronger version of the aggregate external
debt results. Figure 4.7 presents the short-run and long-run effects of democracy on
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debt owed to private lenders. On one hand, democracy, regardless of the level of income
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Figure 4.7: The effect of democracy on debt owed to private lenders
inequality, does not seem to have any immediate effect on the debt level from private
sources. It, in contrast, has a significant long-run, equilibrium effect on debt, the sign
of which changes significantly as the level of income inequality changes.
With the Gini index of 38 or lower, increased democracy has a significant, negative
relationship with private loans. An increase in democracy at t would make the current
level of debt owed to private lenders too high so that the debt level will decrease over
the future periods until it has got back to the equilibrium level. When the level of
income inequality is very high, with the Gini index of 62 or higher, a higher democracy
is significantly associated with a higher level of debt owed to private lenders over the
long run.22
The significance cut-point of the Gini index for the negative democracy effect is 38,
which might cause a concern that the result might have been driven by a few of cases
22These opposing, long-run effects of democracy on loans from private sources are statistically sig-
nificant and particularly robust to various model specifications and alternative measures of the Gini
index.
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with extremely low income inequality. Figure 4.8 shows the distribution of the in-sample
gross-income Gini index with lists of bottom ten and top ten countries. Indeed, in the
Gini index
28 38 56 62 85
Gini < 38 (1.1%)
Bangladesh 91-92
China 84-87
Egypt 88-92
Ethiopia 2000
Hungary 84-02
India 86-92
Indonesia 83-00
Jordan 1982
Pakistan 99-02
Poland 92-99
Gini > 62 (29.1%)
Brazil 81-02
Cameroon 84-95
Guatemala 84-02
Kenya 81-99
Malawi 82-98
Mali 94-95
South Africa 95-00
Swaziland 95-01
Zambia 81-00
Zimbabwe 91-94
Figure 4.8: The distribution of the Gini index in sample
sample, there are only a few cases (1.1 percent of the total sample) whose gross income
Gini index is lower than 38. However, the proportion of the observations beyond the 62
cut-point for democracy to have a significant positive impact is substantially large (29.1
percent). So overall, the ranges of the Gini index that support the significant effects
of democracy, either negative or positive, do actually exist as a substantial proportion
in the sample analyzed. To show that the results are not driven by those extreme
cases, I run the model excluding the top and bottom 1 percentiles, 5 percentiles, and
10 percentiles in the Gini distribution. Table 4.4 reports the results with the variables
of main interest only to save space. Model 6 includes country-years whose Gini index
is greater than 37 and lower than 77, model 7 greater than 42 and lower than 70, and
model 8 greater than 44 and lower than 68. As shown, the lagged interactive term is
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consistently highly significant across models with truncated samples, assuring that the
results are not sensitive to extreme cases.
Table 4.4: Robustness checks
(6) (7) (8)
2nd-99th pct. 6th-95th pct. 11th-90th pct.
∆Democracy −0.014 0.001 0.017
(0.047) (0.054) (0.060)
Democracyt−1 0.017 0.025 0.030
(0.019) (0.021) (0.024)
∆Gini 0.133 0.176∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.077) (0.086)
Ginit−1 −0.024 −0.022 −0.018
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
∆Democracy×Gini −0.005 −0.007 −0.009
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Democracy×Ginit−1 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Range of Gini 37-77 42-70 44-68
Number of observations 853 769 680
Number of countries 59 58 56
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Substantively, a higher democracy in the context of low income inequality implies a
reduced risk associated with sovereign lending to private lenders as improved democracy
exerts a constraining effect on government borrowing and the government begins to
borrow less from official sources. Private lenders then lower the interest rates charged
to the sovereign borrower, and hence, the total debt obligations owed to private lenders
will be reduced over time. In contrast, when the economy is characterized by extreme
income inequality, an increase in democracy heightens the sovereign risk related to
populist macroeconomy. The current level of interest rates would now be too low given
the heightened risk due to such political change. Private lenders then raise the rates
to compensate the risk, which would put swelling pressure on the debt stock owed to
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private lenders over time. Indeed, as discussed earlier, interest rates can explain the
variation in private loans to a much greater degree than that in official lending. In the
cases of bilateral and multilateral lending, the average interest rate has no significant
impact on immediate changes in debt stock and has weak or opposite, long-run effect.
In contrast, it has significant immediate and equilibrium effects on the debt level owed
to private lenders (see Table 4.3).
To see whether the link between democracy and loans from private lenders is con-
nected by the interest rates charged by private lenders, I conduct an analysis of the
average interest rate for private loans. The model setup is parallel to those of debt
in that it is also an error correction model due to the presence of integration in the
dependent variable and there are a host of control variables that might affect the in-
terest rate charged by private lenders. A key feature of this model, however, is that it
is a Heckman selection model. Interest rates charged by private lenders should reflect
the risks of lending to the country; however, if the risks involved are too high, private
credit rationing would have a bite, and hence, instead of being charged for very high
interest rates, high-risk countries would be left without private credit. In other words,
for high-risk countries, interest rates would not be observed, and an analysis using only
observed interest rates would yield biased results.
The results are reported in Table 4.5 with those for the main outcome in column (1)
and the selection results in column (2). There are a couple of interesting findings. First,
many risk factors that affect the likelihood of the selection (or getting loans from private
lenders) do not affect the level of interest rates. For example, the size of the economy
(the log of GDP) significantly increases the likelihood of having contracted loans with
private lenders, but once that is taken into account, it does not seem to decrease the
interest rates charged to those with private credit. Likewise, default history has a
significant negative effect on having access to private credit in the first place, but once
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that is controlled for, whether or not having defaulted in recent years does not matter
for how much interest costs the country would have to pay. Second, for many factors
that come out significant for the main outcome, short-term effects tend to prevail. That
is, the interest rates charged by private lenders tend to respond quickly to changes in
risk factors.
Finally, turning to the impact of democracy, the results are quite supportive al-
though coming short of being fully satisfactory. First, democracy tends to increase the
chance to having private credit when the Gini index is low, but to lower its chance when
the Gini index is high, evidence that suggests that private lenders perceive and respond
by withholding a loan provision to the risks associated with democracy characterized by
high inequality. Second, although it is not a highly significant effect, democracy tends
to increase immediately interest rates when the level of income inequality is high, but to
reduce interest rates when inequality is low. One potential reason for the weak results
for the main outcome is that interest rates tend to vary greatly depending on how the
loans were structured in terms of the grace period, maturity, currency denomination,
indexation to inflation, and the like. Unless all the information relevant to the loan
structure is gathered, an analysis of interest rates cannot be complete. Nevertheless,
this additional analysis complements the main analysis and helps to understand better
how political changes in borrowing countries translate into changes in debt obligations
to private lenders.
Table 4.5: Democracy, inequality, and interest rate
(1) (2)
Interest rate Selection
Interest ratet−1 −0.674∗∗∗
(0.039)
∆Bonds 1.088
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
Interest rate Selection
(1.301)
Bondst−1 1.589∗∗
(0.698)
∆Democracy 0.021
(0.027)
Democracyt−1 −0.007 0.006
(0.011) (0.012)
∆Gini 0.181∗∗
(0.072)
Ginit−1 0.021∗ 0.016
(0.013) (0.015)
∆Democracy×Gini 0.002
(0.003)
Democracy×Ginit−1 −0.001 −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
∆Left −0.389
(0.263)
Leftt−1 −0.153 0.309
(0.160) (0.213)
∆Per capita GDP −0.001
(0.001)
Per capita GDPt−1 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
∆ln(GDP) 31.046
(42.139)
ln(GDP)t−1 −0.004 0.377∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.071)
∆Trade openness −0.012
(0.010)
Trade opennesst−1 0.001 0.0001
(0.005) (0.004)
∆Default history −0.205
(0.225)
Default historyt−1 −0.0005 −0.539∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.118)
∆GDP growth −0.246
(0.403)
GDP growtht−1 −0.259 0.027∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.010)
∆Total debt 0.016∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
Interest rate Selection
(0.005)
Total debtt−1 0.004∗∗ 0.0001
(0.002) (0.001)
∆Concessional debt −0.090∗∗∗
(0.030)
Concessional debtt−1 0.0001 −0.001
(0.008) (0.005)
∆Short-term debt −0.037∗∗
(0.015)
Short-term debtt−1 −0.010 0.008
(0.010) (0.011)
∆Interest payment 6.668
(6.227)
Interest paymentt−1 8.606 7.556
(5.686) (5.430)
∆Terms of trade 0.006
(0.005)
Terms of tradet−1 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
∆Current account −0.034
(0.167)
Current accountt−1 −0.107 0.205
(0.179) (0.165)
∆US interest rate 0.553∗∗∗
(0.131)
US interest ratet−1 −0.027 0.032
(0.089) (0.045)
Eastern Europe 0.044 5.712∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.337)
Latin America 0.490∗∗ −0.270
(0.236) (0.301)
Sub-Sahran Africa 0.012 −0.319
(0.225) (0.352)
Zero accesst−1 −1.192∗∗∗
(0.148)
% Zero access in region −3.943∗
(2.132)
Constant 2.944 72.769
(1.945) (58.768)
ρ −0.064
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
Interest rate Selection
(0.062)
σ 1.662
(0.104)
λ −0.106
(0.103)
Wald test (ρ = 0): χ2(1) = 1.08 (p-value 0.2997)
Observations 1062
Number of countries 59
Note: Heckman selection model with robust standard errors.
4.5 Conclusion
Why are some governments more heavily indebted than others? Factors that are out
of government control, such as the global liquidity, economic growth in industrial coun-
tries, and changes in terms of trade, greatly affect developing countries’ foreign debt
buildups. Sometimes those external factors enable developing country governments to
issue foreign debt easily; sometimes those same factors force them to borrow further.
However, domestic political factors are important as well. As Reinhart, Rogoff, and
Savastano (2003) point out, many developing-country governments have often been too
short-sighted or too corrupt to internalize the costs of overborrowing. Elected leaders
in democracy tend to borrow less than autocrats, who rely on a handful of elite groups
and are unchecked by democratic institutions, if other conditions are right. The key
condition under which democratic constraints deter the government from imprudent
borrowing seems that the distribution of income is not excessively skewed. When in-
come inequality is low, the median income voter is not too poorer than the average
income voter so that she tends to share a stake in the long-run health of the economy.
As democracy empower those who internalize the future costs of excessive borrowing,
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it helps reduce the level of external indebtedness. If the prevailing income inequality is
extremely high, however, electoral contestation and popular mobilizations tend to exac-
erbate foreign debt mismanagement as elected leaders cater to the majority’s demand
for greater redistribution with short-sighted, imprudent policies which often involve a
rapid foreign debt build-up.
This paper has also shown that the ways in which autocratic or populist debt build-
ups are made are different across different categories of debt. Domestic political factors
tend to have an immediate effect on the debt supplied by multilateral lending agencies.
Changes in political factors take time to register in changes in debt stock owed to
private lenders since the part of movements in debt stock comes through interest rate
adjustments over time.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
One of the long-standing debates in comparative political economy concerns the
effect of regime type on economic performance, and yet, there is no strong consensus on
whether democratic governments produce better economic outcomes than dictatorships.
For instance, some suggest that democracy promotes economic growth (North 1990;
Olson 1993), some argue that it hinders growth (Huntington 1968), and still others
show that it makes no difference (Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Przeworski et al.
2000).
In this dissertation, I show that democracy is not necessarily associated with good
performance in international credit markets. Democratic governments do not neces-
sarily imply a low risk of sovereign default, a low likelihood of suffering sudden stops
of bond inflows, or a low level of external indebtedness. One one hand, the benefi-
cial effect of democratic institutions on various aspects of macroeconomic performance
hinges crucially on whom they really empower. With a highly skewed income distribu-
tion, democratic politics empower the poor majority who have much to gain today but
little to lose tomorrow. Catering to the popular demands for immediate consumption,
democratic leaders under such circumstances pursue short-sighted, distortionary poli-
cies, the long-run consequences of which are often devastating for the economy. Budget
deficit, runaway inflation, capital flight, and expropriation of assets of foreigners and of
the “oligarchs” are well known pathologies of democracy with high income inequality.
To that list I add a high risk of sovereign default and the tendency of accumulating
high external debt. The good news is that democracy does promote the long-run health
of the economy when it has a lower level of income inequality, so that the not-so-poor
decisive median voter shares the long-run stake of the economy and is willing to forego
immediate benefits from myopic policies.
On the other hand, the impact of democracy on economic performance is some-
times equivocal in and of itself. In this age of globalization and financial integration
with increased roles played by thousands of investors around the world, so much of
the economic fortune of a country hinges on the confidence those investors have in the
economy. Due to the strategic complementarity among themselves, a country’s fortune
also depends on how they believe what others do. If they are sure that others will stop
investing in the country, they must and will do so. Democracy, being a transparent
regime and providing accurate information about the state of the economy, assures in-
vestors that what they know about the economy is also what others know. This reduced
uncertainty over each others’ beliefs helps the country avoid a confidence crisis that is
not warranted by economic fundamentals. As long as the economy is reasonably doing
well, democratic regimes do not as often suffer from investors’ sudden withdrawals as do
their autocratic counterparts. When the economy seems doing bad, however, democ-
racy tends to make things so apparent to everyone that, unlike under a dictatorship,
there remains little ambiguity about the state of the economy, which triggers a sudden
stop of capital inflows.
Substantive issues besides, this study demonstrates that modeling strategic inter-
action can be crucial for some research questions in making correct predictions. Many
outcomes of interest in international political economy are often an outcome of joint
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events each of which involves strategic interactions between actors. For instance, for-
eign investors may decide to invest in a host country on observing that the country has
signed a bilateral investment treaty with an important capital exporting country. Ex-
pecting this effect, a risky government might want to pay sovereignty costs associated
with signing such a treaty in the hopes that it will bring new foreign investments that it
could exploit. Anticipating this, on observing such a treaty, foreign investors might in-
crease investments only when the host has a sufficiently good risk profile. Then, signing
a bilateral investment treaty might not necessarily increase FDI inflows to the coun-
try. Rather, it might depend on the country’s observable characteristics from which
investors infer its type. In this way, modeling strategic interaction can help us derive
rich empirical implications that are otherwise elusive.
Finally, I have shown that one can measure theoretically important but directly un-
observable concepts such as data transparency. Many researchers of comparative and
international political economy have long been interested in predicting when govern-
ments are more transparent and in estimating the effect of transparency on economic
policy and performance. For instance, there is an argument that less transparent gov-
ernments are often forced to adopt a more rigid monetary policy such as a fixed ex-
change rate regime because if they choose a more flexible policy such as central bank
independence as a way of monetary commitment, then no one would believe that they
are really committed to monetary stability (Broz 2002). One can test this theory with
a measure of transparency in a more direct way.
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